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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Encryption and Authentication
Encryption refers to the translation of data into an encoded format for the pur-
pose of achieving data security. Reading an encrypted ﬁle requires access to a key, which
enables its decryption. The two primary encryption schemes used in most existing cryp-
tographic systems are symmetric encryption and asymmetric encryption, and often occur
in combination to perform complementary functions. In a symmetric cryptosystem, a
single common key (termed secret key) is used for encryption and decryption, while in
an asymmetric cryptosystem, two diﬀerent keys are employed: a public key for encryp-
tion and a private key for decryption. Examples of widely-used symmetric cryptosystems
include the data encryption standard (DES), the Triple-DES, the advanced encryption
standard (AES), RC4, etc. [47], [48]. Examples of widely-used asymmetric cryptographic
algorithms are the RSA scheme, the ElGamal scheme, etc. [18], [19], [53].
One advantage of an asymmetric cryptosystem is that it provides security in a
wide range of applications (e.g., digital signatures) that cannot be provided by using
only symmetric techniques. However, an asymmetric cryptosystem typically executes
computationally heavy and complex operations which need powerful hardware. Also, large
keys, with sizes ranging from 512 to 4096 bits, are needed for an asymmetric cryptosystem
to achieve suﬃcient, lasting security. For instance, the current RSA cryptosystem uses
keys of length 1024 bits [30].
1
On the other hand, a symmetric cryptosystem typically performs simple, eﬃciently
executable algorithms which require relatively inexpensive hardware. The secret keys used
in a symmetric cryptosystem are of small size, usually ranging from 40 to 256 bits (e.g., 56
bits for the DES cryptosystem). In addition, a symmetric cryptosystem is well suited for
networks in which communication takes the form of broadcasts, e.g., over a wireless RF
medium. For instance, consider the situation in which a sensor node attempts to securely
broadcast a message to all the other sensor nodes in a sensor network. If a symmetric
cryptosystem is deployed in this sensor network, then the transmitting sensor node could
use its secret key to encrypt the message, which could be decrypted separately by all the
other sensor nodes using the same secret key. Such a simple operation is not feasible in
an asymmetric cryptosystem. On the other hand, of course, even if a single sensor is
compromised along with its secret key, then the security of the entire network is at risk if
this secret key remains in use. (See Section 1.2 below on “Generation of Multiple Secret
Keys in a Symmetric Cryptosystem.”)
Message authentication is the process of using a key or key pair to verify the origin of
a message and its integrity (cf. e.g., [61]). Most existing message authentication schemes
are based on a digital signature which uses a key pair, or based on a message authentication
code (MAC) which uses a single key (cf. e.g., [55]). A MAC is a short piece of information,
which is attached to a message for the purpose of authenticating the message. A MAC
algorithm (sometimes termed a keyed hash function) accepts as input a message as well
as a secret key, and produces a MAC for the message using a suitable hash function; the
authenticity of the message can be veriﬁed by using the same secret key.
Network Applications of Symmetric Cryptosystems
The symmetric encryption and authentication technologies mentioned above have a
2
wide range of applications in architectures and protocols for network security. For exam-
ple, consider IPSec, which is the security architecture for the Internet protocol (IP). Its
security objectives include data authentication and guaranteeing conﬁdentiality of pack-
ets in their entirety. MACs and symmetric encryption are extensively used in various
protocols of IPSec, e.g., the authentication header (AH) protocol and the encapsulating
security payload (ESP) protocol. Analogously, many link layer security protocols (e.g. the
point-to-point protocol (PPP), the Point-to-point tunneling protocol (PPTP), the layer 2
tunneling protocol (L2TP), etc.) and many transport layer security protocols (e.g., the
secure socket layer (SSL) protocol and the secure shell (SSH) protocol) take advantage
of MACs and symmetric cryptographic algorithms for the purpose of authentication and
encryption.
Wireless communication networks have additional security issues, which are not
present in wired networks. Such issues arise, for instance, in handover, which entails
switching a connection of a mobile phone from one base station to another and which is
a common phenomenon in GSM and CDMA wireless networks (cf. e.g., [28], [46]); MACs
are used in the authentication of mobile phones to base stations during handover.
1.2 Motivation
Secret Key Establishment in a Symmetric Cryptosystem
Although symmetric cryptosystems are feasible in many network settings, the main
diﬃculty in deploying them in a network lies in secret key establishment among diﬀerent
communicating terminals. In an asymmetric cryptosystem, only the encryption keys,
or public keys, should be dispersed among diﬀerent communicating terminals. Since an
encryption key does not need to be kept secret, its distribution is relatively simple. Public-
3
key infrastructure (PKI) frameworks, such as X.509 and Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) (cf.
e.g., [8], [59]), are designed for public key distribution to avoid falsiﬁcation and abuse.
In contrast, secret key establishment in a symmetric cryptosystem among diﬀerent
communicating terminals is fraught with diﬃculties, since a secret key must be protected
from eavesdropping. There are two basic types of secret key establishment procedures in
symmetric cryptosystems: secret key distribution and secret key generation (cf. e.g., [59]).
In a secret key distribution protocol, one communicating terminal determines a
secret key and transmits it to all the other terminals. Traditional methods of secret key
distribution depend on a trusted third party, or key distribution center (KDC). Speciﬁcally,
the task of a KDC is to securely spread a secret key among communicating terminals.
However, such a KDC is often burdened with extensive key management and can become
a bottleneck. Additionally, a KDC itself is an attractive target for an eavesdropper.
Most existing secret key distribution protocols rely on certain asymmetric cryp-
tographic algorithms (e.g., RSA) (cf. e.g., [55]). Speciﬁcally, a secret key is encrypted
with the recipient’s public key before its distribution. This hybrid use of symmetric and
asymmetric cryptographic algorithms (i.e., encrypting a message by a secret key and en-
crypting the secret key by the recipient’s public key) could overcome the ineﬃciency of
an asymmetric cryptosystem and the diﬃculty in secret key distribution in a symmetric
cryptosystem.
In a secret key generation protocol, on the other hand, no communicating terminal
knows a secret key in advance, and a secret key is generated as a result of negotiation
by the terminals. Most current secret key generation protocols are based on the Diﬃe-
Hellman key exchange algorithm (cf. e.g., [55]), which is an asymmetric cryptographic
algorithm.
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Thus, asymmetric cryptographic algorithms play an important role in secret key
establishment for most existing symmetric cryptosystems. However, we shall see from the
discussion below that the security of such asymmetric cryptographic algorithms is based
on the undesirable assumption that an eavesdropper’s computational power is restricted.
In this dissertation, we shall focus on the central problem of secret key generation by
diﬀerent communicating terminals in a symmetric cryptosystem.
Computational Complexity Theoretic Security and Information Theoretic Se-
curity
If the security of a cryptosystem relies on the diﬃculty in solving a computational
problem, then this notion of security is called computational complexity theoretic security.
For instance, the security of the RSA cryptosystem is based on the (unproved) diﬃculty
in factoring large integers, and the security of many other cryptosystems is based on the
(unproved) diﬃculty in computing discrete logarithms in certain groups [18]. (For more
examples of this notion of security, see [26].)
The notion of computational complexity theoretic security relies on the assumption
that an eavesdropper’s computational power is restricted and that the eavesdropper lacks
“eﬃcient algorithms.” However, with the development of eﬃcient algorithms for factoring
large integers and computing discrete logarithms in certain groups (e.g., quadratic sieve,
elliptic curve method, etc., [8]), as well as advances in fast integer factorization using
quantum computing [7], the diﬃculty in solving such computational problems might be
signiﬁcantly reduced.
On the other hand, if the security of a cryptosystem can be rigorously established
without any assumption of limits on an eavesdropper’s computational power, this notion of
security is called information theoretic security or unconditional security. A cryptographic
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model based on the notion of information theoretic security guarantees that legitimate
plaintext messages and secret keys are, in eﬀect, nearly “statistically independent” of the
information of the eavesdropper. This notion is clearly desirable in a cryptosystem, as
it makes no assumption of limited computational power for eavesdropper. However, no
practical cryptosystem based on the notion of information theoretic security has been
designed. In this dissertation, we shall address information theoretic models of secret key
generation in a symmetric cryptosystem.
Generation of Multiple Secret Keys in a Symmetric Cryptosystem
The use of a single secret key by all the communicating terminals in a symmetric
cryptosystem may pose the following security threat: some of these communicating ter-
minals may be compromised or become unauthorized (e.g., when they depart from the
system), along with the (single) secret key, whereby the security of the cryptosystem is
breached. For example, a basic service set (BSS) (cf. e.g., [6], [55]) in a 802.11 wireless
local area network is a set of mobile units using the same radio frequency; a subset of
mobile units in a BSS may cease to be reliable when they are disabled. Hence, the secret
key assigned to them, in eﬀect, is compromised. The remaining authorized mobile units
should then be capable of maintaining security by switching to another secret key which
is concealed from the disabled mobile units.
This leads to a situation in which multiple secret keys must be devised in a coor-
dinated manner by diﬀerent groups of communicating terminals (with possible overlaps
of groups); such keys need protection from prespeciﬁed communicating terminals as also
from the eavesdropper. In the interests of eﬃciency, the assignment of separate secret keys
to diﬀerent groups of communicating terminals must be made at the outset of operations
so as to avoid the need for a fresh key generation procedure after a disablement. This
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dissertation will study the problem of simultaneous generation of multiple secret keys for
diﬀerent groups of communicating terminals.
1.3 Prior Work
Secret Key Generation over Insecure Noisy Channels
A secret key (SK) can be determined at one terminal and transmitted over a secure
channel to other terminals. But in more complex ways, a SK can be generated by using
insecure noisy channels. For example, in Wyner’s “wiretap channel” model [64] which
involves two legitimate terminals, one terminal sends information to the other terminal
over a discrete memoryless channel, subject to a wiretap at the receiver. The wiretapper
sees a noisy version of the receiver’s signal. Wyner proved that in such a setting, a
SK can be generated by the legitimate terminals. Subsequently, Csisza´r and Ko¨rner
[14] considered SK generation in a discrete memoryless broadcast channel in which a
terminal sends information to another terminal over a discrete memoryless channel, called
the legitimate channel, while a wiretapper observes the transmitted information through
another discrete memoryless channel, called the wiretap channel. Unlike Wyner’s wiretap
channel model, in this setting, the wiretapped signal is not necessarily a degraded version
of the legitimate signal.
Secret Key Generation over Noiseless Public Channels
A SK can be generated by separate terminals, in a diﬀerent manner from that
above, based on their observations of separate but correlated signals followed by public
communication among themselves. Such a situation can arise, for instance, in a satellite
broadcasting situation, which can provide for correlated signals to be received at diﬀerent
terminals through separate noisy channels with a common input; these terminals can then
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communicate over a noiseless public channel to generate a SK. Maurer [36], and Ahlswede
and Csisza´r [3] considered SK generation in various source models and channel models.
In a source model, two or more terminals initially observe the outputs of an experiment
(e.g., bits broadcast by a satellite) over separate secure noisy channels. Hence, their
observations are correlated, but not necessarily identical. Based on their observations,
these terminals exchange information over a noiseless public channel in order to generate
a SK. In a channel model, a (central) terminal transmits information to the other terminals
through a secure channel with limited capacity. Additionally, these terminals are allowed
to communicate over a noiseless public channel which is observed by an eavesdropper, for
the purpose of SK generation. Subsequently, much work [5], [9], [13], [16]-[17], [37]-[43],
[51], [62] has been devoted to the study of SK generation at two terminals in various source
and channel models.
In the recent work of Csisza´r and Narayan [17], the authors consider source models
consisting of an arbitrary number of terminals which respectively observe distinct corre-
lated sources followed by unrestricted public communication among themselves; a subset
of the terminals can also serve as “helpers” for the remaining terminals in generating
secrecy. The notion of helpers can be interpreted in terms of a trusted third party in a
key establishment protocol, which assists “user” terminals in SK generation, by providing
them with additional correlated information. A SK generated by a set of user terminals
with assistance – in the form of additional correlated information – from a set of helper
terminals, requires concealment from an eavesdropper with access to the public commu-
nication, but not from the assisting helper terminals. A private key (PK)1 generated by
1This terminology should not be confused with the decryption key in an asymmetric cryptosystem. The
“private key” used hereafter will refer to a special kind of secret key.
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the user terminals must be additionally protected from the assisting helper terminals. It
is shown in [17] that the SK-capacity, i.e., the largest (entropy) rate at which all the
user terminals can generate a SK, is obtained by subtracting from the maximum rate of
shared common randomness (CR) achievable by these user terminals (i.e., information to
which all the user terminals are privy with probability close to 1), the smallest sum-rate
of the data-compressed interterminal communication which enables each of the terminals
to acquire this maximal CR.
Secret Key Construction2
It should be noted that all of the work mentioned above is aimed at characterizing
the secrecy capacities, of diﬀerent varieties. In contrast to so many characterizations of
the SK-capacities, few construction schemes for SK generation have yet been proposed.
Two exceptions are the following.
In the recent work of Thangaraj et al [58], the authors propose a new approach to
constructing SKs for Wyner’s wiretap channel model. The authors prove that by using
a channel code which achieves the capacity of the wiretap channel, a SK with rate close
to SK-capacity can be constructed. The other work is due to Muramatsu [45], in which
the author considers the problem of SK construction in a two-terminal source model.
Speciﬁcally, it is proved that a SK can be extracted by means of a linear transformation
of the CR shared by the terminals acquired through public discussion.
2The work on secret key construction refers to the explicit construction schemes for secret key genera-
tion.
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1.4 Overview of Dissertation
It should be stressed that in all of the work mentioned in Section 1.3, the terminals are
required to devise only a single key, to be used subsequently for secure encrypted com-
munication. There are, however, situations, arising for instance in group communication,
in which multiple keys must be simultaneously generated by diﬀerent groups of termi-
nals. The ﬁrst main problem studied in this dissertation is the simultaneous generation
of multiple keys by diﬀerent groups of terminals in several source models.
The second main problem studied in this dissertation involves construction schemes
for secrecy generation in several simple source models. These constructions are motivated
by innate connections between secrecy generation by multiple terminals and multitermi-
nal data compression of correlated sources not involving any secrecy constraints, recently
highlighted in [17]. This suggests that techniques for multiterminal Slepian-Wolf (SW)
near-lossless3 data compression could be used for the constructions of SKs. In SW coding,
the existence of linear lossless data compression codes with rates arbitrarily close to the
SW bound has been long known [12]. In particular, when the sequences observed at the
terminals are related to each other through virtual communication channels characterized
by independent additive noises, such linear data compression codes can be obtained in
terms of the cosets of linear error-correction codes for these virtual channels, a fact ﬁrst
illustrated in [63] for the special case of two terminals connected by a virtual binary sym-
metric channel. This fact, exploited by most known linear constructions of SW codes (cf.
e.g. [10], [23], [32], [50]), can enable us to translate these constructions and other signiﬁ-
cant recent developments in capacity-achieving linear codes into new SK constructions.
3In the interests of avoiding repeated hyphenation, we shall hereafter use “lossless” in lieu of the correct
“near-lossless,” which should not lead to any confusion.
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This dissertation consists of three parts. In the ﬁrst part (Chapters 2 and 3), we
discuss the problem of simultaneous generation of multiple keys by diﬀerent groups of
terminals for three-terminal source models. Suppose that terminals X , Y and Z observe,
respectively, the distinct components of a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS),
i.e., independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of the generic random
variables (rvs) X , Y , Z with a known joint probability mass function (pmf). Unrestricted
communication among the terminals is allowed over a noiseless public channel, and all the
transmissions are observed by all the terminals. An eavesdropper has access to this public
communication but gathers no additional side information. Furthermore, the eavesdropper
is passive, i.e., unable to corrupt the transmissions4.
In Chapter 2, we examine the problem of characterizing all the rates at which two
designated pairs of terminals can simultaneously generate PKs, each of which is eﬀectively
concealed from the remaining terminal. In the three-terminal source model above, we
assume that terminals X and Y (resp. X and Z) generate a PK with the possible help of
terminal Z (resp. Y) which is concealed from the helper terminal Z (resp. Y) and from
an eavesdropper with access to the public communication among the terminals. Such a
situation can be interpreted in terms of a “central” terminal X establishing individual
PKs with each terminal Y (resp. Z) with the remaining terminal Z (resp. Y) serving as
helper. The set of all rate pairs at which such PK pairs can be generated constitutes the
PK-capacity region. The characterization of the PK-capacity region is given in Chapter
2.
In Chapter 3, we examine the problem of characterizing all the rates at which the
4Throughout this dissertation, we shall only consider cases where the communication has been authen-
ticated, i.e., the eavesdropper is passive.
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following two types of keys can be generated simultaneously: (i) all the three terminals
generate a SK, which is eﬀectively concealed from an eavesdropper; and (ii) a designated
pair of terminals generate a PK, which is eﬀectively concealed from the remaining terminal
as well as the eavesdropper. In the three-terminal source model above, we assume that
terminals X , Y and Z generate a SK. Simultaneously, terminals X and Y generate a PK,
with the possible help of terminal Z . Such a situation can be interpreted in terms of
“core” terminals X and Y establishing a PK with terminal Z serving as helper, and all
the terminals establishing a SK. The set of all rate pairs at which such (SK, PK) pairs
can be generated is called the (SK, PK)-capacity region. The characterization of the (SK,
PK)-capacity region is given in Chapter 3.
In the second part (Chapter 4), we discuss the problem of SK and PK constructions
by multiple terminals. We consider several simple multiterminal source models where the
sources observed at diﬀerent terminals are connected by virtual additive noise channels.
We show how a new class of SKs and PKs can be constructed, based on the SW data
compression code (i.e., a data compression code with rate close to the SW bound) from
[63]. Explicit procedures for such constructions, and their substantiation, are provided.
In particular, we examine the performance of low density parity check (LDPC) codes,
a class of linear capacity-achieving channel codes, in the SW data compression step of
the procedure, in constructing a new class of SKs with rates arbitrarily close to the SK-
capacity.
In the last part (Chapter 5), we study the relationship between the CR-capacity and
the SK-capacity for source models with rate constraints on the public communication. It
follows from the previous discussion that if unrestricted public communication is allowed
among the terminals in source models, then the CR-capacity, i.e., the largest rate of
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CR that is achieved by the terminals, can be decomposed into the smallest sum-rate of
the communication needed to achieve the CR-capacity, and the SK-capacity. In Chapter
5, we consider several two-terminal source models with rate constraints on the public
communication between these terminals. We study the relationship between the SK-
capacity and the CR-capacity for these models. Speciﬁcally, we examine whether the
CR-capacity is equal to the sum of the smallest sum-rate of communication needed to
achieve the CR-capacity and the SK-capacity.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the dissertation and discusses future work.
1.5 Contributions
The main contributions of this dissertation are as follows.
(i). Single-letter inner and outer bounds for the PK-capacity region are derived for
a model with three terminals which observe separate correlated sources, when two pairs
of terminals simultaneously generate PKs after public communication among themselves.
We further prove that under certain special conditions, these bounds coincide to yield
the (exact) PK-capacity region. This is the ﬁrst work on the simultaneous generation of
multiple PKs. It constitutes a generalization of the work on the generation of a single PK
[3], [16], [17].
(ii). Single-letter inner and outer bounds for the (SK, PK)-capacity region are
derived for a model with three terminals which observe separate correlated sources, when
all the terminals generate a SK, and a designated pair of terminals generate a PK, all in
a simultaneous manner. We further prove that under a certain condition, these bounds
coincide to yield the (exact) (SK, PK)-capacity region. This is the ﬁrst work on the
simultaneous generation of a SK and a PK. It constitutes a generalization of the work on
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the generation of a single SK or PK [3], [16], [17].
(iii). A new approach is proposed for constructing SKs and PKs by terminals in
several simple multiterminal source models where the sources are connected by virtual
additive noise channels. We prove that the generated SKs and PKs satisfy the requisite
secrecy conditions, and the rates of the generated SKs and PKs approach the correspond-
ing SK-capacities or PK-capacities. Furthermore, implementations of these constructions
schemes using LDPC codes are illustrated.
(iv). For several two-terminal source models with rate constraints on the public
communication between these terminals, it is proved that the CR-capacity equals the sum
of the smallest sum-rate of the communication needed to achieve the CR-capacity, and the
SK-capacity. These initial results suggest that the decomposition of the CR-capacity into
the SK-capacity, and the smallest sum-rate of the communication needed to achieve the
CR-capacity, could hold for a larger class of source models consisting of multiple terminals
with rate constraints on their public communication.
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Chapter 2
The Private Key Capacity Region for Three Terminals
2.1 Introduction
The problem of secret key generation by separate terminals, based on their observations of
distinct correlated sources followed by public communication among themselves, has been
investigated by several authors ([36], [3], [5], [9], [13], [16]–[17], [37]–[43], [51], [62], among
others). It is shown that these terminals can generate common randomness which is kept
secret from an eavesdropper that is privy to the public interterminal communication and
sometimes also to a wiretapped source which is correlated with the previous sources.
In the wake of [36], models for secrecy generation by two terminals have been widely
studied. Of particular interest to us is the recent work in [17], which considers models
consisting of an arbitrary number of terminals which respectively observe the distinct
components of a discrete memoryless multiple source, followed by unrestricted public
communication among themselves; a subset of the terminals can also serve as “helpers”
for the remaining terminals in generating secrecy. Three varieties of secrecy capacity
– the largest rate of secrecy generation – are considered according to the extent of an
eavesdropper’s knowledge: secret key, private key and wiretap secret key capacity. A secret
key (SK) generated by a set of “user” terminals with assistance – in the form of additional
correlated information – from a set of helper terminals (e.g., centralized or trusted servers
in a key establishment protocol), requires concealment from an eavesdropper with access
to the public interterminal communication. A private key (PK) generated by the user
terminals must be additionally protected from the assisting helper terminals. A wiretap
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secret key1 (WSK) must satisfy the even more stringent requirement of being protected
from a resourceful eavesdropper’s access to a wiretapped correlated source. It should
be stressed that in all of the work mentioned above, the user terminals are required to
devise only a single key, of any variety, to be used subsequently for secure encrypted
communication.
There are, however, situations, arising for instance in “group communication,” in
which multiple keys must be simultaneously devised in a coordinated manner by diﬀerent
groups of terminals (with possible overlaps of groups); such keys need protection from
prespeciﬁed terminals as also from an eavesdropper. Such a situation can occur when
certain disabled terminals cease to be authorized or reliable so that the keys assigned
to them, in eﬀect, are compromised; the remaining authorized terminals must then be
capable of maintaining security by switching to another set of keys which are concealed
from the disabled terminals. In the interests of eﬃciency, all such keys must be devised
at the outset of operations so as to avoid the need for a fresh key generation procedure
after a disablement. These situations produce a rich vein of secrecy generation problems,
the information-theoretic underpinnings of which are substantial enough for investigation
already in the case of just three terminals. Various types of secrecy generation (as in [17])
can then be studied for diﬀerent subsets of the three terminals.
Considering a model with three terminals, our emphasis in this chapter is on the
problem of characterizing all the rates at which two pairs of terminals can simultaneously
generate PKs, each of which is eﬀectively concealed from the remaining terminal. The gen-
eral problem of PK generation for all three pairs of terminals is brieﬂy addressed towards
1The capacity problem associated with a wiretap secret key is not fully resolved even in the case of two
user terminals, and we do not consider it here.
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the end. Suppose that terminals X , Y and Z observe, respectively, the distinct compo-
nents of a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS), i.e., independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of the (generic) random variables (rvs) X , Y , Z, respec-
tively. For the purposes of secrecy generation, the terminals are permitted unrestricted
communication among themselves over a public channel, and all the transmissions are
observed by all the terminals. An eavesdropper has access to this public communication
but gathers no additional side information; also, the eavesdropper is passive, i.e., unable
to corrupt the transmissions. Terminals X and Y (resp. X and Z) generate a PK with
the possible help of terminal Z (resp. Y) which is concealed from the helper terminal
Z (resp. Y) and from an eavesdropper with access to the public communication among
the terminals. Our main technical results are single-letter inner and outer bounds for the
PK-capacity region, i.e., the set of all rate pairs at which such PK pairs can be generated.
Further, under certain special conditions on the joint probability mass function (pmf) of
X , Y , Z, these bounds are shown to coincide to yield the (exact) PK-capacity region.
All our results for the PK-capacity region hold in a strong sense; speciﬁcally, achiev-
ability results are established under a “strong” requirement and converse results under a
“weak” requirement. While the weak and strong deﬁnitions of secrecy capacity have been
shown to yield identical results for various models [37], [13], [16], [40], [17], it is worth
mentioning that our technique leads directly to strong achievability.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains the preliminaries. Our
main results – inner and outer bounds for the PK-capacity region – are provided in Section
2.3. Furthermore, under certain special conditions, these bounds coincide to yield the
(exact) PK-capacity region. Section 2.3 also contains several examples of the PK-capacity
region. The proofs are given in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5, we examine the general problem
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of characterizing all the rates at which all pairs of terminals can simultaneously generate
PKs.
2.2 Preliminaries
Consider a DMMS with three components corresponding to generic rvs X , Y , Z with
ﬁnite alphabets X , Y, Z . Let Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn), Y n = (Y1, · · · , Yn), Zn = (Z1, · · · , Zn)
be n i.i.d. repetitions of the rvs X , Y , Z. The terminals X , Y, Z 2 respectively observe
the components Xn, Y n, Zn of the DMMS (Xn, Y n, Zn), where n denotes the observa-
tion length. The terminals can communicate with each other through broadcasts over a
noiseless public channel, possibly interactively in many rounds. Following [17], we assume
without any loss of generality that these transmissions occur in consecutive time slots
in r rounds; the communication is depicted by 3r rvs F1, · · · , F3r, where Ft denotes the
transmission in time slot t, 1 ≤ t ≤ 3r, by a terminal assigned an index i = t mod 3,
1 ≤ i ≤ 3, with terminals X , Y, Z corresponding to indices 1, 2, 3, respectively. In gen-
eral, Ft is allowed to be any function, deﬁned in terms of a mapping ft, of the observations
at the terminal with index i and of the previous transmissions F[1,t−1] = (F1, · · · , Ft−1);
thus, for instance, F1 = f1(Xn), F2 = f2(Y n, F1), F3 = f3(Zn, F1, F2), and so on. We do
not permit any randomization at the terminals; in particular, f1, · · · , f3r are deterministic
mappings. Let F = (F1, · · · , F3r) denote collectively all the transmissions in the 3r time
slots.
Given ε > 0 and the rvs U , V , we say that U is ε-recoverable from V if Pr{U =
f(V )} ≤ ε for some function f(V ) of V (cf. [17]).
2The use of the same symbol for a terminal as well as for the alphabet of its observations should not
lead to any confusion.
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The rvs KXY and KXZ , which are functions of (Xn, Y n, Zn), with ﬁnite ranges KXY
and KXZ , respectively, represent an ε-private key (ε-PK) pair, where KXY (resp. KXZ)
is the PK for terminals X , Y (resp. X , Z) with privacy from the terminal Z (resp. Y),
achievable with communication F, if:
• KXY is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xn), (F, Y n);
• KXZ is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xn), (F, Zn);
• KXY satisﬁes the secrecy condition and the uniformity condition
1
n
I(KXY ∧F, Zn) ≤ ε; (2.1)
1
n
H(KXY) ≥ 1
n
log |KXY| − ε;
and
• KXZ satisﬁes the secrecy condition and the uniformity condition
1
n
I(KXZ ∧F, Y n) ≤ ε; (2.2)
1
n
H(KXZ) ≥ 1
n
log |KXZ| − ε.
The conditions above thus mean that terminals X and Y generate a PK KXY with the
terminal Z acting as helper (e.g., a “third-party” in a key establishment protocol) by
providing X , Y with additional correlated information; this PK is nearly uniformly dis-
tributed, and is concealed from an eavesdropper that observes the public communication
F as well as from the helper Z (and, hence, “private”). Simultaneously, with the same
public communication, terminals X and Z generate a PK KXZ with the terminal Y acting
as helper; this PK is nearly uniformly distributed, and is concealed from an eavesdropper
as well as from the helper Y. Note that the previous conditions readily imply that KXY
and KXZ are “nearly” statistically independent.
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We remark that this model can be interpreted in terms of a “central” terminal X
establishing individual PKs with each terminal Y (resp. Z) with the remaining terminal Z
(resp. Y) serving as helper. We are interested in the simultaneous generation of individual
PK pairs (KXY, KXZ) as above.
Definition 2.1 A pair of nonnegative numbers (RXY , RXZ) is an achievable PK-rate
pair if εn-PK pairs
(
K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ
)
are achievable with suitable communication (with the
number of rounds possibly depending on n), such that εn → 0, 1nH
(
K
(n)
XY
)
→ RXY ,
1
nH
(
K
(n)
XZ
)
→ RXZ. The set of all achievable PK-rate pairs is the PK-capacity region
CPK . An achievable PK-rate pair will be called strongly achievable if εn above can be taken
to vanish exponentially in n. A PK-capacity region will be termed strong if all rate pairs
in that region are strongly achievable.
Remarks:
1. Maurer [37] pointed out that the secrecy conditions (2.1), (2.2) were inadequate
for cryptographic purposes, and should be strengthened by omission of the factor 1n . Note
that the concept of strong achievability above, which is adopted from [16], [17], demands
even more. All our achievability results will be proved as strong achievability results.
2. The (strong) PK-capacity region is a closed convex set. Closedness is obvious
from the deﬁnition. Convexity follows from a standard time-sharing argument (cf. [15, p.
242]).
3. If K(n)XZ is set equal to a constant in the deﬁnition above, i.e., only a single εn-PK
is generated by terminals X and Y with terminal Z serving as a helper terminal, then
the entropy rate of such a PK is called achievable PK-rate, and the largest achievable
PK-rate is the PK-capacity. An achievable PK-rate is called strongly achievable PK-rate
if εn vanishes exponentially in n. A PK-capacity is termed strong if all smaller rates are
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strongly achievable. It is known (cf. [3], [16]) that the (strong) PK-capacity is equal to
I(X ∧ Y |Z).
2.3 Statement of Results
Theorem 2.1 (Outer bound for CPK): Let (RXY , RXZ) be an achievable PK-rate pair.
Then
RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z), RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Z|Y ), (2.3)
RXY +RXZ ≤ min
U
I(X ∧ Y, Z|U), (2.4)
where the minimum is over all rvs U that satisfy the Markov conditions
U −◦− Y −◦−XZ, U −◦− Z −◦−XY. (2.5)
Remarks:
1. The bounds in (2.3) on the individual largest achievable PK-rates are already
known from the single PK results in [3], [16].
2. The minimum in (2.4) is attainable, since by a direct application of the Support
Lemma [15, p. 310], the rv U in (2.4) can be assumed, without restricting generality, to
take values in a set U of cardinality |U| ≤ |Y| · |Z|+ 1.
Definition 2.2 A common function of Y and Z is any rv which equals both a function
of Y and a function of Z; a maximal common function Umcf(Y,Z) of Y and Z is such that
every other common function of Y and Z is a function of Umcf(Y,Z) (cf. e.g., [16], [22]).
The rvs Y and Z are deterministically correlated if there exists a common function of Y
and Z which renders them conditionally independent (cf. [15, p. 405]).
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Proposition 2.1 If there exists a common function of Y and Z which renders them
conditionally independent, then that common function is a maximal common function of
Y and Z.
Proof of Proposition 2.1: Let U be a common function of Y and Z such that
I(Y ∧ Z|U) = 0. (2.6)
Let U ′ be an arbitrary common function of Y and Z. Then
I(Y ∧ Z|U) ≥ I(U ′ ∧ Z|U) = H(U ′|U)−H(U ′|U, Z) = H(U ′|U). (2.7)
It follows from (2.6) and (2.7) that U ′ is a function of U , which implies that U is a maximal
common function of Y and Z.
An example of a maximal common function is given below.
Example 2.1: Let Y and Z be {0, 1, 2}-valued rvs with joint pmf
PY Z(0, 0) = PY Z(0, 1) = a,
PY Z(1, 2) = PY Z(2, 2) =
1
2
− a,
for some 0 < a < 12 .
A rv U , as a function of Y , is deﬁned as follows:
U =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, if Y = 0,
1, if Y ∈ {1, 2}.
Equivalently, U can also be deﬁned as:
U =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, if Z ∈ {0, 1},
1, if Z = 2.
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Hence, U is a common function of Y and Z. It is easily seen that Y −◦− U −◦− Z.
Therefore, Y and Z are deterministically correlated. Furthermore, by Proposition 2.1, U
is a maximal common function of Y and Z.
Since Umcf(Y,Z) satisﬁes the two Markov conditions in (2.5), we have the following
corollary of Theorem 2.1.
Corollary 2.1 (Outer bound for CPK): Any achievable PK-rate pair (RXY , RXZ) satis-
ﬁes (2.3) and
RXY + RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Y, Z|Umcf(Y,Z)).
Theorem 2.2 (Inner bound for CPK): The (strong) PK-capacity region CPK is inner-
bounded by the convex hull of the union of the regions⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(RXY, RXZ) : RXY ≤ maxU : U−◦−Y −◦−XZ [I(X ∧ Y |U)− I(Y ∧ Z|U)],
RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Z|Y )
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(2.8)
and ⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(RXY, RXZ) : RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z),
RXZ ≤ maxV : V−◦−Z−◦−XY [I(X ∧ Z|V )− I(Y ∧ Z|V )]
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
. (2.9)
Remarks:
1. The maxima in (2.8) and (2.9) are attainable, since by a direct application
of the Support Lemma [15, p. 310], the rvs U , V in (2.8) and (2.9) can be assumed,
without restricting generality, to take values in sets U , V of cardinalities |U| ≤ |Y|+1 and
|V| ≤ |Z|+ 1.
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2. Although interterminal communication between X , Y, Z is permitted, the regions
in (2.8) and (2.9) are shown to be achieved by a single autonomous transmission from each
terminal based on its own local observation of its component of the DMMS.
Note that U = V = Umcf(Y,Z) are permissible choices in (2.8) and (2.9). Hence, it
follows from (2.8) and (2.9) that
(
I(X ∧ Y |Umcf(Y,Z))− I(Y ∧ Z|Umcf(Y,Z)), I(X ∧ Z|Y )
)
(2.10)
and
(
I(X ∧ Y |Z), I(X ∧ Z|Umcf(Y,Z))− I(Y ∧ Z|Umcf(Y,Z))
)
(2.11)
are two strongly achievable rate pairs. Since the sum of the two coordinates in (2.10) as
well as in (2.11) equals I(X ∧Y, Z|Umcf(Y,Z))−I(Y ∧Z|Umcf(Y,Z)), the following corollary
is obtained from the strong achievability of rate pairs (2.10), (2.11), and the convexity of
the (strong) PK-capacity region.
Corollary 2.2 (Inner bound for CPK): The (strong) PK-capacity region CPK is inner-
bounded by the region⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(RXY, RXZ) : RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z), RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Z|Y ),
RXY + RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Y, Z|Umcf(Y,Z))− I(Y ∧ Z|Umcf(Y,Z))
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
.
The gap between the inner bound in Corollary 2.2 and the outer bound in Corollary
2.1 is I(Y ∧Z|Umcf(Y,Z)) for the sum of two individual PK-rates in a PK-rate pair. Figure
2.1 shows both these inner and outer bounds.
The following notion will be used in describing another inner bound for the PK-
capacity region.
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Figure 2.1: Inner and outer bounds for the PK-capacity region.
Definition 2.3 (cf. [11]): A function of Y is a suﬃcient statistic for Y with respect to
(w.r.t.) Z if it renders Y and Z conditionally independent; such a suﬃcient statistic is
a minimal suﬃcient statistic Umss(Y ) for Y w.r.t. Z if it is a function of every other
suﬃcient statistic for Y w.r.t. Z.
Theorem 2.3 (Inner bound for CPK): The (strong) PK-capacity region CPK is inner-
bounded by the convex hull of the union of the regions⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(RXY , RXZ) : 0 ≤ RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Umss(Y ), Z), 0 ≤ RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Z|Y ),
RXY +RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Y, Z|Umss(Y ))
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
(2.12)
and⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(RXY , RXZ) : 0 ≤ RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z), 0 ≤ RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Z|Vmss(Z), Y ),
RXY +RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Y, Z|Vmss(Z))
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
,
(2.13)
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where Umss(Y ) (resp. Vmss(Z)) is the minimal suﬃcient statistic for Y (resp. Z) w.r.t. Z
(resp. Y ).
Remark: Although interterminal communication between X , Y, Z is permitted, the re-
gions in (2.12) and (2.13) are shown to be achieved by a single autonomous transmission
from each terminal based on its own local observation of its component of the DMMS.
Next, under a special (suﬃcient) condition below, the outer bound in Theorem 2.1
coincides with the inner bound in Theorem 2.2, thereby giving a complete characterization
of the PK-capacity region under this condition.
Theorem 2.4 If there exists a rv U such that
U −◦− Y −◦−XZ, U −◦− Z −◦−XY, Y −◦− U −◦− Z, (2.14)
the (strong) PK-capacity region equals the set of pairs (RXY , RXZ) which satisfy (2.3)
and
RXY +RXZ ≤ min
U
I(X ∧ Y, Z|U), (2.15)
where the minimum is w.r.t. U satisfying (2.14).
Remarks:
1. As in Theorem 2.1, the minimum in (2.15) is shown to be attained (cf. Remark
2 following Theorem 2.1).
2. The rv U satisfying all three Markov conditions in (2.14) simultaneously need
not always exist, as shown in Example 2.2 below.
Definition 2.4 (cf. [15, p. 350]): Let (Y, Z) be Y ×Z-valued rvs with a given joint pmf.
The joint pmf of (Y, Z) is called indecomposable if there are no functions f and g with
respective domains Y and Z such that Pr{f(Y ) = g(Z)} = 1 and f(Y ) takes at least two
values with nonzero probability.
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Remark: It should be noted that if Pr{Y = y, Z = z} > 0 for all y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z , then
the joint pmf of (Y, Z) is indecomposable (cf. [2]).
Example 2.2: Let Y and Z be {0, 1}-valued rvs with joint pmf
PY Z(0, 0) = PY Z(1, 1) =
1− p
2
,
PY Z(0, 1) = PY Z(1, 0) =
p
2
,
for some 0 < p < 1, p = 12 .
Suppose that U is an arbitrary rv satisfying the ﬁrst two Markov conditions in
(2.14), whereby
U −◦− Y −◦− Z, U −◦− Z −◦− Y.
Since PY Z(y, z) > 0, y, z ∈ {0, 1}, the joint pmf of (Y, Z) is indecomposable. Then by [15,
p. 402], U is independent of (Y, Z). Consequently,
I(Y ∧ Z|U) = I(Y ∧ Z) = 1− hb(p) > 0,
where hb(p) = −p log2 p− (1−p) log2(1−p) is the binary entropy function. Thus, the last
Markov condition in (2.14) does not hold. Therefore, in this example, no rv U can satisfy
all three Markov conditions in (2.14).
The special case in which Y and Z are deterministically correlated is of particular
interest as then the bounds for the PK-capacity region in Theorem 2.1, Corollary 2.1,
Theorem 2.2, Corollary 2.2, Theorem 2.3, as well as the characterization in Theorem 2.4,
all coincide to yield a complete characterization, as argued next. By Proposition 2.1,
I(Y ∧Z|Umcf(Y,Z)) = 0, so that the gap disappears between the inner bound in Corollary
2.2 and the outer bound in Corollary 2.1. Hence, all the bounds in Theorem 2.1, Corollary
2.1, Theorem 2.2 and Corollary 2.2 coincide to yield the PK-capacity region. Furthermore,
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in this special case, the inner bound in Theorem 2.3 also gives the PK-capacity region since
Umss(Y ) = Vmss(Z) = Umcf(Y,Z), (2.16)
which is easily seen as follows. On the one hand,
0 = I(Y ∧ Z|Umss(Y )) ≥ I(Umcf(Y,Z) ∧ Z|Umss(Y )) = H(Umcf(Y,Z)|Umss(Y )),
and
0 = I(Y ∧ Z|Vmss(Z)) ≥ I(Umcf(Y,Z) ∧ Z|Vmss(Z)) = H(Umcf(Y,Z)|Vmss(Z)),
i.e., Umcf(Y,Z) is a common function of Umss(Y ) and Vmss(Z). On the other hand, I(Y ∧
Z|Umcf(Y,Z)) = 0 gives that Umcf(Y,Z) is a suﬃcient statistic for Y w.r.t. Z as well as for
Z w.r.t. Y , thereby implying that both Umss(Y ) and Vmss(Z) are functions of Umcf(Y,Z).
Thus, (2.16) follows. Lastly, since U = Umcf(Y,Z) satisﬁes (2.14) and can be easily seen
to achieve the minimum in (2.15), the PK-capacity region of Theorem 2.4 is the same as
that alluded to above. These observations lead to the following summary result.
Theorem 2.5 If the rvs Y and Z are deterministically correlated, the (strong) PK-
capacity region CPK equals the set of pairs (RXY , RXZ) which satisfy (2.3) and
RXY + RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Y, Z|Umcf(Y,Z)),
where Umcf(Y,Z) is the maximal common function of Y and Z.
Example 2.3: Let Y and Z be independent rvs, each uniformly distributed on {0, 1},
and let X = Y ⊕Z, where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2. Since Y and Z are independent,
Umcf(Y,Z) is a constant. Further, Y and Z are deterministically correlated. It follows from
Theorem 2.5 that the PK-capacity region is the set of pairs (RXY , RXZ) satisfying
RXY +RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Y, Z|Umcf(Y,Z)) = 1.
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This PK-capacity region is triangular. The two corner points, (0, 1) and (1, 0), can be
perfectly achieved (i.e., with εn = 0), which implies, from a time-sharing argument, that
all PK-rate pairs in this region could be perfectly achieved. To achieve the corner point
(1, 0), terminal Z transmits F = Zn = zn. Upon receiving zn, terminal X recovers yn
perfectly, which is set to be KXY . It is clear that
I(KXY ∧F, Zn) = I(Y n ∧ Zn) = 0,
and
1
n
H(KXY) =
1
n
H(Y n) = 1.
Therefore, a perfect PK, of rate 1 bit/symbol, is generated by terminals X and Y. By
symmetry, the other corner point (0, 1) can also be perfectly achieved.
Example 2.4: Let Y = (Y1, N ) and Z = (Z1, N ), where Y1, Z1, and N are mutually
independent. Let the joint pmf of (X, Y1, Z1, N ) satisfy
I(Y1 ∧ Z1|X,N ) > 0, (2.17)
and
max{I(X ∧ Z1|N ), I(X ∧ Y1|N )} > 0. (2.18)
Since
I(Y ∧ Z|N ) = I(Y1 ∧ Z1|N ) = I(Y1 ∧ Z1) = 0,
Y and Z are deterministically correlated and N is a maximal common function of Y and
Z. It follows from Theorem 2.5 that the PK-capacity region is the set of pairs (RXY , RXZ)
satisfying
RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y1|Z1, N ),
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RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Z1|Y1, N ),
RXY + RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Y1, Z1|N ).
Then from (2.17) and (2.18),
I(X ∧ Y1, Z1|N ) = I(X ∧ Y1|N ) + I(X ∧ Z1|Y1, N )
= H(Y1|Z1, N )−H(Y1|X,N ) + I(X ∧ Z1|Y1, N )
< H(Y1|Z1, N )−H(Y1|X,Z1, N ) + I(X ∧ Z1|Y1, N )
= I(X ∧ Y1|Z1, N ) + I(X ∧ Z1|Y1, N ),
and
I(X ∧ Y1, Z1|N ) > max {I(X ∧ Y1|Z1, N ), I(X ∧ Z1|Y1, N )} .
Hence, this PK-capacity region is pentagonal.
2.4 Proofs
The technical tool used to prove Theorem 2.1 is supplied by Lemma 2.1 below.
Lemma 2.1 Let (KXY , KXZ) be an ε-PK pair, with values in ﬁnite sets KXY and KXZ ,
respectively, achieved with communication F = (F1, · · · , F3r). Let U be an arbitrary rv sat-
isfying the Markov conditions in (2.5). Let Un = (U1, · · · , Un) be n i.i.d. repetitions of the
rv U such that each (Ui, Xi, Yi, Zi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, has identical joint pmf, and (Ui, Xi, Yi, Zi)
is independent of (Uj, Xj, Yj, Zj), 1 ≤ j = i ≤ n. Then
1
n
H(KXY, KXZ|F, Un) = H(X, Y, Z|U)−(RX+RY +RZ)+3 + 3ε log |KXY ||KXZ|
n
(2.19)
for some (RX , RY , RZ) satisfying
RX ≥ H(X |Y, Z), RY +RZ ≥ H(Y, Z|U,X), (2.20)
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RY ≥ H(Y |X,Z), RX +RZ ≥ H(X,Z|Y )− 1
n
H(KXZ), (2.21)
RZ ≥ H(Z|X, Y ), RX +RY ≥ H(X, Y |Z)− 1
n
H(KXY). (2.22)
The proof of Lemma 2.1 is analogous to that of Lemma 2 in [17]. Still, for completeness,
a proof is provided below.
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Since F, KXY and KXZ are functions of (Xn, Y n, Zn),
H(Xn, Y n, Zn|Un) = H(F|Un)+H(KXY, KXZ|F, Un)+H(Xn, Y n, Zn|F, KXY, KXZ, Un).
Setting
RX =
1
n
∑
t:t mod 3≡1
H(Ft|Un, F[1,t−1]) +
1
n
H(Xn|F, KXY, KXZ, Un)
+
1 + ε log |KXY||KXZ|
n
,
RY =
1
n
∑
t:t mod 3≡2
H(Ft|Un, F[1,t−1]) +
1
n
H(Y n|F, KXY, KXZ, Un, Xn),
+
1 + ε log |KXY||KXZ|
n
,
RZ =
1
n
∑
t:t mod 3≡3
H(Ft|Un, F[1,t−1]) +
1
n
H(Zn|F, KXY, KXZ, Un, Xn, Y n),
+
1 + ε log |KXY||KXZ|
n
,
the previous equality gives
1
n
H(KXY, KXZ|F, Un) = H(X, Y, Z|U)− (RX + RY +RZ) + 3 + 3ε log |KXY ||KXZ|
n
.
It remains to show that (RX , RY , RZ) as deﬁned above satisfy (2.20) – (2.22).
Since Un −◦− Y nZn −◦−Xn,
H(Xn|Y n, Zn) = H(F, Xn|Un, Y n, Zn)
=
3r∑
t=1
H(Ft|Un, Y n, Zn, F[1,t−1]) + H(Xn|F, Un, Y n, Zn). (2.23)
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Since for t mod 3 = 1, Ft is a function of (Y n, Zn, F[1,t−1]),
3r∑
t=1
H(Ft|Un, Y n, Zn, F[1,t−1]) =
∑
t:t mod 3≡1
H(Ft|Un, Y n, Zn, F[1,t−1])
≤
∑
t:t mod 3≡1
H(Ft|Un, F[1,t−1]).
Further,
H(Xn|F, Un, Y n, Zn) ≤ H(KXY, KXZ, Xn|F, Un, Y n, Zn)
≤ H(KXY, KXZ|F, Un, Y n, Zn) +H(Xn|F, KXY, KXZ, Un)
≤ 1 + ε log |KXY||KXZ|+ H(Xn|F, KXY, KXZ, Un),
where the last inequality follows from Fano’s inequality.
Upon bounding the terms on the right side of (2.23) from above, we obtain that
H(Xn|Y n, Zn) ≤ nRX .
Since
H(Y n, Zn|Un, Xn) ≤ H(F, KXY, KXZ, Y n, Zn|Un, Xn)
= H(F|Un, Xn) +H(KXY, KXZ|F, Un, Xn)
+H(Y n|F, KXY, KXZ, Un, Xn) + H(Zn|F, KXY, KXZ, Un, Xn, Y n)
=
∑
t:t mod 3≡2,3
H(Ft|Un, Xn, F[1,t−1]) + H(KXY, KXZ|F, Un, Xn)
+H(Y n|F, KXY, KXZ, Un, Xn) + H(Zn|F, KXY, KXZ, Un, Xn, Y n)
≤ n(RY + RZ),
(RX , RY , RZ) satisfy (2.20). Since
H(Y n|Xn, Zn) ≤ H(F, KXY, KXZ, Y n|Un, Xn, Zn)
=
∑
t:t mod 3≡2
H(Ft|Un, Xn, Zn, F[1,t−1]) +H(KXY, KXZ|F, Un, Xn, Zn)
32
H(Y n|F, KXY, KXZ, Un, Xn, Zn)
≤ nRY ,
and
H(Xn, Zn|Y n) ≤ H(F, KXY, KXZ, Xn, Zn|Un, Y n)
≤ H(F|Un, Y n) + H(KXY|F, Un, Y n) +H(KXZ|F, KXY, Un, Y n)
+H(Xn|F, KXY, KXZ, Un) + H(Zn|F, Un, Xn, Y n)
≤ n(RX + RZ) +H(KXZ),
(RX , RY , RZ) also satisfy (2.21). Similarly, it can be shown that (RX , RY , RZ) satisfy
(2.22), completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.1: We only show (2.4), as (2.3) is from [17]. Suppose that
(
K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ
)
represent an εn-PK pair, with values in ﬁnite sets K(n)XY and K(n)XZ , respec-
tively, achieved with communication F = (F1, · · · , F3r), where εn → 0 (see Deﬁnition 2.1).
Let U be an arbitrary rv satisfying the Markov conditions in (2.5). Let Un = (U1, · · · , Un)
be n i.i.d. repetitions of the rv U such that each (Ui, Xi, Yi, Zi), 1 ≤ i ≤ n, has identical
joint pmf, and (Ui, Xi, Yi, Zi) is independent of (Uj, Xj, Yj, Zj), 1 ≤ j = i ≤ n. Then
Un −◦− Y n −◦−XnZn, Un −◦− Zn −◦−XnY n,
which implies that
Un −◦− FY n −◦−XnZn, Un −◦− FZn −◦−XnY n.
Hence,
I
(
K
(n)
XZ ∧F, Un
)
≤ I
(
K
(n)
XZ ∧F, Un, Y n
)
= I
(
K
(n)
XZ ∧F, Y n
)
+ I
(
K
(n)
XZ ∧ Un|F, Y n
)
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≤ nεn + I
(
K
(n)
XZ , X
n ∧ Un|F, Y n
)
≤ nεn +H
(
K
(n)
XZ |F, Xn
)
≤ nεn + 1 + εn log
∣∣∣K(n)XY
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣K(n)XZ
∣∣∣ . (2.24)
Similarly, we have
I
(
K
(n)
XY ∧F, K(n)XZ, Un
)
≤ nεn + 2 + 2εn log
∣∣∣K(n)XY ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣K(n)XZ ∣∣∣ . (2.25)
On the other hand, it follows from (2.19) and (2.20) that
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ|F, Un
)
≤ H(X, Y, Z|U)− [H(X |Y, Z)+H(Y, Z|U,X)]
+
3 + 3εn log
∣∣∣K(n)XY
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣K(n)XZ
∣∣∣
n
= I(X ∧ Y, Z|U) +
3 + 3εn log
∣∣∣K(n)XY
∣∣∣ ∣∣∣K(n)XZ
∣∣∣
n
. (2.26)
Finally, it follows from (2.24) – (2.26) that
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY
)
+
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XZ
)
=
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ
)
+
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
XY ∧K(n)XZ
)
=
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ|F, Un
)
+
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
XZ ∧F, Un
)
+
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
XY ∧F, K(n)XZ, Un
)
≤ I(X ∧ Y, Z|U) + 2εn +
6 + 6εn log
∣∣∣K(n)XY ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣K(n)XZ ∣∣∣
n
.
This completes the proof.
The proof of Theorem 2.2 is based on Lemma 2.2 below, which is implied by [16]
(Theorem 2.6). Since the models considered in [16] involve rate constraints on the public
communication F between user terminals, the full force of the results in [16] is not needed
here. We provide below a version of the model and the corresponding lemma of direct use
here.
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Consider a DMMS with three components corresponding to generic rvs X , Y , Z with
ﬁnite alphabets X , Y, Z . Let Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn), Y n = (Y1, · · · , Yn), Zn = (Z1, · · · , Zn)
be n i.i.d. repetitions of the rvs X , Y , Z. Terminals X and Y respectively observe the
components Xn and Y n of the DMMS, where n denotes the observation length. Here, ter-
minals X and Y represent the two users who wish to generate a wiretap secret key (WSK),
which should be concealed from a wiretapper Z that observes the component Zn of the
DMMS. The user terminals can communicate with each other through broadcasts over a
noiseless public channel, possibly interactively in many rounds. Again, we assume without
any loss of generality that these transmissions occur in consecutive time slots in r rounds;
the communication is depicted by 2r rvs F1, · · · , F2r, where Ft denotes the transmission
in time slot t, 1 ≤ t ≤ 2r, by terminal X (resp. Y) if t is odd (resp. even). In general, Ft
is allowed to be any function, deﬁned in terms of a mapping ft, of the local observations
at the user terminal and of the previous transmissions F[1,t−1] = (F1, · · · , Ft−1). No ran-
domization is permitted at the user terminals; in particular, f1, · · · , f2r are deterministic
mappings. Let F = (F1, · · · , F2r) denote collectively all the transmissions in the 2r time
slots.
The rv KXY , which is a function of (Xn, Y n), with ﬁnite range KXY, represents an
ε-wiretap secret key (ε-WSK) for terminals X and Y and concealed from the wiretapper
Z , achievable with communication F, if:
• KXY is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xn), (F, Y n);
• KXY satisﬁes the wiretap secrecy condition
1
n
I(KXY ∧F, Zn) ≤ ε;
and
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• KXY satisﬁes the uniformity condition
1
n
H(KXY) ≥ 1
n
log |KXY| − ε.
Definition 2.5 A nonnegative number RXY is an achievable WSK-rate if an εn-WSK
K
(n)
XY is achievable with suitable communication (with the number of rounds possibly de-
pending on n), such that εn → 0 and 1nH
(
K
(n)
XY
)
→ RXY . The largest achievable WSK-
rate is the WSK-capacity CWSK . An achievable WSK-rate will be said to be strongly
achievable if εn above can be taken to vanish exponentially in n. A WSK-capacity will be
termed strong if all smaller rates are strongly achievable.
Lemma 2.2 [16] The (strong) WSK-capacity is bounded below according to
CWSK ≥ max
U
[I(X ∧ Y |U)− I(X ∧ Z|U)] , (2.27)
where the maximum is over all rvs U that satisfy the Markov condition U −◦−X −◦−Y Z.
Furthermore, the right side of (2.27) is a WSK-rate that can be achieved by a single
transmission from terminal X .
Remarks:
1. The right side of (2.27) was ﬁrst proved to be a lower bound for the “weak”
WSK-capacity in [3]. If randomization is allowed at terminals X and Y, the right side of
(2.27) was also proved to be a lower bound for the strong WSK-capacity in [13].
2. It follows from the proof of Lemma 2.2 that upon receiving the transmission
from terminal X , terminal Y recovers the observation Xn = xn at terminal X , with error
probability decaying to 0 exponentially with n.
Proof of Theorem 2.2: We prove here only the strong achievability of the region (2.8).
The strong achievability of the region (2.9) follows by symmetry. Thanks to a time-sharing
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argument, to ﬁnish the proof of this theorem, it suﬃces to show the strong achievability
of the rate pair
(
max
U : U−◦−Y −◦−XZ
[I(X ∧ Y |U)− I(Y ∧ Z|U)] , I(X ∧ Z|Y )
)
.
The scheme to achieve a PK pair with the rates as above is as follows. Let Xn = xn, Y n =
yn, Zn = zn be the respective observations at the terminals X , Y, Z . Terminal X does
not transmit in the ﬁrst time slot. In the second time slot, terminal Y transmits f2(yn), in
order to establish a WSK with terminal X by regarding terminal Z as a wiretapper. By
Lemma 2.2, after this transmission, terminals X and Y generate an εn-WSK K(n)XY , with
εn decaying to 0 exponentially, and
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY
)
≥ max
U : U−◦−Y−◦−XZ
[I(X ∧ Y |U)− I(Y ∧ Z|U)] .
Furthermore, upon receiving the transmission f2(yn), terminal X recovers yn with error
probability decaying exponentially 0 with n.
In the third time slot, terminal Z transmits f3(zn), in order to establish a WSK
with terminal X by regarding terminal Y as a wiretapper. Again, by Lemma 2.2, after
this transmission, terminals X and Z generate an εn-WSK K(n)XZ, with εn decaying to 0
exponentially, and
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XZ
)
≥ max
V : V−◦−Z−◦−XY
[I(Z ∧X, Y |V )− I(Z ∧ Y |V )]
≥ I(X ∧ Z|Y ).
The last inequality follows by choosing V to be a constant. In this scheme, F = (F2, F3),
where F2 = f2(Y n) and F3 = f3(Zn). Now,
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
XZ ∧ F, Y n
)
=
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
XZ ∧ F3, Y n
)
≤ εn,
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where the inequality follows since K(n)XZ is an εn-WSK. Similarly,
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
XY ∧F, Zn
)
≤ εn.
Therefore, the two εn-WSK K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ, with individual rates no less than
max
U : U−◦−Y −◦−XZ
[I(X ∧ Y |U)− I(Y ∧ Z|U)]
and
I(X ∧ Z|Y ),
respectively, constitute an εn-PK pair. This completes the proof.
In the proof of Theorem 2.3, we shall use the notations and properties of typical
sequences, which are given in Appendix A.2, as well as the following lemma, which is
proved in [17].
Lemma 2.3 [17] Given the ﬁnite sets U , V, a function f : Un → {1, · · · , 2nR}, and a
positive number H , there exists a mapping g : Un → {1, · · · , 2nH} such that for i.i.d.
repetitions of any rvs (U, V ) with
H(U |V ) > R +H + δ,
where δ > 0 is arbitrarily small but ﬁxed, the probabilities that g(Un) is uniformly dis-
tributed and g(Un) is independent of (f(Un), V n) go exponentially to 0.
Proof of Theorem 2.3: We prove here only the strong achievability of the region (2.12).
The strong achievability of the region (2.13) follows by symmetry.
Denote by Umss(Yi) the minimal suﬃcient statistic for Yi w.r.t. Zi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Let
Unmss(Y ) =
(
Umss(Y1), · · · , Umss(Y2)
)
. Terminal Y obtains the sequence Unmss(Y ) = un from
its local observation yn, and transmits the sequence un.
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Consider random partitions of Yn and Zn into b1 and b2 bins, respectively, where
b1 = b1(n) and b2 = b2(n) are two integers to be speciﬁed later. For each yn ∈ Yn
(resp. zn ∈ Zn), let FY(yn) (resp. FZ (zn)) be the random index of the bin containing yn
(resp. zn), where FY(yn) (resp. FZ (zn)) is uniformly distributed on the set of integers
{1, · · · , b1} (resp. {1, · · · , b2}). Then, clearly FY(yn), yn ∈ Yn are mutually independent,
as are FZ (zn), zn ∈ Zn. Furthermore, assume that (FY(yn), yn ∈ Yn), (FZ(zn), zn ∈ Zn)
and (Xn, Y n, Zn) are mutually independent.
Terminals Y and Z , with respective observations yn and zn, transmit random indices
FY (yn) = JY and FZ (zn) = JZ , where JY and JZ are uniformly distributed on {1, · · · , b1}
and {1, · · · , b2}, respectively.
The decoding at terminal X is performed as follows. Fix ξ > 0. Terminal X , upon
observing xn ∈ X n as well as receiving the sequence un and the integers jY , jZ , decodes
according to the decoding rule φ, deﬁned by
φ(un, xn, jY, jZ) = (yˆn, zˆn),
iﬀ (yˆn, zˆn) is the unique element in Yn × Zn such that
• (un, xn, yˆn, zˆn) ∈ T nUmss(Y )XY Z,ξ and
• FY(yˆn) = jY , FZ(zˆn) = jZ .
If no such (yˆn, zˆn) exists, an error is declared. The probability of decoding error at terminal
X is then
P (n)e = Pr
{
φ(Unmss(Y ), X
n, FY(Y n), FZ(Zn)) = (Y n, Zn)
}
.
Deﬁne the events
E0 =
{
(Unmss(Y ), X
n, Y n, Zn) ∈ T nUmss(Y )XY Z,ξ
}
,
E1 =
{
∃y˜n ∈ Yn : Y n = y˜n;FY(Y n) = FY (y˜n); (Unmss(Y ), Xn, y˜n, Zn) ∈ T nUmss(Y )XY Z,ξ
}
,
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E2 =
{
∃z˜n ∈ Zn : Zn = z˜n;FZ(Zn) = FZ(z˜n); (Unmss(Y ), Xn, Y n, z˜n) ∈ T nUmss(Y )XY Z,ξ
}
,
E3 = {∃(y˜n, z˜n) ∈ Yn ×Zn : Y n = y˜n;Zn = z˜n;FY(Y n) = FY(y˜n);FZ(Zn) = FZ (z˜n);
(Unmss(Y ), X
n, y˜n, z˜n) ∈ T nUmss(Y )XY Z,ξ},
Clearly,
P (n)e = Pr
{
3⋃
i=0
Ei
}
≤
3∑
i=0
Pr {Ei} . (2.28)
It follows from Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.2 that for some ε = ε(ξ) > 0, and all
suﬃciently large n,
Pr {E0} < 2−nε (2.29)
To bound Pr{E1}, we have
Pr {E1}
=
∑
(un,xn,yn,zn)∈Tn
Umss(Y )XY Z,ξ
Pr
{
(Unmss(Y ), X
n, Y n, Zn) = (un, xn, yn, zn)
}
·
∑
y˜n =yn :(un,xn,y˜n,zn)∈Tn
Umss(Y )XY Z,ξ
Pr
{
FY (y˜n) = FY (yn)|(Unmss(Y ), Xn, Y n, Zn) = (un, xn, yn, zn)
}
=
∑
(un,xn,yn,zn)∈Tn
Umss(Y )XY Z,ξ
Pr
{
(Unmss(Y ), X
n, Y n, Zn) = (un, xn, yn, zn)
}
∑
y˜n =yn :(un,xn,y˜n,zn)∈TnUmss(Y )XY Z,ξ
b−11
≤
∑
(un,xn,yn,zn)∈TnUmss(Y )XY Z,ξ
Pr
{
(Unmss(Y ), X
n, Y n, Zn) = (un, xn, yn, zn)
}
·b−11 · 2n[H(Y |Umss(Y ),X,Z)+2ξ]
≤ 2−n[ 1n log b1−H(Y |Umss(Y ),X,Z)−2ξ]. (2.30)
Similarly, we have
Pr{E2} ≤ 2−n[
1
n
log b2−H(Z|Umss(Y ),X,Y )−2ξ], (2.31)
and
Pr{E3} ≤ 2−n[
1
n
log b1b2−H(Y,Z|Umss(Y ),X)−2ξ]. (2.32)
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Upon picking the integers b1, b2 so as to satisfy
1
n
log b1 ≥ H(Y |Umss(Y ), X, Z) + 3ξ, (2.33)
1
n
log b2 ≥ H(Z|Umss(Y ), X, Y ) + 3ξ, (2.34)
and
1
n
log b1b2 ≥ H(Y, Z|Umss(Y ), X) + 3ξ, (2.35)
it follows from (2.28) – (2.32) that for some η = η(ε, ξ) > 0 and all suﬃciently large n,
P (n)e ≤ 2−nη.
It then follows that there exists a pair of (deterministic) mappings fY = fY (Y n) and
fZ = fZ(Zn) satisfying
Pr
{
φ
(
Unmss(Y ), X
n, fY(Y n), fZ(Zn)
)
= (Y n, Zn)
}
≤ 2−nη .
Next, apply Lemma 2.3 with Y , (Umss(Y ), Z) and fY in the roles of U , V and f ,
with R = 1n log b1 and H = H(Y |Umss(Y ), Z)− 1n log b1 − ξ = H(Y |Umss(Y )) − 1n log b1 −
ξ, respectively. The following holds with probability exponentially tending to 1 in n:
there exists a mapping gY : Yn → {1, · · · , 2n[H(Y |Umss(Y ))− 1n log b1−ξ]} such that gY(Y n) is
uniformly distributed and gY(Y n) is independent of (fY(Y n), Unmss(Y ), Z
n).
Apply Lemma 2.3 again with Z, Y and fZ in the roles of U , V and f , with R =
1
n log b2 and H = H(Z|Y )− 1n log b2−ξ, respectively. The following holds with probability
exponentially tending to 1: there exists a mapping gZ : Zn → {1, · · · , 2n[H(Z|Y )− 1n log b2−ξ]}
such that gZ(Zn) is uniformly distributed and gZ(Zn) is independent of (fZ(Zn), Y n)
If no error is declared by terminal X , the PK K(n)XY is set as gY(Y n), and the PK
K
(n)
XZ is set as gZ(Z
n). Otherwise, K(n)XY and K
(n)
XZ are respectively set to be uniformly
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distributed on
{
1, · · · , 2n[H(Y |Umss(Y ))− 1n log b1−ξ]
}
,
and
{
1, · · · , 2n[H(Z|Y )− 1n log b2−ξ]
}
,
independent of (Xn, Y n, Zn).
Clearly, K(n)XY and K
(n)
XZ are εn-recoverable at terminal X , with εn exponentially
decaying to 0.
The uniformity of gY(Y n) and gZ(Zn) gives that
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY
)
= H(Y |Umss(Y ))−
1
n
log b1 − ξ,
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XZ
)
= H(Z|Y )− 1
n
log b2 − ξ.
The lower bounds (2.33) – (2.35) on 1n log b1,
1
n log b2 and
1
n log b1b2 imply that
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY
)
≤ H(Y |Umss(Y ))−H(Y |Umss(Y ), X, Z)− 4ξ = I(X ∧ Y |Umss(Y ), Z)− 4ξ,
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XZ
)
≤ H(Z|Y )−H(Z|X, Y )− 4ξ = I(X ∧ Z|Y )− 4ξ,
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY
)
+
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XZ
)
≤ H(Y |Umss(Y )) +H(Z|Y )−H(Y, Z|Umss(Y ), X)− 5ξ
= I(X ∧ Y, Z|Umss(Y ))− 5ξ.
Note that
I
(
K
(n)
XY ∧ F, Zn
)
= I(gY(Y n) ∧ fY (Y n), Unmss(Y ), Zn)
and
I
(
K
(n)
XZ ∧F, Y n
)
= I(gZ(Zn) ∧ fZ(Zn), Y n).
It follows from the independence of gY(Y n) and (fY(Y n), Unmss(Y ), Z
n), as well as of gZ(Zn)
and (fZ(Zn), Y n), that
(
K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ
)
constitutes a (strongly) achievable PK pair. This
completes the proof.
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Proof of Theorem 2.4: The converse part follows from Theorem 2.1. The achievability
part is seen as follows. Let U be an arbitrary rv satisfying all three Markov conditions in
(2.14). Theorem 2.2 implies that
(I(X ∧ Y |U), I(X ∧ Z|Y ))
and
(I(X ∧ Y |Z), I(X ∧ Z|U))
are two strongly achievable PK-rate pairs. Note that
I(X ∧ Y |U) + I(X ∧ Z|Y ) = I(X ∧ Y |Z) + I(X ∧ Z|U)
= I(X ∧ Y, Z|U).
Hence, the strong PK-capacity region is inner bounded by the region⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(RXY, RXZ) : RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z) RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Z|Y ),
RXY + RXZ ≤ maxU I(X ∧ Y, Z|U)
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
,
where the maximum is w.r.t. U satisfying (2.14). This completes the proof.
2.5 Generalizations
The model considered in this section is an obvious generalization of the previous model,
in that after r rounds of communication, a PK must be generated by each of the three
pairs of terminals (i.e., terminals X and Y, X and Z , Y and Z). We shall deﬁne the
PK-capacity region for this model and derive an outer bound for the PK-capacity region.
Also, we shall provide an example in which this outer bound for the PK-capacity region
is tight.
Consider a DMMS with three components corresponding to generic rvs X , Y , Z with
ﬁnite alphabets X , Y, Z . Let Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn), Y n = (Y1, · · · , Yn), Zn = (Z1, · · · , Zn)
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be n i.i.d. repetitions of the rvs X , Y , Z. The terminals X , Y, Z respectively observe
the components Xn, Y n, Zn of the DMMS (Xn, Y n, Zn), where n denotes the observa-
tion length. The terminals can communicate with each other through broadcasts over a
noiseless public channel, possibly interactively in many rounds. We assume without any
loss of generality that these transmissions occur in consecutive time slots in r rounds; the
communication is depicted by 3r rvs F1, · · · , F3r, where Ft denotes the transmission in
time slot t, 1 ≤ t ≤ 3r, by a terminal assigned an index i = t mod 3, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, with
terminals X , Y, Z corresponding to indices 1, 2, 3, respectively. In general, Ft is allowed
to be any function, deﬁned in terms of a mapping ft, of the observations at the terminal
with index i and of the previous transmissions F[1,t−1] = (F1, · · · , Ft−1); thus, for instance,
F1 = f1(Xn), F2 = f2(Y n, F1), F3 = f3(Zn, F1, F2), and so on. We do not permit any
randomization at the terminals; in particular, f1, · · · , f3r are deterministic mappings. Let
F = (F1, · · · , F3r) denote collectively all the transmissions in the 3r time slots.
The rvs KXY, KXZ and KYZ , which are functions of (Xn, Y n, Zn), with ﬁnite ranges
KXY , KXZ and KYZ , respectively, represent an ε-private key (ε-PK) triple, where KXY
(resp. KXZ ; KYZ) is the PK for terminals X , Y (resp. X , Z ; Y, X ) with privacy from
the terminal Z (resp. Y; Z), achievable with communication F, if:
• KXY is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xn), (F, Y n);
• KXZ is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xn), (F, Zn);
• KYZ is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Y n), (F, Zn);
• KXY satisﬁes the secrecy condition and the uniformity condition
1
n
I(KXY ∧F, Zn) ≤ ε;
1
n
H(KXY) ≥ 1
n
log |KXY| − ε;
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• KXZ satisﬁes the secrecy condition and the uniformity condition
1
n
I(KXZ ∧F, Y n) ≤ ε;
1
n
H(KXZ) ≥ 1
n
log |KXZ| − ε.
and
• KYZ satisﬁes the secrecy condition and the uniformity condition
1
n
I(KYZ ∧F, Xn) ≤ ε;
1
n
H(KYZ) ≥ 1
n
log |KYZ| − ε.
Definition 2.6 A triple of nonnegative numbers (RXY, RXZ, RYZ) is an achievable PK-
rate triple if an εn-PK triple
(
K
(n)
XY, K
(n)
XZ, K
(n)
YZ
)
is achievable with suitable communica-
tion, such that εn → 0, 1nH
(
K
(n)
XY
)
→ RXY , 1nH
(
K
(n)
XZ
)
→ RXZ , 1nH
(
K
(n)
YZ
)
→ RYZ .
The set of all achievable PK-rate triples is the PK-capacity region CPK . An achievable
PK-rate triple will be called strongly achievable if εn above can be taken to vanish expo-
nentially in n. A PK-capacity region will be termed strong if all rate triples in that region
are strongly achievable.
Remark: The (strong) PK-capacity region is also a closed convex set.
Theorem 2.6 (Outer bound for CPK): Let (RXY, RXZ , RYZ) be an achievable PK-rate
triple. Then
RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z), RXZ +RYZ ≤ I(Z ∧X, Y |Umcf(X,Y )), (2.36)
RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Z|Y ), RXY +RYZ ≤ I(Y ∧X,Z|Umcf(X,Z)), (2.37)
RYZ ≤ I(Y ∧ Z|X), RXY +RXZ ≤ I(X ∧ Y, Z|Umcf(Y,Z)), (2.38)
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RXY + RXZ + RYZ ≤ 2H(X, Y, Z|Umcf(X,Y,Z))−H(X, Y |Z)−H(X,Z|Y )−H(Y, Z|X),
(2.39)
where Umcf(X,Y ) (resp. Umcf(X,Z), Umcf(Y,Z)) is a maximal common function of X and Y
(resp. X and Z, Y and Z), and Umcf(X,Y,Z) is a maximal common function of X , Y and
Z.
The technical tool used to prove Theorem 2.6 is supplied by Lemma 2.4 below.
Lemma 2.4 Let (KXY , KXZ, KYZ) be an ε-PK triple, with values in ﬁnite sets KXY ,
KXZ , KYZ , respectively, achieved with communication F = (F1, · · · , F3r). Then
1
n
H(KXY, KXZ, KYZ|F, Unmcf(X,Y,Z)) = H(X, Y, Z|Umcf(X,Y,Z))− (RX +RY +RZ)
+
3 + 3ε log |KXY ||KXZ||KXY|
n
(2.40)
for some (RX , RY , RZ) satisfying
RX ≥ H(X |Y, Z), RY +RZ ≥ H(Y, Z|X)− 1
n
H(KYZ),
RY ≥ H(Y |X,Z), RX +RZ ≥ H(X,Z|Y )− 1
n
H(KXZ),
RZ ≥ H(Z|X, Y ), RX +RY ≥ H(X, Y |Z)− 1
n
H(KXY).
Proof of Lemma 2.4: Set
RX =
1
n
∑
t:t mod 3≡1
H(Ft|Unmcf(X,Y,Z), F[1,t−1]) +
1
n
H(Xn|F, Unmcf(X,Y,Z), KXY, KXZ)
+
1 + ε log |KXY||KXZ||KYZ |
n
,
RY =
1
n
∑
t:t mod 3≡2
H(Ft|Unmcf(X,Y,Z), F[1,t−1]) +
1
n
H(Y n|F, Xn),
+
1 + ε log |KXY||KXZ||KYZ |
n
,
46
RZ =
1
n
∑
t:t mod 3≡3
H(Ft|Unmcf(X,Y,Z), F[1,t−1]) +
1
n
H(Zn|F, Xn, Y n),
+
1 + ε log |KXY||KXZ||KYZ |
n
.
The remaining proof is analogous to that of Lemma 2.1, and omitted here.
Proof of Theorem 2.6: We only show (2.39), as the bounds in (2.36) – (2.38) are already
known from Theorem 2.1.
Suppose that
(
K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ, K
(n)
YZ
)
represent an εn-PK triple, with values in ﬁnite sets
K(n)XY , K(n)XZ, K(n)YZ , respectively, achieved with communication F = (F1, · · · , F3r), where
εn → 0 (see Deﬁnition 2.6). Then
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY
)
+
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XZ
)
+
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
YZ
)
=
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY, K
(n)
XZ, K
(n)
YZ
)
+
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
XY ∧K(n)XZ
)
+
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
YZ ∧K(n)XY , K(n)XZ
)
=
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY, K
(n)
XZ, K
(n)
YZ|F, Unmcf(X,Y,Z)
)
+
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
XY ∧ F, Unmcf(X,Y,Z)
)
+
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
XZ ∧F, Unmcf(X,Y,Z), K(n)XY
)
+
1
n
I
(
K
(n)
YZ ∧ F, Unmcf(X,Y,Z), K(n)XY, K(n)XZ
)
≤ 1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY, K
(n)
XZ, K
(n)
YZ|F, Unmcf(X,Y,Z)
)
+ 3εn, (2.41)
where the inequality follows since
(
K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ, K
(n)
YZ
)
represent an εn-PK triple. Now,
(2.40) and the latter inequalities in (2.37) – (2.39) imply that
1
n
H
(
K
(n)
XY , K
(n)
XZ, K
(n)
YZ|F, Unmcf(X,Y,Z)
)
≤ H(X, Y, Z|Umcf(X,Y,Z))−
1
2
[H(X, Y |Z) + H(X,Z|Y ) +H(Y, Z|X)]
+
1
2n
[
H
(
K
(n)
XY
)
+ H
(
K
(n)
XZ
)
+ H
(
K
(n)
YZ
)]
+
3 + 3εn log
∣∣∣K(n)XY ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣K(n)XZ ∣∣∣ ∣∣∣K(n)YZ ∣∣∣
n
.(2.42)
Putting (2.42) into (2.41), we ﬁnish the proof of the theorem.
Example 2.5: Let X and Y be {0, 1}-valued rvs with joint pmf
PXY (0, 0) = PXY (1, 1) =
1− p
2
,
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PXY (0, 1) = PXY (1, 0) =
p
2
,
for some 0 < p < 1. Let Z = X ⊕ Y . As in Example 2.2, the joint pmf of (X, Y ) is
indecomposable, and Umcf(X,Y ) is independent of (X, Y ), which implies that Umcf(X,Y ) is
a constant. Consequently, Umcf(X,Y,Z) is a constant. Since I(X∧Y |Umcf(X,Y )) = 1−hb(p),
X and Y are deterministically correlated iﬀ p = 12 .
It is easily seen that Z is independent of X (resp. Y ), which implies that Umcf(X,Z)
(resp. Umcf(Y,Z)) is a constant. Thus,
I(X ∧ Y |Z) = 1, I(X ∧ Z|Y ) = I(Y ∧ Z|X) = hb(p),
I(X ∧ Y, Z|Umcf(Y,Z)) = I(Y ∧X,Z|Umcf(X,Z)) = 1,
I(Z ∧X, Y |Umcf(X,Y )) = hb(p),
and
2H(X, Y, Z|Umcf(X,Y,Z))−H(X, Y |Z)−H(X,Z|Y )−H(Y, Z|X) = 1.
The outer bound for CPK is, hence, given by (2.36) – (2.39). Figure 2.2 shows this outer
bound for CPK .
Next, the tightness of this outer bound is easily seen. It is clear that (1, 0, 0),
(0, hb(p), 0) and (0, 0, hb(p)) are perfectly achievable PK-rate triples (i.e., with εn =
0). From Theorem 2.5 and the fact that Y and Z are deterministically correlated,
(1− hb(p), hb(p), 0) is also a perfectly achievable PK-rate triple. Similarly, (1− hb(p), 0, hb(p))
is another perfectly achievable PK-rate triple. Therefore, by means of a time-sharing ar-
gument, every PK-rate triple in the region of Figure 2.2 is also perfectly achievable.
48
RRXZ
XY
1
h  (p)b
h  (p)b
RYZ
b1−h  (p)
Figure 2.2: The PK-capacity region for Example 2.5.
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Chapter 3
The Secret Key–Private Key Capacity Region for Three Terminals
3.1 Introduction
As has already been mentioned in Chapter 2 that there are situations, arising for instance
in “group communication,” in which multiple keys must be simultaneously devised in a
coordinated manner by diﬀerent groups of terminals (with possible overlaps of groups);
such keys need protection from prespeciﬁed terminals as also from an eavesdropper. For
instance, in group communication, diﬀerent groups of terminals (with possible overlaps of
groups) must generate diﬀerent keys for encrypted communication within those groups.
A key devised for a group must be concealed from terminals outside that group as well
as from an eavesdropper. Such “group-wide” keys can be simultaneously devised in a
coordinated manner by diﬀerent groups of terminals. Separate keys for diﬀerent groups
are also needed when certain disabled terminals become unauthorized or unreliable so that
the keys assigned to them, in eﬀect, are compromised; to maintain security, the remaining
authorized terminals must then switch to another set of keys which are concealed from
the disabled terminals. In the interests of eﬃciency, all such keys must be devised at the
outset of operations so as to avoid the need for a fresh key generation procedure after a
disablement.
In general, in a network with m terminals, we could have one (common) secret key
(SK) for all the terminals, and private keys (PK) for every proper subset of the m terminals.
These situations produce a rich vein of secrecy generation problems, the information-
theoretic underpinnings of which are substantial enough for investigation already in the
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case of just three terminals.
In this chapter, we consider a simple model with three terminals and examine the
problem of characterizing all the rates at which the following two types of keys can be
generated simultaneously: (i) all the three terminals generate a SK, which is eﬀectively
concealed from an eavesdropper; and (ii) a designated pair of terminals generate a PK,
which is eﬀectively concealed from the remaining terminal as well as the eavesdropper.
Suppose that terminals X , Y and Z observe, respectively, the distinct components of a
discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS), i.e., independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) repetitions of the generic random variables (rvs) X , Y , Z, respectively. The termi-
nals are permitted unrestricted communication among themselves over a public channel,
and all the transmissions are observed by all the terminals. An eavesdropper has access to
this public communication too, but gathers no additional (wiretapped) side-information;
also, the eavesdropper is passive, i.e., unable to corrupt the transmissions. Terminals X , Y
and Z generate a SK, which is concealed from the eavesdropper with access to the public
communication among the terminals. Also, terminals X and Y generate a PK, with the
possible help of terminal Z , which is concealed from the helper terminal Z and from the
eavesdropper. The set of all rate pairs at which such (SK, PK) pairs can be generated is
called the (SK, PK)-capacity region. Our main technical results are single-letter inner and
outer bounds for the (SK, PK)-capacity region. Further, under a certain special condition,
these bounds are shown to coincide to yield the (exact) (SK, PK)-capacity region.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 contains the preliminaries. Our
main results – an outer bound and an inner bound for the (SK, PK)-capacity region – are
provided in Section 3.3. Furthermore, under a certain condition, these bounds coincide
to yield the (exact) (SK, PK)-capacity region. The proofs are given in Section 3.4. In
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Section 3.5, we discuss the tightness of the outer bound.
3.2 Preliminaries
Consider a DMMS with three components, and with corresponding generic rvs X , Y , Z
taking values in ﬁnite alphabets X , Y, Z , respectively. Let Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn), Y n =
(Y1, · · · , Yn), Zn = (Z1, · · · , Zn) be n i.i.d. repetitions of the rvs X , Y , Z. The terminalsX ,
Y, Z respectively observe the components Xn, Y n, Zn of the DMMS (Xn, Y n, Zn), where
n denotes the observation length. The terminals can communicate with each other through
broadcasts over a noiseless public channel, possibly interactively in many rounds. We
assume, without any loss of generality, that these transmissions occur in consecutive time
slots in r rounds; the communication is depicted by 3r rvs F1, · · · , F3r, where Ft denotes
the transmission in time slot t, 1 ≤ t ≤ 3r, by a terminal assigned an index i = t mod 3,
1 ≤ i ≤ 3, with terminals X , Y, Z corresponding to indices 1, 2, 3, respectively. In general,
Ft is allowed to be any function, deﬁned in terms of a mapping ft, of the observations
at the terminal with index i, i = t mod 3, and of the previous transmissions F[1,t−1] =
(F1, · · · , Ft−1). We do not permit any randomization at the terminals; in particular,
f1, · · · , f3r are deterministic mappings. Let F = (F1, · · · , F3r) denote collectively all the
transmissions in the 3r time slots.
The rvs KXYZ and KXY , which are functions of (Xn, Y n, Zn), with ﬁnite ranges
KXYZ and KXY , respectively, represent an ε-secret key-private key (ε-(SK, PK)) pair,
where the SK KXYZ is for all the terminals and the PK KXY is for terminals X , Y with
privacy from the terminal Z , achievable with communication F, if:
• KXYZ is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xn), (F, Y n), (F, Zn);
• KXY is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xn), (F, Y n);
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• KXYZ satisﬁes the secrecy condition and the uniformity condition
1
n
I(KXYZ ∧F) ≤ ε; (3.1)
1
n
H(KXYZ) ≥ 1
n
log |KXYZ| − ε; (3.2)
and
• KXY satisﬁes the secrecy condition and the uniformity condition
1
n
I(KXY ∧F, Zn) ≤ ε; (3.3)
1
n
H(KXY) ≥ 1
n
log |KXY| − ε. (3.4)
The conditions above thus mean that terminals X , Y and Z generate a nearly uniformly
distributed SK KXYZ which is concealed from an eavesdropper that observes the public
communication F. Simultaneously, based on the same public communication, terminals X
and Y generate a PK KXY with the terminal Z acting as helper (e.g., a “third-party” in a
key establishment protocol) by providing X , Y with additional correlated information; this
private key is nearly uniformly distributed, and is concealed from an eavesdropper that
observes the public communicationF as well as from the helper Z (hence, “private”). Note
that the previous conditions readily imply that KXYZ and KXY are “nearly” statistically
independent.
Definition 3.1 A pair of nonnegative numbers (RXYZ, RXY) constitute an achievable
(SK, PK)-rate pair if for every ε > 0 and all suﬃciently large n, ε-(SK, PK) pairs
(KXYZ , KXY) are achievable with suitable communication (with the number of rounds
possibly depending on n), such that 1nH (KXYZ) ≥ RXYZ −ε, 1nH (KXY) ≥ RXY−ε. The
set of all achievable (SK, PK)-rate pairs is the (SK, PK)-capacity region, denoted by CSP .
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Remarks:
1. Maurer [37] pointed out that the secrecy conditions (3.1) and (3.3) were inade-
quate for cryptographic purposes, and should be strengthened by omission of the factor
1
n . While all our achievability results below are presented in the “weak sense,” they can
be established in the stronger sense of [37] by using the techniques developed in [40].
2. The (SK, PK)-capacity region CSP is a closed convex set. Closedness is obvious
from the deﬁnition, while convexity follows from a time-sharing argument (cf. [15, p.
242]).
3. If KXY is set equal to a constant in the deﬁnition above, i.e., only a (single) ε-SK
is generated by terminals X , Y and Z , then the entropy rate of such a secret key is called
an achievable SK-rate, and the largest achievable SK-rate is the SK-capacity. It is known
[17] that the SK-capacity is equal to
min
{
I(X ∧ Y, Z), I(Y ∧X,Z), I(Z ∧X, Y ), 1
2
[H(X) + H(Y ) +H(Z)−H(X, Y, Z)]
}
.
(3.5)
4. If KXYZ is set equal to a constant in the deﬁnition above, i.e., only a (single)
ε-PK is generated by terminals X and Y with terminal Z serving as a helper terminal,
then the entropy rate of such a private key is called an achievable PK-rate, and the largest
achievable PK-rate is the PK-capacity. It is known (cf. [3], [16]) that the PK-capacity is
equal to
I(X ∧ Y |Z). (3.6)
Example 3.1: Let X and Y be independent rvs, each uniformly distributed on {0, 1}, and
let Z = X ⊕ Y , where ⊕ denotes addition modulo 2.
It is easily seen from (3.5) that the SK-capacity for the terminals X , Y, Z equals 12
bit/symbol, and from (3.6) that the PK-capacity for the terminals X , Y, with privacy
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from Z , equals 1 bit/symbol. We claim in this elementary example that 1 bit of perfect
SK (i.e., ε-SK with ε = 0) is achievable for all the terminals, with observation length n = 2,
using the following scheme. Terminals X , Y, Z , with respective observations (X1, X2),
(Y1, Y2), (Z1, Z2), transmit X1, Y2 and Z1 ⊕ Z2, respectively. Then each terminal can
perfectly recover all the observations of the other terminals. The secret key KXYZ is set
to be X2 (or Y1 or Z1 or Z2). It can be shown that
I(KXYZ ∧ F) = I(X2 ∧X1, Y2, Z1 ⊕ Z2) = 0,
and
H(KXYZ) = 1.
On the other hand, it is shown in Example 2.3 that a perfect PK KXY with rate 1
bit/symbol is achievable for terminals X and Y, with privacy from Z . By a time-sharing
argument, every (SK, PK)-rate pair (RXYZ , RXY) satisfying
2RXYZ +RXY ≤ 1 (3.7)
is perfectly achievable. The results in this chapter (cf. Theorem 3.1 below) will show that
the secret key-private key capacity region CSP for this example cannot be larger than the
region in (3.7), so that (3.7) characterizes the capacity region CSP in this example.
3.3 Statement of Results
For notational simplicity, we set
A

= I(Z ∧X, Y ),
B
= min{I(X ∧ Y, Z), I(Y ∧X,Z)} ,
C

=
1
2
[H(X) + H(Y ) + H(Z)−H(X, Y, Z)],
55
Thus, the SK-capacity (3.5) for the terminals X , Y, Z is equal to min{A,B, C}.
Theorem 3.1 (Outer bound for CSP ): Let (RXYZ, RXY) be an achievable (SK, PK)-rate
pair. Then
RXYZ ≤ min{A,B, C}, (3.8)
RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z), (3.9)
RXYZ + RXY ≤ B, (3.10)
2RXYZ + RXY ≤ 2C. (3.11)
Remark: The bounds (3.8), (3.9) on the individual largest achievable SK- and PK-rates
are directly from (3.5) and (3.6). Also, while (3.5) implies
RXYZ ≤ B, RXYZ ≤ C,
note that the conditions (3.10), (3.11) above are more stringent than (3.5).
Theorem 3.2 (Inner bound for CSP ): The (SK, PK)-capacity region CSP is inner-bounded
by the region⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
(RXYZ, RXY) :
min{A,B,C}−min{I(X∧Z),I(Y∧Z)}
I(X∧Y |Z) · RXY + RXYZ ≤ min{A,B, C},
RXY ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z)
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
.
(3.12)
Remark: The proof of Theorem 3.2 is based on the following idea: a modiﬁed version of the
random binning technique developed in [17] is ﬁrst used to generate the needed “common
randomness.” A SK and a PK, of rate pair (min{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)} , I(X ∧ Y |Z)), are
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then extracted from this common randomness, by a means from [17]. The achievability
of the rate pair above means that besides a PK generated by terminals X and Y, which
approaches the PK-capacity, a SK, of rate min{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)}, can simultaneously
be generated by terminals X , Y and Z . An application of the time-sharing technique then
leads to the achievability of the region in (3.12). Although interterminal communication
between X , Y, Z is permitted, the region in (3.12) is shown to be achieved by a single
autonomous transmission from each terminal based on its own local observation of its
component of the DMMS.
Under a certain condition, the outer bound in Theorem 3.1 coincides with the inner
bound in Theorem 3.2, which provides a characterization of the (SK, PK)-capacity region
CSP .
Theorem 3.3 If min{A,B, C} = B, then CSP equals the set of pairs (RXYZ , RXY) sat-
isfying (3.9) and (3.10).
Example 3.2: Let X , Y and Z be rvs, each uniformly distributed on {0, 1}, and satisfying
the Markov condition Y −◦−X −◦− Z. Further, suppose that
PXY (0, 0) = PXY (1, 1) =
1− p
2
, PXY (0, 1) = PXY (1, 0) =
p
2
,
PXZ(0, 0) = PXZ(1, 1) =
1− q
2
, PXZ(0, 1) = PXZ(1, 0) =
q
2
,
where 0 < q < p < 12 .
Straightforward calculations show that
A = I(Z ∧X, Y ) = 1− hb(q),
B = min{I(X ∧ Y, Z), I(Y ∧X,Z)} = 1− hb(p),
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1−h  (p+q−2pq)b
h   (p+q−2pq)−h   (p)b
RXYZ
b
1−h  (p)b
RXY
Figure 3.1: CSP for Example 3.2.
and
C =
1
2
[H(X) +H(Y ) +H(Z)−H(X, Y, Z)] = 1− hb(p) + hb(q)
2
,
where hb(p) = −p log2 p − (1 − p) log2(1 − p). Since 0 < q < p < 12 , we have that
min{A,B, C} = B. It follows from Theorem 3.3 that CSP is the set of pairs (RXYZ, RXY)
satisfying
RXY ≤ hb(p + q − 2pq)− hb(p),
RXYZ + RXY ≤ 1− hb(p).
This region is depicted in Figure 3.1.
3.4 Proofs
The technical tool used to prove Theorem 3.1 is supplied by Lemma 3.1 below.
Lemma 3.1 Let (KXYZ , KXY) be an ε-(SK, PK) pair (with values in ﬁnite sets KXYZ
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and KXY , respectively), achieved with communication F = (F1, · · · , F3r). Then
1
n
H(KXYZ, KXY|F) = H(X, Y, Z)− (RX + RY +RZ) + 3 + 3ε log |KXYZ ||KXY|
n
(3.13)
for some (RX , RY , RZ) satisfying
RX ≥ H(X |Y, Z), RY + RZ ≥ H(Y, Z|X), (3.14)
RY ≥ H(Y |X,Z), RX +RZ ≥ H(X,Z|Y ), (3.15)
RZ ≥ H(Z|X, Y ), RX +RY ≥ H(X, Y |Z)− 1
n
H(KXY). (3.16)
The proof of Lemma 3.1 is analogous to that of Lemma 2.1. Still, for completeness, a
proof is provided below.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Since F, KXYZ and KXY are functions of (Xn, Y n, Zn),
H(Xn, Y n, Zn) = H(F, KXYZ, KXY, Xn, Y n, Zn)
=
3r∑
t=1
H(Ft|F[1,t−1]) + H(KXYZ, KXY|F) + H(Xn, Y n, Zn|F, KXYZ, KXY).
Setting
RX =
1
n
∑
t:t mod 3≡1
H(Ft|F[1,t−1]) +
1
n
H(Xn|F, KXYZ, KXY)
+
1 + ε log |KXYZ ||KXY|
n
,
RY =
1
n
∑
t:t mod 3≡2
H(Ft|F[1,t−1]) +
1
n
H(Y n|F, KXYZ, KXY, Xn)
+
1 + ε log |KXYZ ||KXY|
n
,
RZ =
1
n
∑
t:t mod 3≡3
H(Ft|F[1,t−1]) +
1
n
H(Zn|F, KXYZ, KXY, Xn, Y n)
+
1 + ε log |KXYZ ||KXY|
n
,
the previous equality gives
1
n
H(KXYZ, KXY|F) = H(X, Y, Z)− (RX +RY + RZ) + 3 + 3ε log |KXYZ||KXY |
n
.
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It remains to show that (RX , RY , RZ) as deﬁned above satisfy (3.14) – (3.16). To this
end,
H(Xn|Y n, Zn) ≤ H(F, KXYZ, KXY, Xn|Y n, Zn)
≤
3r∑
t=1
H(Ft|Y n, Zn, F[1,t−1]) +H(KXYZ , KXY|F, Y n, Zn)
+H(Xn|F, KXYZ, KXY), (3.17)
Since t mod 3 = 1, Ft is a function of (Y n, Zn, F[1,t−1]),
3r∑
t=1
H(Ft|Y n, Zn, F[1,t−1]) =
∑
t:t mod 3≡1
H(Ft|Y n, Zn, F[1,t−1])
≤
∑
t:t mod 3≡1
H(Ft|F[1,t−1]).
Further, it follows from Fano’s inequality that
H(KXYZ, KXY|F, Y n, Zn) ≤ 1 + ε log |KXYZ||KXY|.
Upon bounding those terms on the right side of (3.17) from above, we obtain that
H(Xn|Y n, Zn) ≤ nRX .
Again, from Fano’s inequality, we show the latter part of (3.14) below.
H(Y n, Zn|Xn) ≤ H(F, KXYZ, KXY, Y n, Zn|Xn)
=
∑
t:t mod 3≡2,3
H(Ft|Xn, F[1,t−1]) +H(KXYZ, KXY|F, Xn)
+H(Y n|F, KXYZ, KXY, Xn) + H(Zn|F, KXYZ, KXY, Xn, Y n)
≤ n(RY + RZ).
By means of similar arguments used in the proof of (3.14), we can show (3.15) and (3.16)
as follows:
H(Y n|Xn, Zn) ≤
∑
t:t mod 3≡2
H(Ft|Xn, Zn, F[1,t−1]) + H(KXYZ, KXY|F, Xn, Zn)
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+H(Y n|F, KXYZ, KXY, Xn, Zn)
≤ nRY ,
H(Xn, Zn|Y n) ≤ H(F|Y n) +H(KXYZ , KXY|F, Y n) + H(Xn|F, KXYZ, KXY, Y n)
+H(Zn|F, KXYZ, KXY , Xn, Y n)
≤ n(RX +RZ),
H(Zn|Xn, Y n) ≤
∑
t:t mod 3≡3
H(Ft|Xn, Y n, F[1,t−1]) + H(KXYZ, KXY|F, Xn, Y n)
+H(Zn|F, KXYZ, KXY, Xn, Y n)
≤ nRZ ,
H(Xn, Y n|Zn) ≤ H(F|Zn) +H(KXYZ|F, Zn) + H(KXY|F, KXYZ, Zn)
+H(Xn|F, KXYZ, KXY, Zn) + H(Y n|F, KXYZ, KXY, Xn, Zn)
≤ n(RX +RY ) +H(KXY).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We only show (3.10) and (3.11), as (3.8) and (3.9) are from
(3.6) and (3.7). Given an (arbitrary) ε > 0, suppose that (KXYZ , KXY) represent an
ε-(SK, PK) pair (with values in ﬁnite sets KXYZ and KXY , respectively), achieved with
communication F = (F1, · · · , F3r). Then
1
n
H (KXYZ) +
1
n
H (KXY)
=
1
n
H (KXYZ, KXY) +
1
n
I (KXYZ ∧KXY)
=
1
n
H (KXYZ, KXY|F) + 1
n
I (KXYZ ∧ F) + 1
n
I (KXY ∧F, KXYZ)
≤ 1
n
H (KXYZ, KXY|F) + 1
n
I (KXYZ ∧ F) + 1
n
I (KXY ∧F, Zn) + 1
n
H (KXYZ |F, Zn)
≤ 1
n
H (KXYZ, KXY|F) + 2ε + 1+ ε log |KXYZ |
n
, (3.18)
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where (3.18) follows from secrecy conditions (3.1), (3.3) and Fano’s inequality.
Next, we shall bound 1nH (KXYZ , KXY|F) from above using Lemma 3.1. It is implied
by (3.13) and (3.14) that
1
n
H (KXYZ, KXY |F)
≤ H(X, Y, Z)− [H(X |Y, Z)+ H(Y, Z|X)]+ 3 + 3ε log |KXYZ| |KXY |
n
= I(X ∧ Y, Z) + 3 + 3ε log |KXYZ | |KXY |
n
. (3.19)
Putting (3.19) into (3.18), we obtain that
1
n
H (KXYZ) +
1
n
H (KXY) ≤ I(X ∧ Y, Z) + 2ε + 4 + 4ε log |KXYZ| |KXY |
n
.
Similarly, it follows from (3.13), (3.15) and (3.18) that
1
n
H (KXYZ) +
1
n
H (KXY) ≤ I(Y ∧X,Z) + 2ε + 4 + 4ε log |KXYZ | |KXY |
n
,
which leads to (3.10).
Finally, from the latter inequalities of (3.14) – (3.16), we have
RX +RY +RZ ≥ 12
[
H(X, Y |Z) + H(X,Z|Y ) +H(Y, Z|X)− 1
n
H (KXY)
]
. (3.20)
A comparison of (3.13), (3.18) and (3.20) shows that
2
n
H (KXYZ)+
1
n
H (KXY) ≤ H(X)+H(Y )+H(Z)−H(X, Y, Z)+4ε+8+ 8ε log |KXYZ | |KXY |
n
,
proving (3.11).
In order to prove Theorem 3.2, we ﬁrst show the achievability of a (SK,PK) pair, of
rate
(min{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)}, I(X ∧ Y |Z)),
which is Lemma 3.2. The following proposition is a technical tool used to prove Lemma
3.2.
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Proposition 3.1 Let Xn = (X1, · · · , Xn), Y n = (Y1, · · · , Yn) and Zn = (Z1, · · · , Zn) be
n i.i.d. repetitions of rvs X , Y and Z with (known) joint pmf PXY Z. For every ε > 0,
ν > 0, and all suﬃciently large n, there exists a source code (fX , fZ , φ), where fX :
X n → {1, · · · , b1(n)}, fZ : Zn → {1, · · · , b2(n)}, φ : Yn×{1, · · · , b1(n)}×{1, · · · , b2(n)} →
X n ×Zn, such that
Pr{φ(Y n, fX (Xn), fZ(Zn)) = (Xn, Zn)} ≥ 1− ε, (3.21)
1
n
log ||fX (Xn)|| ≤ H(X |Y, Z)+ ν. (3.22)
Further, for every such source code,
1
n
I(fX (Xn) ∧ Y n, Zn) ≤ ν + ε log |X |+ 1
n
hb(ε).
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The existence part in (3.21), (3.22) follows directly from the
Slepian-Wolf Theorem (cf. [15, Theorem 3.1.14], [65]). Next, let
(fX (Xn), fZ(Zn), φ(Y n, fX (Xn), fZ(Zn)))
be a source code satisfying (3.21) and (3.22). Then, it follows from Fano’s inequality that
H(Xn|fX (Xn), fZ(Zn), Y n) ≤ hb(ε) + nε log |X |.
From (3.22) and the inequality above, we have
H(fX (Xn)) ≤ nH(X |Y, Z)+ nν
= H(Xn, fX (Xn)|Y n, Zn) + nν
= H(fX (Xn)|Y n, Zn) +H(Xn|fX (Xn), Y n, Zn) + nν
≤ H(fX (Xn)|Y n, Zn) + nν + nε log |X |+ hb(ε).
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Therefore,
1
n
I(fX (Xn) ∧ Y n, Zn) ≤ ν + ε log |X |+ 1
n
hb(ε).
Lemma 3.2 It holds that
(min{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)} , I(X ∧ Y |Z)) (3.23)
is an achievable (SK, PK)-rate pair.
Proof of Lemma 3.2: The idea underlying the proof is as follows. First, terminal Z
helps terminals X and Y generate a PK at rate I(X ∧ Y |Z), by not revealing “all” of Zn
at rate H(Z), but at rate max{H(Z|X),H(Z|Y )}. Then, the “remainder” of Zn, of rate
min{I(X ∧Z), I(Y ∧Z)}, can be used for simultaneous SK-generation by terminals X , Y
and Z .
We now provide a formal proof. Without loss of generality, assume that I(X ∧Z) ≤
I(Y ∧ Z). Then (3.23) becomes
(I(X ∧ Z), I(X ∧ Y |Z)) .
Consider random partitions of Xn and Zn into b1 and b2 bins, where b1 = b1(n)
and b2 = b2(n) are two integers to be speciﬁed later. For each xn ∈ X n (resp. zn ∈ Zn),
let FX (xn) (resp. FZ(zn)) be the random index of the bin containing xn (resp. zn),
where FX (xn) (resp. FZ (zn)) is uniformly distributed on the set of integers {1, · · · , b1}
(resp. {1, · · · , b2}). Then, clearly FX (xn), xn ∈ X n are mutually independent, as are
FZ(zn), zn ∈ Zn. Furthermore, assume that (FX (xn), xn ∈ X n), (FZ(zn), zn ∈ Zn) and
(Xn, Y n, Zn) are mutually independent.
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TerminalsX and Z , with respective observations xn and zn, transmit random indices
FX (xn) = JX and FZ (zn) = JZ , where JX and JZ are uniformly distributed on {1, · · · , b1}
and {1, · · · , b2}, respectively.
The decoding at terminal X is performed as follows. Fix ξ > 0. Terminal X , upon
observing xn ∈ X n as well as receiving the integer jZ , decodes according to the decoding
rule φX , deﬁned by
φX (xn, jZ) = zˆn,
iﬀ zˆn is the unique element in Zn such that
• (xn, zˆn) ∈ T nXZ,ξ; and
• FZ(zn) = jZ .
If no such zˆn exists, an error is declared.
The probability of decoding error at terminal X is then
P
(n)
e,X = Pr {φX (Xn, FZ(Zn)) = Zn} .
Deﬁne the events
E0 = {(Xn, Zn) ∈ T nXZ,ξ},
E1 = {∃z˜n ∈ Zn : Zn = z˜n;FZ(Zn) = FZ(z˜n); (Xn, z˜n), (Xn, Zn) ∈ T nXZ,ξ}.
Clearly,
P
(n)
e,X = Pr{E0}+Pr{E1},
noting that the events E0 and E1 are disjoint. By the Asymptotic Equipartition Property
(AEP) (cf. e.g. [11, p. 51]), for every ε > 0 and all suﬃciently large n, Pr{E0} < ε6 . To
bound Pr{E1}, we have
Pr{E1} =
∑
(xn,zn)∈TnXZ,ξ
Pr{(Xn, Zn) = (xn, zn)}
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·
∑
z˜n =zn:(xn,z˜n)∈TnXZ,ξ
Pr {FZ(z˜n) = FZ(zn)|(Xn, Zn) = (xn, zn)}
=
∑
(xn,zn)∈Tn
XZ,ξ
Pr{(Xn, Zn) = (xn, zn)}
∑
z˜n =zn :(xn,z˜n)∈Tn
XZ,ξ
b−12 (3.24)
≤
∑
(xn,zn)∈TnXZ,ξ
Pr{(Xn, Zn) = (xn, zn)} · 2n[H(Z|X)+2ξ] · b−12 (3.25)
≤ 2−n[ 1n log b2−H(Z|X)−2ξ], (3.26)
where (3.24) follows from the independence of FZ(zn) and (Xn, Zn), and (3.25) follows
from (A.1).
The decoding at terminal Y is performed as follows. Terminal Y, upon observing
yn ∈ Yn as well as receiving the integers jX and jZ , decodes according to the decoding
rule φY , deﬁned by
φY(yn, jX , jZ) = (xˆn, zˆn),
iﬀ (xˆn, zˆn) is the unique element in X n × Zn such that
• (xˆn, yn, zˆn) ∈ T nXYZ,ξ; and
• FX (xn) = jX , FZ(zn) = jZ .
If no such (xˆn, zˆn) exists, an error is declared.
The probability of decoding error at terminal Y is then
P
(n)
e,Y = Pr {φY(Y n, FX (Xn), FZ(Zn)) = (Xn, Zn)} .
Deﬁne the events
E2 = {(Xn, Y n, Zn) ∈ T nXYZ,ξ},
E3 = {∃x˜n ∈ X n : Xn = x˜n;FX (Xn) = FX (x˜n); (x˜n, Y n, Zn), (Xn, Y n, Zn) ∈ T nXY Z,ξ},
E4 = {∃z˜n ∈ Zn : Zn = z˜n;FZ(Zn) = FZ (z˜n); (Xn, Y n, z˜n), (Xn, Y n, Zn) ∈ T nXYZ,ξ},
and
E5 = {∃(x˜n, z˜n) ∈ X n × Zn : Xn = x˜n;Zn = z˜n;FX (Xn) = FX (x˜n);
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FZ (Zn) = FZ (z˜n); (x˜n, Y n, z˜n), (Xn, Y n, Zn) ∈ T nXYZ,ξ}.
Clearly,
P
(n)
e,Y = Pr
{
5⋃
i=2
Ei
}
≤
5∑
i=2
Pr{Ei}.
By the AEP, for all suﬃciently large n, Pr{E2} < ε6 . To bound Pr{E3}, we have
Pr{E3}
=
∑
(xn,yn,zn)∈Tn
XYZ,ξ
Pr{(Xn, Y n, Zn) = (xn, yn, zn)}
·
∑
x˜n =xn:(x˜n,yn,zn)∈TnXYZ,ξ
Pr {FX (x˜n) = FX (xn)|(Xn, Y n, Zn) = (xn, yn, zn)}
=
∑
(xn,yn,zn)∈TnXYZ,ξ
Pr{(Xn, Y n, Zn) = (xn, yn, zn)}
∑
x˜n =xn:(x˜n,yn,zn)∈TnXY Z,ξ
b−11
≤
∑
(xn,yn,zn)∈Tn
XYZ,ξ
Pr{(Xn, Y n, Zn) = (xn, yn, zn)} · 2n[H(X |Y,Z)+2ξ] · b−11
≤ 2−n[ 1n log b1−H(X |Y,Z)−2ξ]. (3.27)
Similarly, we have
Pr{E4} ≤ 2−n[ 1n log b2−H(Z|X,Y )−2ξ], (3.28)
and
Pr{E5} ≤ 2−n[ 1n log b1b2−H(X,Z|Y )−2ξ]. (3.29)
Upon picking the integers b1, b2 so as to satisfy
1
n
log b1 ≥ H(X |Y, Z)+ 3ξ, (3.30)
1
n
log b2 ≥ H(Z|X) + 3ξ, (3.31)
it follows from (3.26) – (3.29) that for all suﬃciently large n, Pr{Ei} is less than ε6 ,
i ∈ {1, 3, 4, 5}. Hence, there exists of a pair of (deterministic) mappings fX = fX (Xn)
and fZ = fZ (Zn) satisfying
Pr {φX (Xn, fZ(Zn)) = Zn}+Pr {φY (Y n, fX (Xn), fZ(Zn)) = (Xn, Zn)} ≤ ε. (3.32)
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Next, apply Lemma 2.3 with X , Z and fX in the roles of U , V and f , with R =
1
n log b1 and H = H(X |Z)− 1n log b1−ξ, respectively. The following holds with probability
exponentially tending to 1 in n. There exists a mapping gX : X n → {1, · · · , 2n[H(X |Z)−1n log b1−ξ]}
such that gX (Xn) is uniformly distributed and gX (Xn) is independent of (fX (Xn), Zn).
Apply Lemma 2.3 again with Z, a constant and fZ in the roles of U , V and f ,
with R = 1n log b2 and H = H(Z) − 1n log b2 − ξ, respectively. The following holds
with probability exponentially tending to 1 in n. There exists a mapping gZ : Zn →
{1, · · · , 2n[H(Z)− 1n logb2−ξ]} such that gZ(Zn) is uniformly distributed and gZ(Zn) is inde-
pendent of fZ(Zn).
If no decoding error is declared by terminals X or Y, the SK KXYZ is set as gZ(Zn)
and the PK KXY is set as gX (Xn). Otherwise, the SK is set to be uniformly distributed
on {1, · · · , 2n[H(Z)− 1n log b2−ξ]} and the PK is set to be uniformly distributed on
{1, · · · , 2n[H(X |Z)−1n log b1−ξ]},
independent of (Xn, Y n, Zn).
Since the sum of the decoding errors at terminals X and Y is less than ε by (3.32),
KXYZ is ε-recoverable from the data available at terminals X , Y, Z , and KXY is ε-
recoverable from the data available at terminals X and Y.
Clearly, if a decoding error is declared by terminal X or Y, KXYZ and KXY satisfy
the secrecy conditions (3.1), (3.3), and the uniformity conditions (3.2), (3.4). Further, the
lower bounds on 1n log b1 and
1
n log b2 in (3.30), (3.32) imply that
1
n
H(KXYZ) = H(Z)− 1
n
log b2 − ξ ≤ I(X ∧ Z)− 4ξ, (3.33)
1
n
H(KXY) = H(X |Z)− 1
n
log b1 − ξ ≤ I(X ∧ Y |Z)− 4ξ. (3.34)
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If no decoding error is declared by both X and Y, KXYZ and KXY also satisfy the
uniformity conditions (3.2), (3.4), with respective rates satisfying (3.33) and (3.34). It
remains to show in this case that KXYZ and KXY satisfy the secrecy conditions (3.1) and
(3.3). With F = (fX (Xn), fZ(Zn)), it is clear that
I(KXY ∧ F, Zn) = I(gX (Xn) ∧ fX (Xn), Zn) ≤ ε,
for all suﬃciently large n. Also,
I(KXYZ ∧F) = I(gZ(Zn) ∧ fX (Xn), fZ(Zn))
≤ I(gZ(Zn) ∧ fZ(Zn)) + I(fX (Xn) ∧ fZ (Zn), gZ(Zn))
≤ I(gZ(Zn) ∧ fZ(Zn)) + I(fX (Xn) ∧ Zn).
It is clear that
I(gZ(Zn) ∧ fZ(Zn)) ≤ ε,
for all suﬃciently large n. Since
Pr {φY (Y n, fX (Xn), fZ(Zn)) = (Xn, Zn)} ≤ ε
by (3.32), and 1n log ||fX (Xn)|| is arbitrarily close to H(X |Y, Z) by (3.30), it follows from
Proposition 1 that
I(fX (Xn) ∧ Zn) ≤ nε.
This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2.
Remark: Note that the (SK, PK)-rate pair (3.23) is shown to be achieved by a single
autonomous transmission from each terminal based on its own local observation of its
component of the DMMS.
Proof of Theorem 3.2: Since (min{A,B, C}, 0), (0, I(X ∧ Y |Z)) and
(min{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)} , I(X ∧ Y |Z))
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are achievable (SK, PK)-rate pairs, it follows from a time-sharing argument that any (SK,
PK)-rate pair inside the region (3.12) is achievable. Further, it is known [17] that there is
no need for interactive communication to achieve (SK, PK)-rate pairs (min{A,B, C}, 0)
and (0, I(X ∧ Y |Z)). Hence, one round of transmission (in any order) is suﬃcient to
achieve any (SK, PK)-rate pair in this region.
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Consider the outer bound for CSP in Theorem 3.1. Under the
condition min{A,B, C} = B, the constraints (3.8) and (3.11) are implied by the constraint
(3.10). Hence, the outer bound for CSP is determined by (3.9) and (3.10).
On the other hand, considering that
min{A,B, C} = B = I(X ∧ Y |Z) +min{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)},
the region (3.12) reduces to the constraints (3.9) and (3.10).
3.5 Discussion
Although we have shown the tightness of the outer bound for CSP under the condition
min{A,B, C} = B, it remains open as to whether this outer bound is tight in general. To
prove its tightness, it would suﬃce to show the tightness of the outer bound under the
condition min{A,B, C} = min{A,C}.
Case 1: min{A,B, C} = C:
Under this condition, the constraint (3.8) is implied by the constraint (3.11). Thus,
the outer bound for the (SK, PK)-capacity region is given by the constraints (3.9), (3.10)
and (3.11), and is depicted in Figure 3.2. By a time-sharing argument, to show the
achievability of this region, it suﬃces to show that (SK, PK)-rate pairs (0, I(X ∧ Y |Z)),
(C, 0),
(min{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)} , I(X ∧ Y |Z)) ,
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Figure 3.2: Inner and outer bounds for CSP for Case 1.
and
(max{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)}, B −max{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)}) (3.35)
are all achievable. While the ﬁrst three (SK, PK)-rate pairs are known to be achievable,
it is unclear if the achievability of the (SK, PK)-rate pair (3.35) holds.
Case 2: A < B < C:
Upon writing C as
1
2
[I(X ∧ Z) + I(Y ∧X,Z)]
or
1
2
[I(Y ∧ Z) + I(X ∧ Y, Z)],
71
we obtain from B < C that
I(X ∧ Z) > I(Y ∧X,Z), (3.36)
or
I(Y ∧ Z) > I(X ∧ Y, Z). (3.37)
On the other hand, upon writing C as
1
2
[I(X ∧ Y ) + I(Z ∧X, Y )],
we obtain from A < C that
I(X ∧ Y ) > I(Z ∧X, Y ). (3.38)
A contradiction arises when comparing (3.36), (3.38) or (3.37), (3.38). Therefore, the
condition C > max(A,B) is not true.
Case 3: A < C ≤ B:
The outer bound for the (SK, PK)-capacity region under this condition is depicted
in Figure 3.3. To show that this region is achievable, it suﬃces to show the achievability
of (SK, PK)-rate pairs (0, I(X ∧ Y |Z)), (A, 0),
(min{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)} , I(X ∧ Y |Z)) ,
(max{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)}, B−max{I(X ∧ Z), I(Y ∧ Z)}), (3.39)
and
(I(Z ∧X, Y ), I(X ∧ Y )− I(Z ∧X, Y )) . (3.40)
While the achievability of the ﬁrst three (SK, PK)-rate pairs can be shown, it remains
unclear whether (SK, PK)-rate pairs (3.39) and (3.40) are achievable.
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Figure 3.3: Inner and outer bounds for CSP for Case 3.
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Chapter 4
Secret Key and Private Key Constructions for Simple Multiterminal Source Models
4.1 Introduction
This part of the dissertation is motivated by recent results of Csisza´r and Narayan [17],
which highlight innate connections between secrecy generation by multiple terminals and
multiterminal Slepian-Wolf near-lossless data compression (sans secrecy restrictions). We
propose a new approach for constructing secret and private keys based on the long-known
Slepian-Wolf code for sources connected by a virtual additive noise channel, due to Wyner
[63]. Explicit procedures for such constructions, and their substantiation, are provided.
In particular, we use low density parity check (LDPC) channel codes to construct a new
class of secret keys.
Of particular relevance to the contents of this chapter are recent results in [17] for
models with an arbitrary number of terminals, each of which observes a distinct component
of a discrete memoryless multiple source (DMMS). Unrestricted public communication is
allowed between these terminals. All the transmissions are observed by all the terminals
and by the eavesdropper. Two models considered in [17] are directly relevant to our work,
and these are ﬁrst brieﬂy described below.
(i) Suppose that m ≥ 2 terminals X1, · · · ,Xm1 observe n independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.) repetitions of the random variables (rvs) X1, · · ·Xm, denoted by
Xn1 , · · · , Xnm, respectively. A SK generated by these terminals consists of “common ran-
1Since we shall consider the models with an arbitrary number of terminals hereafter, we shall use
X1, · · · ,Xm in lieu of X ,Y ,Z , · · · to denote the terminals.
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domness,” based on public communication which is concealed from an eavesdropper with
access to this communication. The largest (entropy) rate of such a SK is termed the
SK-capacity, denoted by CS , and is shown in [17] to equal
CS = H(X1, · · · , Xm)−Rmin, (4.1)
where
Rmin = min
(R1,···,Rm)∈R
m∑
i=1
Ri,
with
R =
⎧⎨
⎩(R1, · · · , Rm) :
∑
i: Xi∈B
Ri ≥ H(XB|XBc),B ⊂ {X1, · · · ,Xm}
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
where XB = {Xi,Xi ∈ B} and Bc = {X1, · · · ,Xm}\B.
(ii) For a given subset of the terminals A ⊂ {X1, · · · ,Xm}, a private key (PK) for the
terminals in A, private from the terminals in Ac, is a SK generated by the terminals in A
(with the possible help of the terminals in Ac), which is concealed from an eavesdropper
with access to the public communication and also from the “helper” terminals in Ac (and,
hence, private). The largest (entropy) rate of such a PK is termed the PK-capacity,
denoted by CP (A). It is shown in [17] that
CP (A) = H(XA|XAc)− Rmin(A), (4.2)
where
Rmin(A) = min{Ri, Xi∈A}∈R(A)
∑
i: Xi∈A
Ri,
with
R(A) =
⎧⎨
⎩{Ri, Xi ∈ A} :
∑
i: Xi∈B
Ri ≥ H(XB|XBc),B ⊂ A
⎫⎬
⎭ .
The results above aﬀord the following interpretation. The SK-capacity CS , i.e.,
largest rate at which all the m terminals can generate a SK, is obtained by subtract-
ing from the maximum rate of shared common randomness (CR) achievable by these
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terminals, viz. H(X1, · · · , Xm), the smallest sum-rate Rmin of the data-compressed in-
terterminal communication which enables each of the terminals to acquire this maximal
CR. A similar interpretation holds for the PK-capacity CP (A) as well, with the diﬀer-
ence that the terminals in Ac, which act as helpers but must not be privy to the secrecy
generated, can simply “reveal” their observations. Hence, the entropy terms in (4.1) are
now replaced in (4.2) with additional conditioning on XAc . It should be noted that Rmin
and Rmin(A) are obtained as solutions to Slepian-Wolf (SW) multiterminal near-lossless
data compression problems not involving any secrecy constraints. This characterization
of the SK-capacity and PK-capacity in terms of the decompositions above also mirrors
the consecutive stages in the random coding arguments used in establishing these results.
For instance, and loosely speaking, to generate a SK, the m terminals ﬁrst generate CR
(without any secrecy restrictions), say a rv L of entropy rate 1nH(L) > 0, through SW-
compressed interterminal communication F. This means that all the m terminals acquire
the rv L with probability∼= 1. The next step entails an extraction from L of a SK K = g(L)
of entropy rate 1nH(L|F), by means of a suitable operation performed identically at each
terminal on the acquired CR L. When the CR ﬁrst acquired by the m terminals is max-
imal, i.e., L = (Xn1 , · · · , Xnm) with probability ∼= 1, then the corresponding SK K = g(L)
has the best rate CS given by (4.1). A similar approach is used to generate a PK of rate
given by (4.2). Recent independent work [45] for the special case of m = 2 terminals
shows that the mentioned identical operation by the m terminals, to extract a SK from
the previously acquired CR, can be accomplished by means of a linear transformation.
The discussion above suggests that techniques for multiterminal SW data compres-
sion could be used for the constructions of SKs and PKs. Next, in SW coding, the existence
of linear data compression codes with rates arbitrarily close to the SW bound has been
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long known [12]. In particular, when the i.i.d. sequences observed at the terminals are
related to each other through virtual communication channels characterized by indepen-
dent additive noises, such linear data compression codes can be obtained in terms of the
cosets of linear error-correction codes for these virtual channels, a fact ﬁrst illustrated
in [63] for the special case of m = 2 terminals connected by a virtual binary symmetric
channel (BSC). This fact, exploited by most known linear constructions of SW codes (cf.
e.g., [1], [10], [23], [24], [27], [29], [31]–[33], [44], [50], [56]), can enable us to translate such
constructions and other signiﬁcant recent developments in capacity-achieving linear codes
into new constructions of SKs and PKs.
Motivated by these considerations, we seek to devise new construction schemes for
secrecy generation. The main technical contribution of this work is the following: we
consider four simple models of secrecy generation and show how a new class of SKs and
PKs can be constructed, based on the SW data compression code from [63]. Additionally,
we study the use of LDPC codes, a class of linear capacity-achieving channel codes, in the
SW data compression step of the procedure to construct a new class of SKs with rates
arbitrarily close to SK-capacity.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Preliminaries are contained in
Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we consider four simple models for which we illustrate the
constructions of appropriate SKs or PKs, which rely on suitable SW data compression
codes. The SKs or PKs generated by these schemes are shown to satisfy the requisite
secrecy conditions in Section 4.4. Implementations of these constructions using LDPC
codes are illustrated in Section 4.5, and simulation results are also reported in Section 4.5.
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4.2 Preliminaries
4.2.1 The Secret Key Capacity and the Private Key Capacity
Consider a DMMSwithm ≥ 2 components, and with corresponding generic rvs X1, · · · , Xm
taking values in ﬁnite alphabets X1, · · · ,Xm, respectively. Let Xni = (Xi,1, · · · , Xi,n) be n
i.i.d. repetitions of rv Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Terminals X1, · · · ,Xm, with respective observations
Xn1 , · · · , Xnm, represent the m users that wish to generate a SK by means of public com-
munication. These terminals can communicate with each other through broadcasts over
a noiseless public channel, possibly interactively in many rounds. In general, a transmis-
sion from a terminal is allowed to be any function of its observations, and of all previous
transmissions. Let F denote collectively all the public transmissions.
Given ε > 0, the rv KM, with ﬁnite range KM, represents an ε-secret key (ε-SK)
for the terminals in M = {X1, · · · ,Xm}, achieved with communication F, if KM satisﬁes
• the common randomness condition: KM is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xni ),
1 ≤ i ≤ m;
• the secrecy condition:
1
n
I(KM ∧F) ≤ ε;
and
• the uniformity condition:
1
n
H(KM) ≥ 1
n
log |KM| − ε.
Let A ⊂ {X1, · · · ,Xm} be an arbitrary subset of the terminals. The rv KA, with
ﬁnite range KP (A), represents an ε-private key (ε-PK) for the terminals in A, private
from the terminals in Ac =M\A, achieved with communication F, if KA satisﬁes
• the common randomness condition: KA is ε-recoverable from each of (F, Xni ), for
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Xi ∈ A;
• the secrecy condition:
1
n
I (KA ∧F, XnAc) ≤ ε;
and
• the uniformity condition:
1
n
H(KA) ≥ 1
n
log |KP(A)| − ε.
Definition 4.1 [17]: A nonnegative number R is called an achievable SK rate if εn-
SKs K(n)M are achievable with suitable communication (with the number of rounds possibly
depending on n), such that εn → 0 and 1nH
(
K
(n)
M
)
→ R. The largest achievable SK
rate is called the SK-capacity, denoted by CS . The PK-capacity for the terminals in A,
denoted by CP (A), is similarly deﬁned. An achievable SK rate (resp. PK rate) will be
called strongly achievable if εn above can be taken to vanish exponentially in n. The
corresponding capacities are termed strong capacities.
Single-letter characterizations have been obtained for CS in the case of m = 2 ter-
minals in [3], [36] and for m ≥ 2 terminals in [17], given by (4.1); and for CP (A) in the
case of m = 3 terminals in [3] and for m ≥ 3 terminals in [17], given by (4.2). The proofs
of the achievability parts exploit the close connection between secrecy generation and SW
data compression. Loosely speaking, CR sans any secrecy restrictions, is ﬁrst generated
through SW-compressed interterminal communication, whereby all the m terminals ac-
quire a (common) rv with probability ∼= 1. In the next step, secrecy is then extracted by
means of a suitable identical operation performed at each terminal on the acquired CR.
When the CR initially acquired by the m terminals is maximal, the corresponding SK has
the best rate CS given by (4.1).
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In this chapter, we consider four simple models for which we illustrate the construc-
tions of appropriate strong SKs or PKs.
4.2.2 Linear Codes for the Binary Symmetric Channel
The SW codes of interest will rely on the following result concerning the existence of
“good” linear channel codes for a binary symmetric channel (BSC).
Hereafter, a BSC with crossover probability p, 0 < p < 12 , will be denoted by
BSC(p). Let hb(.) denote the binary entropy function.
Lemma 4.1 [20] For every ε > 0, 0 < p < 12 , and for all n suﬃciently large, there exists
a binary linear (n, n− u) code for a BSC(p), with u < n[hb(p) + ε], such that the average
error probability of maximum likelihood decoding is less than 2−nη , for some η > 0.
4.3 Statement of Results
We now describe our main results on secrecy generation for four speciﬁc models.
Model 4.1: Let the terminals X1 and X2 observe, respectively, n i.i.d. repetitions of
the correlated rvs X1 and X2, where X1, X2 are binary rvs with joint probability mass
function (pmf)
PX1X2(0, 0) = PX1X2(1, 1) =
1− p
2
, PX1X2(0, 1) = PX1X2(1, 0) =
p
2
, (4.3)
with 0 < p < 12 . These terminals wish to generate a strong SK of maximal rate.
The SK-capacity for this model is [3], [17], [36]
CS = I(X1 ∧X2) = 1− hb(p) bit/symbol.
We show a simple scheme for the terminals to generate a SK with rate close to 1− hb(p)
bit/symbol, which relies on Wyner’s well-known method for SW data compression [63].
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The SW problem of interest entails terminal X2 reconstructing the observed sequence xn1
at terminal X1 from the SW codeword for xn1 and its own observed sequence xn2 .
Observe that under the given joint pmf (4.3), Xn2 can be considered as an input to
a virtual BSC(p), while Xn1 is the corresponding output, i.e., we can write
Xn1 = X
n
2 ⊕ V n, (4.4)
where V n = (V1, · · · , Vn) is an i.i.d. sequence of {0, 1}-valued rvs, independent of Xn2 ,
with Pr{Vi = 1} = p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(i) SW data compression [63]:
Let C be a linear (n, n−u) code as in Lemma 4.1 with parity check matrix P. Both
terminals know C (and P).
Terminal X1 transmits the syndromePxn1 2 to terminalX2. The maximum likelihood
estimate of xn1 at terminal X2 is:
xˆn2 (1) = x
n
2 ⊕ fP(Pxn1 ⊕Pxn2 ),
where fP(Pxn1 ⊕Pxn2 ) is the most likely sequence vn (under the pmf of V n as above) with
syndrome Pvn = Pxn1⊕Pxn2 , with ⊕ denoting addition modulo 2. Note that in a standard
array corresponding to the code C above, fP(Pxn1 ⊕Pxn2 ) is simply the coset leader of the
coset with syndrome Pxn1 ⊕Pxn2 . Also, xn1 and xˆ2(1) lie in the same coset.
The probability of decoding error at terminal X2 is given by
Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 } = Pr{Xn2 ⊕ fP(PXn1 ⊕PXn2 ) = Xn1 }.
It readily follows from (4.4) that
Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 } = Pr{fP(PV n) = V n}.
2In the interests of avoiding repeated superscript, we shall hereafter use Pxn1 in lieu of the correct
P(xn1 )
t, which should not cause any confusion.
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By Lemma 4.1, Pr{fP(PV n) = V n} < 2−nη for some η > 0 and for all n suﬃciently large,
so that
Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 } ≥ 1− 2−nη .
(ii) SK construction:
Consider a (common) standard array for C known to both terminals. Denote by
ani,j the element of the i
th row and the jth column in the standard array, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u,
1 ≤ j ≤ 2n−u.
Terminal X1 sets K1 = j1 if Xn1 equals ani,j1 in its coset i in the standard array.
Terminal X2 sets K2 = j2 if Xˆn2 (1) equals ani,j2 in the coset i of same standard array.
(iii) SK criteria:
The following theorem shows that K1 constitutes a strongly achievable SK with rate
approaching the SK-capacity.
Theorem 4.1 For some η > 0 and for all n suﬃciently large, the pair of rvs (K1, K2)
generated above, with (common) range K1 (say), satisfy
Pr{K1 = K2} ≥ 1− 2−nη; (4.5)
I(K1 ∧ F) = 0; (4.6)
H(K1) = log |K1|. (4.7)
Furthermore,
1
n
H(K1) > 1− hb(p)− ε. (4.8)
Remark: The probability of K1 being diﬀerent from K2 equals exactly the average error
probability of maximum likelihood decoding when C is used on a BSC(p). Furthermore,
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the gap between the rate of the generated SK and the SK-capacity is as wide as the gap
between the rate of C and the channel capacity. Therefore, if a “better” channel code
for a BSC(p), in the sense that the rate of this code is closer to the channel capacity
and the average error probability of maximum likelihood decoding is smaller, is applied,
then a “better” SK can be generated at both terminals, in the sense that the rate of this
SK is closer to the SK-capacity and the probability is smaller that the keys generated at
diﬀerent terminals do not agree with each other.
Model 4.2: Let the terminals X1 and X2 observe, respectively, n i.i.d. repetitions of the
correlated rvs X1 and X2, where X1, X2 are binary rvs with joint pmf
PX1X2(0, 0) = (1− p)(1− q), PX1X2(0, 1) = pq,
PX1X2(1, 0) = p(1− q), PX1X2(1, 1) = q(1− p), (4.9)
with 0 < p < 12 and 0 < q < 1. These terminals wish to generate a strong SK of maximal
rate.
Note that Model 4.1 is a special case of Model 4.2 for q = 12 . We show below a
scheme for the terminals to generate a SK with rate close to the SK-capacity for this
model [3], [17],[36], which is
CS = I(X1 ∧X2) = hb(p+ q − 2pq)− hb(p) bit/symbol.
(i) SW data compression:
This step is identical to step (i) for Model 4.1. Note that under the given joint pmf
(4.9), Xn1 and X
n
2 can be written as in (4.4). It follows in the same manner as for Model
4.1 that for some η > 0 and for all suﬃciently large n,
Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 } ≥ 1− 2−nη .
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(ii) SK construction:
Both terminals know the linear (n, n − u) code C speciﬁed in Lemma 4.1, and a
(common) standard array for C. Let {eni : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u} denote the set of coset leaders for
all the cosets of C.
Denote by Ai the set of T nX1,ξ sequences in the coset of C with coset leader eni ,
1 ≤ i ≤ 2u. If the number of sequences of the same type in Ai is more than 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′],
where ε′ > ξ + ε with ε being the parameter satisfying u < n[hb(p) + ε] in Lemma 4.1,
then collect arbitrarily 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′] such sequences to compose a subset, which we call a
regular subset (as it consists of sequences of the same type). Continue this procedure until
the number of sequences of every type in Ai is less than 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]. Let Ni denote
the number of distinct regular subsets of Ai.
Enumerate (in any way) the sequences in each regular subset. Let bni,j,k, where
1 ≤ i ≤ 2u, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ni, 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′], denote the kth sequence of the jth regular
subset in the ith coset (i.e., the coset with coset leader eni ).
Terminal X1 sets K1 = k1 if Xn1 equals bni,j1,k1 . Otherwise, K1 is set to be uni-
formly distributed on
{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′]
}
, independent of (Xn1 , X
n
2 ). Terminal X2 sets
K2 = k2 if Xˆn2 (1) equals b
n
i,j2,k2
. Otherwise, K2 is set to be uniformly distributed on{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′]
}
, independent of (Xn1 , X
n
2 , K1).
(iii) SK criteria:
The following theorem shows that K1 constitutes a strongly achievable SK with rate
approaching the SK-capacity.
Theorem 4.2 For some η′ = η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0 and for all n suﬃciently large, the pair of
rvs (K1, K2) generated above, with range K1 (say), satisfy
Pr{K1 = K2} ≥ 1− 2−nη′ ; (4.10)
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I(K1 ∧ F) = 0; (4.11)
H(K1) = log |K1|. (4.12)
Furthermore,
1
n
H(K1) = I(X1 ∧X2)− ε′. (4.13)
The next model is an instance of a Markov chain on a tree (cf. [25], [17]), which
considers a tree T with vertex set V (T ) = {1, · · · , m} and edge set E(T ). For (i, j) ∈
E(T ), let B(i ← j) denote the set of all vertices connected with j by a path containing
the edge (i, j). The rvs X1, · · · , Xm form a Markov chain on the tree T if for each (i, j) ∈
E(T ), the conditional pmf of Xj given {Xl, l ∈ B(i ← j)} depends only on Xi (i.e., is
conditionally independent of {Xl, l ∈ B(i ← j)}\{Xi}, conditioned on Xi. Note that
when T is a chain, this concept reduces to that of a standard Markov chain.
Model 4.3: Let the terminals X1, · · · ,Xm observe, respectively, n i.i.d. repetitions of
{0, 1}-valued rvs X1, · · · , Xm which form a Markov chain on the tree T , and have a joint
pmf PX1···Xm described in the following manner: for (i, j) ∈ E(T ),
PXiXj(xi, xj) =
1
2
(1− p(i,j))δxixj +
1
2
p(i,j) (1− δxixj), 0 < p(i,j) <
1
2
,
for xi ∈ {0, 1}, xj ∈ {0, 1}. These m terminals wish to generate a strong SK of maximal
rate.
Note that Model 4.1 is a special case of Model 4.3 for m = 2. Without any loss of
generality, let
pmax = p(i∗,j∗) = max
(i,j)∈E(T )
p(i,j).
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Then, the SK-capacity for this model is [17]
CSK = I(Xi∗ ∧Xj∗) = 1− hb(pmax) bit/symbol. (4.14)
We show below how to extract a SK with rate close to 1−hb(pmax) by using an extension of
the SW data compression scheme of Model 4.1 for reconstructing xni∗ at all the terminals.
(i) SW data compression:
Let C be a linear (n, n − u) code as in Lemma 4.1 for a BSC(pmax), with parity
check matrix P. Each terminal Xi transmits the syndrome Pxni , 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Let xˆni (j) denote the maximum likelihood estimate at terminal Xi of xnj , 1 ≤ i =
j ≤ m. For a terminal Xi, i = i∗, denote by (i0, i1, · · · , ir) the (only) path in the tree
T from i to i∗, where i0 = i and ir = i∗; this terminal Xi, with the knowledge of (xni ,
Pxni1, · · · ,Pxnir−1,Pxni∗), forms its estimate xˆni (i∗) of xni∗ through the following successive
maximum likelihood estimates of xni1, · · · , xnir−1:
xˆni (i1) = x
n
i ⊕ fP(Pxni ⊕Pxni1),
xˆni (i2) = xˆ
n
i (i1)⊕ fP(Pxni1 ⊕Pxni2),
...
...
...
xˆni (ir−1) = xˆ
n
i (ir−2)⊕ fP(Pxnir−2 ⊕Pxnir−1)
and ﬁnally,
xˆni (i
∗) = xˆni (ir−1)⊕ fP(Pxnir−1 ⊕Pxni∗).
Proposition 4.1 By the successive maximum likelihood estimates above, the estimate
Xˆni (i
∗) at terminal Xi, i = i∗, satisﬁes
Pr{Xˆni (i∗) = Xni∗} ≥ 1−m · 2−nη , (4.15)
for some η > 0 and for all n suﬃciently large.
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Proof of Proposition 4.1: See Appendix B.
It follows directly from (4.15) that for some η′ = η′(η,m) > 0 and for all n suﬃciently
large,
Pr{Xˆni (i∗) = Xni∗ , 1 ≤ i = i∗ ≤ m} ≥ 1− 2−nη
′
.
(ii) SK construction:
Consider a (common) standard array for C known to all the terminals. Denote by
anl,k the element of the l
th row and the kth column in the standard array, 1 ≤ l ≤ 2u,
1 ≤ k ≤ 2n−u.
Terminal Xi∗ sets Ki∗ = ki∗ if Xni∗ equals anl,ki∗ in the standard array. Terminals Xi,
1 ≤ i = i∗ ≤ m, set Ki = ki if Xˆni (i∗) equals anl,ki in the same standard array.
(iii) SK criteria:
The following theorem shows that Ki∗ constitutes a strongly achievable SK with
rate approaching the SK-capacity.
Theorem 4.3 For some η′ = η′(η,m) > 0 and for all suﬃciently large n, the set of rvs
(K1, · · · , Km) generated above, with range Ki∗ (say), satisfy
Pr{K1 = · · · = Km} ≥ 1− 2−nη′ ; (4.16)
I(Ki∗ ∧F) = 0; (4.17)
H(Ki∗) = log |Ki∗|. (4.18)
Furthermore,
1
n
H(Ki∗) > 1− hb(pmax)− ε. (4.19)
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Model 4.4: Let the terminals X1, X2 and X3 observe, respectively, n i.i.d. repetitions
of the {0, 1}-valued correlated rvs X1, X2, X3, with joint pmf PX1X2X3 given by:
PX1X2X3(0, 0, 0) = PX1X2X3(0, 1, 1) =
(1− p)(1− q)
2
,
PX1X2X3(0, 0, 1) = PX1X2X3(0, 1, 0) =
pq
2
,
PX1X2X3(1, 0, 0) = PX1X2X3(1, 1, 1) =
p(1− q)
2
,
PX1X2X3(1, 0, 1) = PX1X2X3(1, 1, 0) =
q(1− p)
2
, (4.20)
with 0 < p < 12 and 0 < q < 1. Terminals X1 and X2 wish to generate a strong PK of
maximal rate, which is concealed from the helper terminal X3.
Note that under the joint pmf of X1, X2, X3 above, we can write
Xn1 = X
n
2 ⊕Xn3 ⊕ V n, (4.21)
where V n = (V1, · · · , Vn) is an i.i.d. sequence of {0, 1}-valued rvs, independent of (Xn2 , Xn3 ),
with Pr{Vi = 1} = p, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We show below a scheme for terminals X1 and X2 to generate a PK with rate close
to the PK-capacity for this model [3], [16], [17]
CP ({X1,X2}) = I(X1 ∧X2|X3) = hb(p + q − 2pq)− hb(p) bit/symbol.
The ﬁrst step of this scheme entails terminal X3 simply revealing its observations xn3
to both terminals X1 and X2. Then, Wyner’s SW data compression scheme is used for
reconstructing xn1 at terminal X2 from the SW codeword for xn1 and its own knowledge of
xn2 ⊕ xn3 .
(i) SW data compression:
This step is identical to step (i) for Model 4.1, as seen with the help of (4.21).
Obviously,
Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 } ≥ 1− 2−nη ,
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for some η > 0 and for all suﬃciently large n.
(ii) SK construction:
Suppose that terminals X1 and X2 know a linear (n, n − u) code C as in Lemma
4.1, and a (common) standard array for C. Let {eni : 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u} denote the set of coset
leaders for all the cosets of C.
For a sequence xn3 ∈ {0, 1}n, denote by Ai(xn3 ) the set of T nX1|X3,ξ(xn3 ) sequences
in the coset of C with coset leader eni , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u. If the number of sequences of the
same joint type with xn3 in Ai(x
n
3 ) is more than 2
n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′], where ε′ > 2ξ + ε and
ε satisﬁes u < n[hb(p) + ε] (as in Lemma 4.1), then collect arbitrarily 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′]
such sequences to compose a regular subset. Continue this procedure until the number of
sequences of every joint type with xn3 in Ai(x
n
3 ) is less than 2
n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′]. Let Ni(xn3 )
denote the number of distinct regular subsets of Ai(xn3 ).
For a given sequence xn3 , enumerate (in any way) the sequences in each regular
subset. Let bni,j,k(x
n
3 ), where 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u, 1 ≤ j ≤ Ni(xn3 ), 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′],
denote the kth sequence of the jth regular subset in the ith coset.
Terminal X1 sets K1 = k1 if Xn1 equals bni,j1,k1(xn3 ). Otherwise, K1 is set to be
uniformly distributed on
{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′]
}
, independent of (Xn1 , X
n
2 , X
n
3 ). Ter-
minal X2 sets K2 = k2 if Xˆn2 (1) equals bni,j2,k2(xn3 ). Otherwise, K2 is set to be uniformly
distributed on
{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′]
}
, independent of (Xn1 , X
n
2 , X
n
3 , K1).
(iii) SK criteria:
The following theorem shows that K1 constitutes a strongly achievable PK with rate
approaching the PK-capacity.
Theorem 4.4 For some η′ = η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0 and for all suﬃciently large n, the pair of
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rvs (K1, K2) generated above, with range K1 (say), satisfy
Pr{K1 = K2} ≥ 1− 2−nη′ ; (4.22)
I(K1 ∧Xn3 ,F) = 0; (4.23)
H(K1) = log |K1|. (4.24)
Furthermore,
1
n
H(K1) = I(X1 ∧X2|X3)− ε′. (4.25)
Remark: The PK construction scheme above applies for any joint pmf of X1, X2, X3,
satisfying (4.21), and is not restricted to the given joint pmf of X1, X2, X3 in (4.20).
4.4 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 4.1: It follows from the SK construction scheme that
Pr{K1 = K2} = Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 } < 2−nη,
which is (4.5). Since the rv X1 is uniformly distributed on {0, 1}, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u, 1 ≤ j ≤
2n−u,
Pr{Xn1 = ani,j} = 2−n.
Hence,
Pr{K1 = j} =
2u∑
i=1
Pr{Xn1 = ani,j} = 2−(n−u), 1 ≤ j ≤ 2n−u,
i.e., K1 is uniformly distributed on {1, · · · , 2n−u}, and so
H(K1) = log 2n−u = n − u = log |K1|,
which is (4.7). Therefore, (4.8) holds since u < n[hb(p) + ε].
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It remains to show that K1 satisﬁes the secrecy condition (4.6), with F = PXn1 .
Let {eni , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u} be the set of coset leaders for all the cosets of C. For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u,
1 ≤ j ≤ 2n−u,
Pr{K1 = j|PXn1 = Peni } =
Pr{K1 = j,PXn1 = Peni }
Pr{PXn1 = Peni }
=
Pr{Xn1 = ani,j}∑2n−u
j′=1 Pr{Xn1 = ani,j′}
= 2−(n−u)
= Pr{K1 = j}.
Therefore, K1 is independent of F, and I(K1 ∧F) = 0, establishing (4.6).
Proof of Theorem 4.2: Let F denote the union of all regular subsets in ⋃2ui=1 Ai. Clearly,
F ⊆ T nX1,ξ, so that
Pr{Xn1 ∈ F} = Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1,ξ, Xn1 ∈ F} = Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1,ξ}−Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1,ξ\F}. (4.26)
By Proposition A.1, Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1,ξ} goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in n. We show below
that Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1,ξ\F} goes to 0 exponentially rapidly in n.
Recall from Appendix A.1 that the number of diﬀerent types of sequences in {0, 1}n does
not exceed (n+ 1)2. Thus,
∣∣∣{xn1 : xn1 ∈ T nX1,ξ\F}
∣∣∣ ≤ 2u · (n+ 1)2 · 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′]
< (n+ 1)2 · 2n[H(X1)+ε−ε′],
where the previous inequality is from u < n[hb(p) + ε] = n[H(X1|X2) + ε].
Since PnX1(x
n
1 ) ≤ 2−n[H(X1)−ξ], xn1 ∈ T nX1,ξ, we get
Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1,ξ\F} < (n+ 1)2 · 2−n(ε
′−ξ−ε).
Choosing ε′ > ξ + ε, Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1,ξ\F} goes to 0 exponentially rapidly. Therefore, it
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follows from (4.26) that Pr{Xn1 ∈ F} goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in n, with exponent
depending on (ξ, ε, ε′).
By the SK construction scheme,
Pr{K1 = K2} = Pr{K1 = K2, Xn1 ∈ F}+ Pr{K1 = K2, Xn1 ∈ F}
≤ Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 , Xn1 ∈ F}+ Pr{Xn1 ∈ F}
≤ Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 }+ Pr{Xn1 ∈ F}.
Since Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 } < 2−nη, by the observation in the previous paragraph, we have
Pr{K1 = K2} < 2−nη′ ,
for some η′ = η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0 and for all suﬃciently large n, which is (4.10).
Next, we shall show that K1 satisﬁes the uniformity condition (4.12). For 1 ≤ k ≤
2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′], it is clear by choice that
Pr{K1 = k|Xn1 ∈ F} = 2−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′], (4.27)
and that
Pr{K1 = k|Xn1 ∈ F} =
Pr{K1 = k, Xn1 ∈ F}
Pr{Xn1 ∈ F}
=
∑2u
i=1
∑Ni
j=1 Pr{Xn1 = bni,j,k}∑2u
i=1
∑Ni
j=1 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′] Pr{Xn1 = bni,j,k}
(4.28)
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′], (4.29)
where (4.28) is due to every regular subset consisting of sequences of the same type. From
(4.27) and (4.29),
Pr{K1 = k} = 2−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′], (4.30)
i.e., K1 is uniformly distributed on
{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′]
}
, with
1
n
H(K1) = I(X1 ∧X2)− ε′,
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which is (4.13).
It remains to show that K1 satisﬁes the secrecy condition (4.11), with F = PXn1 .
For 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u and 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε′], we have
Pr{K1 = k|PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F} = 2−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′],
by choice, and
Pr{K1 = k|PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F} =
Pr{K1 = k,PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F}
Pr{PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F}
=
∑Ni
j=1 Pr{Xn1 = bni,j,k}∑Ni
j=1 2n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′] Pr{Xn1 = bni,j,k}
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′].
Hence,
Pr{K1 = k|PXn1 = Peni } = Pr{K1 = k|PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F} · Pr{Xn1 ∈ F|PXn1 = Peni }
+Pr{K1 = k|PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F} · Pr{Xn1 ∈ F|PXn1 = Peni }
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2)−ε
′]
= Pr{K1 = k},
where the previous equality follows from (4.30). In other words, K1 is independent of F,
establishing (4.11).
Proof of Theorem 4.3: Applying the same arguments used in Theorem 4.1, we can
show that the set of rvs (K1, · · · , Km) satisfy (4.16), (4.18) and (4.19). It then remains to
show that Ki∗ satisﬁes the secrecy condition (4.17), with F = (PXn1 , · · · ,PXnm).
Under the given joint pmf PX1···Xm, for each i = i∗, we can write
Xni = X
n
i∗ ⊕ V ni ,
where V ni = (Vi,1, · · · , Vi,n) is an i.i.d. sequence of {0, 1}-valued rvs. Further, V ni , 1 ≤ i =
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i∗ ≤ m, and Xni∗ are mutually independent. Then,
I(Ki∗ ∧F) = I(Ki∗ ∧ {PXni , 1 ≤ i ≤ m})
≤ I(Ki∗ ∧PXni∗ , {PV ni , 1 ≤ i = i∗ ≤ m})
≤ I(Ki∗ ∧PXni∗) + I(Ki∗,PXni∗ ∧ {PV ni , 1 ≤ i = i∗ ≤ m}). (4.31)
Clearly, the ﬁrst term on the right side of (4.31) is zero. Since for a ﬁxed P, (Ki∗ ,PXni∗)
are functions of Xni∗,
I(Ki∗,PXni∗ ∧ {PV ni , 1 ≤ i = i∗ ≤ m}) ≤ I(Xni∗ ∧ {V ni , 1 ≤ i = i∗ ≤ m}) = 0,
i.e., Ki∗ is independent of F, establishing (4.17).
Proof of Theorem 4.4: For every xn3 ∈ {0, 1}n, let F (xn3) denote the union of all regular
subsets in
⋃2u
i=1 Ai(x
n
3 ). Since F (xn3 ) ⊆ T nX1|X3,ξ(xn3 ),
Pr{Xn1 ∈ F(Xn3 )} = Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(Xn3 )} − Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(Xn3 )\F (Xn3 )}. (4.32)
It follows from Proposition A.1 that Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(Xn3 )} goes to 1 exponentially
rapidly in n. We shall show below that Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(Xn3 )\F (Xn3 )} goes to 0 expo-
nentially rapidly in n.
Recall from Appendix A.1 that the number of diﬀerent joint types of pairs in
{0, 1}n× {0, 1}n does not exceed (n+ 1)4. Thus,
∣∣∣{xn1 : xn1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(xn3 )\F (xn3)}
∣∣∣ ≤ 2u · (n+ 1)4 · 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′]
< (n+ 1)4 · 2n[H(X1|X3)+ε−ε′],
where the previous inequality is from u < n[hb(p) + ε] = n[H(X1|X2, X3) + ε].
Since PnX1|X3(x
n
1 |xn3 ) ≤ 2−n[H(X1|X3)−2ξ], (xn1 , xn3 ) ∈ T nX1X3,ξ, we get
Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(Xn3 )\F (Xn3 )} < (n+ 1)4 · 2−n(ε
′−2ξ−ε).
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Choosing ε′ > 2ξ + ε, Pr{Xn1 ∈ T nX1|X3,ξ(Xn3 )\F (Xn3 )} goes to 0 exponentially rapidly.
Therefore, it follows from (4.32) that Pr{Xn1 ∈ F(Xn3 )} goes to 1 exponentially rapidly in
n, with an exponent depending on (ξ, ε, ε′).
By the PK construction scheme,
Pr{K1 = K2} = Pr{K1 = K2, Xn1 ∈ F(xn3 )}+ Pr{K1 = K2, Xn1 ∈ F(xn3)}
≤ Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 , Xn1 ∈ F(xn3 )}+ Pr{Xn1 ∈ F(xn3 )}
≤ Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 ) + Pr(Xn1 ∈ F(Xn3 )}.
Since Pr{Xˆn2 (1) = Xn1 } < 2−nη, by the observation in the previous paragraph, we have
Pr{K1 = K2} < 2−nη′ ,
for some η′ = η′(η, ξ, ε, ε′) > 0 and for all suﬃciently large n, which is (4.22).
Next, we shall show that K1 satisﬁes the uniformity condition (4.24). For xn3 ∈
{0, 1}n and 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′], it is clear by choice that
Pr{K1 = k|Xn1 ∈ F(xn3), Xn3 = xn3} = 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′],
and that
Pr{K1 = k|Xn1 ∈ F(xn3), Xn3 = xn3}
=
Pr{K1 = k, Xn1 ∈ F(xn3)|Xn3 = xn3}
Pr{Xn1 ∈ F(xn3)|Xn3 = xn3}
=
∑2u
i=1
∑Ni(xn3 )
j=1 Pr{Xn1 = bni,j,k(xn3 )|Xn3 = xn3}∑2u
i=1
∑Ni(xn3 )
j=1 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′] Pr{Xn1 = bni,j,k(xn3 )|Xn3 = xn3}
(4.33)
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′],
where (4.33) is due to every regular subset consisting of sequences of the same joint type
with xn3 . Therefore,
Pr{K1 = k} =
∑
xn3∈{0,1}n
Pr{K1 = k, Xn3 = xn3}
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=
∑
xn3∈{0,1}n
[Pr{Xn1 ∈ F(xn3 ), Xn3 = xn3} · Pr{K1 = k|Xn1 ∈ F(xn3), Xn3 = xn3}
+Pr{Xn1 ∈ F(xn3 ), Xn3 = xn3} · Pr{K1 = k|Xn1 ∈ F(xn3), Xn3 = xn3}]
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′], (4.34)
i.e., K1 is uniformly distributed on
{
1, · · · , 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε′]
}
, with
1
n
H(K1) = I(X1 ∧X2|X3)− ε′,
which is (4.25).
It remains to show that K1 satisﬁes the secrecy condition (4.23), with (Xn3 ,F) =
(Xn3 ,PX
n
1 ). For x
n
3 ∈ {0, 1}n, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u and 1 ≤ k ≤ 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′], we have
Pr{K1 = k|PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F(xn3), Xn3 = xn3} = 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′],
by choice, and
Pr{K1 = k|PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F(xn3 ), Xn3 = xn3}
=
Pr{K1 = k,PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F(xn3)|Xn3 = xn3}
Pr{PXn1 = Peni , Xn1 ∈ F(xn3)|Xn3 = xn3}
=
∑Ni(xn3 )
j=1 Pr{Xn1 = bni,j,k(xn3 )|Xn3 = xn3}∑Ni(xn3 )
j=1 2n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′] Pr{Xn1 = bni,j,k(xn3 )|Xn3 = xn3}
= 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′].
Hence,
Pr{K1 = k|PXn1 = Peni , Xn3 = xn3} = 2−n[I(X1∧X2|X3)−ε
′] = Pr{K1 = k},
where the previous equality follows from (4.34). In other words, K1 is independent of
(Xn3 ,F), establishing (4.23).
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4.5 Implementation Using LDPC Codes
4.5.1 Preliminaries Concerning LDPC Codes
The following standard deﬁnitions on LDPC codes can be found, for instance, in [57], [34],
[52], [60].
A linear code is associated with a graphical representation, by means of a bipartite
graph whose left (or variable) nodes correspond to coordinates of a codeword and right (or
check) nodes correspond to the set of parity check constraints satisﬁed by codewords of
this code. The bipartite graph representing a linear (n, n− u) code has n variable nodes
and u check nodes. A variable node is connected with a check node if the coordinate
corresponding to that variable node is involved in the parity check constraint corresponding
to that check node.
Binary LDPC codes are binary linear codes with low density parity check matrices
in the sense that the parity check matrices contain relatively few 1s. In a parity check
matrix for a (l, r)-regular LDPC code, every row has r 1s and every column has l 1s. Thus,
a (l, r)-regular LDPC code is represented by a bipartite graph in which the degree of every
variable node is l and the degree of every check node is r.
An irregular LDPC code with degree distribution pair (λ(x), ρ(x)) is represented by
a bipartite graph, in which the degrees of variable nodes (resp. check nodes) are chosen
according to the distribution λ(x) =
∑
i λix
i−1 (resp. ρ(x) =
∑
i ρix
i−1), with λi (resp.
ρi) denoting the fraction of edges connecting variable (resp. check) nodes of degree i.
The rate of a (l, r)-regular LDPC code is 1− lr and the rate of an irregular LDPC
code with degree distribution pair (λ(x), ρ(x)) is given by 1−
∫ 1
0
ρ(x)dx∫ 1
0
λ(x)dx
.
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4.5.2 Implementation for Model 4.1
The implementation of the SK construction scheme for Model 4.1 is illustrated below by
using binary LDPC codes.
(i) LDPC code:
Since every linear code is equivalent to a systematic code (cf. e.g., [49, p. 46]),
without loss of generality, we consider a systematic (n, n−u) LDPC code C with generator
matrix G = [In−u A], where In−u is an (n − u) × (n − u) identity matrix and A is an
(n − u) × u matrix. Then, the parity check matrix for C is P = [At Iu], where Iu is an
u× u identity matrix.
The ﬁrst n − u bits of every codeword in C, which are called information bits, are
pairwise distinct. Further, since the coset of C with coset leader eni , 1 ≤ i ≤ 2u, must
contain the sequence bni = [0
n−u eni P
t], with 0n−u denoting a sequence of n− u zeros, the
ﬁrst n− u bits of every sequence in this coset {bni ⊕ cn, cn ∈ C} are pairwise distinct.
(ii) SW data compression:
The following scheme is known from [32].
Terminal X1 transmits the syndrome Pxn1 . Terminal X2, with the knowledge of xn2 ,
Pxn1 , and (the crossover probability) p, applies the following belief-propagation algorithm
[32] to estimate xˆn2 (1).
Let (v1, · · · , vn) and (w1, · · · , wu) denote variable-node sets and check-node sets in
the bipartite graph representing C. Depict by vi ∼ wj (or equivalently, wj ∼ vi), if the
variable node vi is connected with the check node wj. The decoding algorithm will proceed
in iterations. Each iteration starts by propagating messages from variable nodes to check
nodes and ends by sending messages from check nodes back to variable nodes. Messages
are propagated only between the connected nodes.
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Let M (k)vi→wj denote the message propagated from the variable node vi to the check
node wj in the kth iteration, k ≥ 1. Let M (k)wj→vi denote the message propagated from the
check node wj to the variable node vi in the kth iteration. Then, set
M (k)vi→wj = (1− 2x2,i) log
1− p
p
+
∑
l:l =j,wl∼vi
M (k−1)wl→vi ,
and
M (k)wj→vi = 2 tanh
−1
⎡
⎣(1− 2sj) ∏
l:l =i,vl∼wj
tanh
⎛
⎝M (k)vl→wj
2
⎞
⎠
⎤
⎦ ,
where x2,i denotes the ith bit of xn2 and sj denotes the j
th bit of Pxn1 . By deﬁnition,
M
(0)
wl→vi = 0.
At the end of the kth iteration, estimate xˆn2 (1) = (xˆ2(1, 1), · · · , xˆ2(1, n)) as
xˆ2(1, i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
0, if (1− 2x2,i) log 1−pp +
∑
j:wj∼vi M
(k)
wj→vi ≥ 0,
1, if (1− 2x2,i) log 1−pp +
∑
j:wj∼vi M
(k)
wj→vi < 0.
This procedure is terminated if either Pxˆn2 (1) = Px
n
1 or a designated number of iterations
has been reached.
(iii) SK construction:
Since the ﬁrst n − u bits of every sequence in each coset of C are pairwise distinct,
these n − u bits can serve as the index of the sequence in its coset. Therefore, terminal
X1 (resp. X2) could simply set K1 (resp. K2) as the ﬁrst n− u bits of xn1 (resp. xˆn2 (1)).
The same implementation of the SW data compression scheme above applies for
Models 4.2 and 4.4. They can also be applied repeatedly for the successive estimates in
Model 4.3.
In Model 4.3, Ki∗ (resp. Ki, i = i∗) is simply set as the ﬁrst n− u bits of xni∗ (resp.
xˆni (i
∗)). However, the current complexity of generating regular subsets for Models 4.2 and
4.4 poses a hurdle in explicit constructions of SKs or PKs for these models.
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4.5.3 Simulation Results
In this subsection, we provide simulation results on the tradeoﬀ between the relative
secrecy rate (i.e., the diﬀerence between the rate of the generated SK and the SK-capacity)
and the rate of generating unequal SKs at diﬀerent terminals, when LDPC codes are used
in the SK construction problem for Model 4.1.
For the purposes of comparison, three diﬀerent kinds of LDPC codes are used:
• a (3, 4)-regular LDPC code;
• a (3, 6)-regular LDPC code;
and
• an irregular LDPC code with degree distribution pair (cf. [32])
λ(x) = 0.234029x+ 0.212425x2 + 0.146898x5 + 0.102840x6 + 0.303808x19,
ρ(x) = 0.71875x7 + 0.28125x8.
The codeword lengths of all the three LDPC codes are 103 bits. The rate of the ﬁrst LDPC
code is 14 bit/channel use, while the rate of the other two LDPC codes is
1
2 bit/channel use.
Sixty iterations of the belief-propagation algorithm are allowed. More than 103 blocks are
transmitted from terminal X1.
Simulation results are shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2, where conditional entropy (i.e.,
H(X1|X2) = hb(p)) is plotted against key bit error rate (KBER). We remark that in this
work, SKs are generated at ﬁxed rates, which are equal to the rates of LDPC codes used.
Since the SK-capacity is given by 1 − hb(p), the conditional entropy hb(p) can serve as
an indicator of the gap between the rate of the generated SK and the SK-capacity. On
the other hand, the KBER is related to the rate of generating unequal SKs at diﬀerent
terminals
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Figure 4.1: Simulation results for the (3, 6)-regular and the irregular LDPC codes.
Figure 4.1 shows the performance of the (3, 6)-regular and the irregular LDPC codes;
ﬁgure 4.2 shows the performance of the (3, 4)-regular LDPC code. It is seen in both ﬁgures
that KBER increases with hb(p). Since the SK-capacity decreases with hb(p), the increase
of hb(p) narrows the gap between the rate of the generated SK and the SK-capacity, but
raises the possibility of generating unequal SKs at diﬀerent terminals. In contrast, the
decrease of hb(p) widens the gap between the rate of the generated SK and the SK-capacity,
but reduces the possibility of generating unequal SKs at diﬀerent terminals.
It is seen from Figure 4.1 that the irregular LDPC code outperforms the (3, 6)-
regular LDPC code. For instance, for a ﬁxed crossover probability p = 0.068, say, and
hb(p) ≈ 0.3584, the KBER with the use of the irregular LDPC code is as low as 10−5,
while the KBER with the use of the (3, 6)-regular LDPC code is only about 4× 10−3.
101
0.54 0.56 0.58 0.6 0.62 0.64 0.66 0.68 0.7 0.72 0.74
10−6
10−5
10−4
10−3
10−2
10−1
100
H(X1|X2)=hb(p) (bits)
KB
ER
(3,4)−regular
Figure 4.2: Simulation results for the (3, 4)-regular LDPC code.
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Chapter 5
The Relationship Between the Common Randomness Capacity and the Secret Key
Capacity for Source Models with Rate Constraints
5.1 Introduction
It has been described in Chapter 4 that for a source model consisting of an arbitrary num-
ber of terminals which respectively observe the distinct components of a DMMS followed
by unrestricted public communication among themselves, the CR-capacity, i.e., the largest
rate of CR that is achieved by the terminals, can be decomposed into the smallest sum-
rate of the communication needed to achieve the CR-capacity, and the SK-capacity (i.e.,
the largest rate at which all the terminals can generate a SK). This leads to the following
question: what is the relationship between the CR-capacity and the SK-capacity for a
given source model with rate constraints on the public communication?
Ahlswede and Csisza´r [4] have determined the CR-capacities for several two-terminal
source models with rate constraints on the public communication. On the other hand,
the SK-capacities for these two-terminal source models are given in [16]. However, the
relationship between the CR-capacities and the SK-capacities for these models has not yet
been examined. In this chapter, we shall discuss this relationship for several two-terminal
source models1 with rate constraints on the public communication.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 contains the prelim-
1The CR-capacities are still unknown, in general, for source models consisting of more than two termi-
nals, and with rate constraints on the public communication. We do not discuss the relationship between
the CR-capacities and the SK-capacities for source models consisting of more than two terminals here.
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inaries. In Section 5.3, we shall consider three simple two-terminal source models, the
ﬁrst two of which have known CR-capacities and SK-capacities. Our main results – the
CR-capacity and the SK-capacity for the third model, as well as the smallest sum-rate
of the communication needed to achieve the CR-capacity for each of the three models
– are provided in Section 5.4. We observe that in each of the three models, the SK-
capacity is equal to the diﬀerence between the CR-capacity and the smallest sum-rate of
the communication needed to achieve the CR-capacity. The proofs are given in Section
5.5.
5.2 Preliminaries
Consider a DMMS with m ≥ 2 components, with corresponding generic rvs X1, · · · , Xm
taking values in ﬁnite alphabets X1, · · · ,Xm, respectively. Let Xni = (Xi,1, · · · , Xi,n),
1 ≤ i ≤ m, be n i.i.d. repetitions of the rv Xi. Terminals X1, · · · ,Xm, with respective
observations Xn1 , · · · , Xnm, represent the m users who wish to generate CR or a SK by
public communication.
Each terminal can communicate with every other terminal through noiseless broad-
casts. The transmissions can be assumed, without any loss of generality, to occur in rm
(r ≥ 1) consecutive time slots in r rounds. The communication can be depicted by rm
rvs F1, · · · , Frm, where Ft denotes the transmission in time slot t, 1 ≤ t ≤ rm, by the
terminal Xi, i = t mod m. In general, Ft is allowed to be any function, deﬁned in terms
of a mapping ft, of the observations at the terminal Xi and of the previous transmis-
sions F[1,t−1] = (F1, · · · , Ft−1). No other resources are available to these m terminals; in
particular, additional randomization is not permitted at the terminals.
Denote by Fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, all the transmissions from terminal Xi. Since the transmis-
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sions from terminal Xi occur in time slots i, · · · , i+(r−1)m, Fi = {Fi+jm, 0 ≤ j ≤ r−1}.
Suppose that Fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, is subject to the rate constraint Ri, i.e.,
1
n
log ||Fi|| = 1
n
r−1∑
j=0
log ||Fi+jm|| ≤ Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, (5.1)
where ||Fi+jm|| denotes the cardinality of the range of Fi+jm. Such rate constraints im-
posed on transmissions depict bandwidth limitations associated with the use of shared
public channels. The notation Ri = ∞ will be used to denote the fact that constraint
(5.1) is not imposed for that i.
The rv K, as a function of (Xn1 , · · · , Xnm) and with ﬁnite range K, represents ε-
common randomness (ε-CR), achievable with communication F = (F1, · · · ,Fm), if K is
ε-recoverable from (F, Xni ) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Definition 5.1 A nonnegative number R is an achievable CR rate if for every ε > 0 and
all suﬃciently large n, there exists ε-CR K, achieved with F = (F1, · · · ,Fm) satisfying
the rate constraints (5.1), such that
1
n
H(K) > R− ε.
The largest achievable CR rate is called the CR-capacity, denoted by CCR(R1, · · · , Rm).
Definition 5.2 A nonnegative number R is an achievable sum-rate of “communication
for largest common randomness” (CLCR sum-rate) if for every ε > 0 and all suﬃciently
large n, ε-CR with rate larger than CCR(R1, · · · , Rm)−ε is achievable with communication
F = (F1, · · · ,Fm) satisfying the rate constraints (5.1), such that for every ξ > 0,
1
n
m∑
i=1
log ||Fi|| = 1
n
m∑
i=1
r−1∑
j=0
log ||Fi+jm|| < R + ξ.
The smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate is denoted by Rmin(R1, · · · , Rm).
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Remark: It follows directly from the deﬁnitions above that
CCR(R1, · · · , Rm) ≤ H(X1, · · · , Xm),
and
Rmin(R1, · · · , Rm) ≤
m∑
i=1
Ri.
The rv KM, with ﬁnite range KM, represents an ε-secret key (ε-SK), achieved with
communication F, if KM is ε-CR and KM satisﬁes the secrecy condition
1
n
I(KM ∧F) < ε,
and the uniformity condition
1
n
H(KM) ≥ 1
n
log |KM| − ε.
Definition 5.3 A nonnegative number R is called an achievable SK rate if for every
ε > 0 and all suﬃciently large n, there exist ε-SKs KM, achieved with F satisfying the
rate constraints (5.1), such that
1
n
H(KM) > R− ε.
The largest achievable SK rate is called the SK-capacity, denoted by CS(R1, · · · , Rm).
Remark: Note that the deﬁnitions of the CR-capacity and the SK-capacity are in the “weak
sense.” (cf. e.g, [3], [17]) While all our results below are presented in the “weak sense,”
they can be established in the stronger sense of [37] by using the techniques developed in
[40].
Let CCR(∞, · · · ,∞), Rmin(∞, · · · ,∞), and CS(∞, · · · ,∞) 2 respectively denote the
CR-capacity, the smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate, and the SK-capacity, when there
2These notations are in eﬀect, identical to Rmin and CS in Chapter 4.
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are no rate constraints (5.1), i.e., Ri =∞, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Clearly,
CCR(∞, · · · ,∞) = H(X1, · · · , Xm),
Rmin(∞, · · · ,∞) = min
(r1,···,rm)∈R
m∑
i=1
ri,
with
R =
⎧⎨
⎩(r1, · · · , rm) :
∑
i: Xi∈B
ri ≥ H(XB|XBc),B ⊂ {X1, · · · ,Xm}
⎫⎬
⎭ ,
and
CS(∞, · · · ,∞) = H(X1, · · · , Xm)−Rmin(∞, · · · ,∞).
This suggests that under unrestricted public communication, the CR-capacityCCR(∞, · · · ,∞)
can be decomposed into the smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate Rmin(∞, · · · ,∞) and the
SK-capacity CS(∞, · · · ,∞).
In this chapter, we study the relationship between CCR(R1, · · · , Rm), Rmin(R1, · · · , Rm)
and CS(R1, · · · , Rm) in the presence of rate constraints (5.1); in particular, we examine
whether and in which situations the relation
CS(R1, · · · , Rm) = CCR(R1, · · · , Rm)−Rmin(R1, · · · , Rm)
holds.
5.3 Previous Results
Model 5.1: Let the terminals X1 and X2 observe, respectively, n i.i.d. repetitions of the
correlated rvs X1 and X2. These terminals wish to generate CR or a SK by means of a
single transmission from terminal X1, which is subject to the rate constraint R1.
Note that Model 5.1 is a special case of the general source model in Section 5.1
for m = 2, r = 1, R1 > 0, and R2 = 0. The CR-capacity for this model, denoted by
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CCR(R1, 0), is [4]
CCR(R1, 0) = max
U
I(U ∧X1),
where the maximum is over all rvs U that satisfy the Markov condition
U −◦−X1 −◦−X2, (5.2)
and the rate condition
I(U ∧X1|X2) ≤ R1. (5.3)
Furthermore, the maximum is attained by a rv U taking values in set U of cardinality
|U| ≤ |X1|.
The SK-capacity for this model, denoted by CS(R1, 0), is [16]
CS(R1, 0) = max
U
I(U ∧X2),
where the rv U satisﬁes (5.2) – (5.3). Also, it is known [3], [36] that if R1 ≥ H(X1|X2),
CCR(R1, 0) = H(X1),
and
CS(R1, 0) = I(X1 ∧X2).
Model 5.2: Let the terminals X1 and X2 observe, respectively, n i.i.d. repetitions of the
correlated rvs X1 and X2. These terminals wish to generate CR or a SK by means of two
transmissions: one from terminal X1, which is subject to the rate constraint R1; the other
from terminal X2, which is subject to the rate constraint R2.
Note that Model 5.1 is a special case of the general source model in Section 5.1
for m = 2, r = 1, R1 > 0, and R2 > 0. The CR-capacity for this model, denoted by
CCR(R1, R2), is [4]
CCR(R1, R2) = max
U,V
I(U, V ∧X1, X2),
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where the maximum is over all pairs of rvs (U, V ) that satisfy the Markov conditions
U −◦−X1 −◦−X2, V −◦−X2, U −◦−X1, (5.4)
and the rate conditions
I(U ∧X1|X2) ≤ R1, I(V ∧X2|X1, U) ≤ R2. (5.5)
Furthermore, the maximum is attained by a pair of rvs (U, V ) taking values in sets (U , V)
of cardinalities |U| ≤ |X1|+ 3, |V| ≤ |X2|.
The SK-capacity for this model, denoted by CS(R1, R2), is [16]
CS(R1, R2) = max
U,V
[I(U ∧X2) + I(V ∧X1|U)],
where the rvs U , V satisfy (5.4) – (5.5). Also, it is known [3], [17], [36] that if either
R1 ≥ H(X1|X2) or R2 ≥ H(X2|X1),
CS(R1, R2) = I(X1 ∧X2),
and
CCR(R1, R2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
H(X1, X2), if R1 ≥ H(X1|X2) and R2 ≥ H(X2|X1),
R2 + H(X1), if R1 ≥ H(X1|X2) and R2 < H(X2|X1),
R1 + H(X2), if R1 < H(X1|X2) and R2 ≥ H(X2|X1).
Model 5.3: Let the terminals X1 and X2 observe, respectively, n i.i.d. repetitions of the
correlated rvs X1 and X2. These terminals wish to generate CR or a SK by means of two-
way multiple rounds (say r rounds) of transmissions. The transmissions from terminal
X1 (resp. X2) are subject to the rate constraint R1 (resp. R2).
Note that Model 5.1 is a special case of the general source model in Section 5.1 for
m = 2, R1 > 0, and R2 > 0.
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5.4 Statement of Results
The following theorem characterizes the smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate for Model 5.1.
Further, the CR-capacity for Model 5.1 is found to be equal to the sum of the SK-capacity
and the smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate.
Theorem 5.1 The smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate for Model 5.1 is
Rmin(R1, 0) = min{R1, H(X1|X2)}.
Further,
CS(R1, 0) = CCR(R1, 0)− Rmin(R1, 0).
Remark: It readily follows from the Slepian-Wolf theorem that if R1 ≥ H(X1|X2),
Rmin(R1, 0) = H(X1|X2). Further, it is clear from the characterizations of CCR(R1, 0),
Rmin(R1, 0) and CS(R1, 0) that if R1 ≥ H(X1|X2), CS(R1, 0) is equal to the diﬀerence
between CCR(R1, 0) and Rmin(R1, 0).
The following theorem characterizes the smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate for
Model 5.2. Further, the CR-capacity for Model 5.2 is found to be equal to the sum of the
SK-capacity and the smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate.
Theorem 5.2 The smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate for Model 5.2 is
Rmin(R1, R2) = min{R1, H(X1|X2)}+min{R2, H(X2|X1)}.
Further,
CS(R1, R2) = CCR(R1, R2)− Rmin(R1, R2).
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Remark: It follows from the Slepian-Wolf theorem that if R1 ≥ H(X1|X2) and R2 ≥
H(X2|X1),
Rmin(R1, R2) = H(X1|X2) +H(X2|X1).
Further, it is clear from the characterizations of CCR(R1, R2), Rmin(R1, R2) andCS(R1, R2)
that if either R1 ≥ H(X1|X2) or R2 ≥ H(X2|X1), CCR(R1, R2) is equal to the sum of
CS(R1, R2) and Rmin(R1, R2).
The following three theorems characterize CCR(R1, R2), CS(R1, R2), andRmin(R1, R2)
for Model 5.3, respectively. Further, the CR-capacity for Model 5.3 is found to be equal
to the sum of the SK-capacity and the smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate.
Theorem 5.3 The CR-capacity CCR(R1, R2) for Model 5.3 is
CCR(R1, R2) = max
U1,···,Ur,V1,···,Vr
I(U1, · · · , Ur, V1, · · · , Vr ∧X1, X2),
where the rvs U1, · · · , Ur, V1, · · · , Vr satisfy the Markov conditions
Ui −◦−X1, U1, · · · , Ui−1, V1, · · · , Vi−1 −◦−X2, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, (5.6)
Vi −◦−X2, U1, · · · , Ui, V1, · · · , Vi−1 −◦−X1, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, (5.7)
and the rate conditions
r∑
i=1
I(Ui ∧X1|X2, U1, · · · , Ui−1, V1, · · · , Vi−1) ≤ R1, (5.8)
r∑
i=1
I(Vi ∧X2|X1, U1, · · · , Ui, V1, · · · , Vi−1) ≤ R2. (5.9)
Theorem 5.4 The SK-capacity CS(R1, R2) for Model 5.3 is
CS(R1, R2) = max
U1,···,Ur,V1,···,Vr
r∑
i=1
[I(Ui ∧X2|U1, · · · , Ui−1, V1, · · · , Vi−1)
+I(Vi ∧X1|U1, · · · , Ui, V1, · · · , Vi−1)],
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where the rvs U1, · · · , Ur, V1, · · · , Vr satisfy (5.6) – (5.9).
Remark: The maxima in Theorems 5.3 and 5.4 are attainable, since by a direct application
of the Support Lemma [15, p. 310], the rvs U1, · · · , Ur, V1, · · · , Vr can be assumed, without
restricting generality, to take values in ﬁnite sets.
Theorem 5.5 The smallest achievable CLCR sum-rate for Model 5.3 is
Rmin(R1, R2) = min{R1, H(X1|X2)}+min{R2, H(X2|X1)}.
Further,
CS(R1, R2) = CCR(R1, R2)− Rmin(R1, R2).
5.5 Proofs
The technical tools used to prove Theorem 5.1 are supplied by Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 below.
For a given joint probability mass function (pmf) PX1X2, deﬁne
S(R1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
PUX1X2 : PUX1X2 = PU |X1PX1X2,
∑
u,x1,x2
PUX1X2 log
PUX1|X2
PU |X2PX1|X2
≤ R1
⎫⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎭
. (5.10)
Note that the CR-capacity for Model 5.1 is
CCR(R1, 0) = max
U :PUX1X2∈S(R1)
I(U ∧X1).
Lemma 5.1 Let X1 and X2 be X1- and X2-valued rvs with joint pmf PX1X2 = PX1PX2|X1,
where PX1 is ﬁxed. Then, I(X1 ∧ X2) is a convex function of PX2|X1. Furthermore,
I(X1 ∧ X2) is a strictly convex function of PX2|X1, iﬀ PX2|X1 = PX2, i.e., X1 is not
independent of X2.
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Proof of Lemma 5.1: Fix PX1 . Consider the conditional pmfs PX2|X1 and PX ′2|X1 , and
let the corresponding joint pmfs on X1 ×X2 be PX1X2 and PX1X ′2 , respectively, and their
respective marginals on X2 be PX2 and PX ′2 . Let
PXλ2 |X1 = λPX2|X1 + λ¯PX ′2|X1 ,
where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 and λ¯ = 1− λ. Clearly, for a given PX1,
PX1Xλ2
= λPX1X2 + λ¯PX1X ′2,
and
PXλ2
= λPX2 + λ¯PX ′2.
Then,
I(X1 ∧Xλ2 ) =
∑
x1,x2
PX1Xλ2
log
PX1Xλ2
PX1PXλ2
=
∑
x1,x2
(λPX1X2 + λ¯PX1X ′2) log
λPX1X2 + λ¯PX1X ′2
λPX1PX2 + λ¯PX1PX ′2
≤
∑
x1,x2
[
λPX1X2 log
PX1X2
PX1PX2
+ λ¯PX1X ′2 log
PX1X ′2
PX1PX ′2
]
(5.11)
= λI(X1 ∧X2) + λ¯I(X1 ∧X ′2),
where (5.11) follows from the log-sum inequality (cf. e.g., [11, p. 29]). Hence, I(X1 ∧X2)
is a convex function of PX2|X1 for ﬁxed PX1. According to the log-sum inequality, equality
in (5.11) holds iﬀ PX1X2 = PX1PX2 and PX1X ′2 = PX1PX ′2 , proving strict convexity. This
completes the proof.
Lemma 5.2 [3]: For arbitrary rvs U , V and sequences of rvs Y = (Y1, · · · , Yn), Z =
(Z1, · · · , Zn),
I(U ∧Y|V )− I(U ∧ Z|V ) =
n∑
i=1
[I(U ∧ Yi|Y1, · · · , Yi−1, Zi+1, · · · , Zn, V )
−I(U ∧ Zi|Y1, · · · , Yi−1, Zi+1, · · · , Zn, V )].
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Proof of Theorem 5.1: To prove the ﬁrst part of this theorem, it suﬃces to show that
Rmin(R1, 0) ≥ R1 for R1 < H(X1|X2).
Let K (with values in K) be arbitrary ε-CR with rate
1
n
H(K) ≥ CCR(R1, 0)− ε,
achieved by a single transmission F = F1 = f1(Xn1 ). We shall show below that for every
ξ > 0 and for all suﬃciently large n,
1
n
log ||F|| ≥ R1 − ξ.
Since K is ε-recoverable from Xn1 , there exists a rv K
′, as a function of Xn1 and
taking values in K, such that
Pr{K ′ = K} ≤ ε.
It follows from Fano’s inequality that
1
n
H(K ′) ≥ 1
n
H(K)− ε log |K|+ 1
n
≥ CCR(R1, 0)− ε− ε log |K|+ 1
n
.
Let U˜ = K ′X1,1 · · ·X1,J−1X2,J+1 · · ·X2,nJ, where J is a rv independent of (Xn1 , Xn2 ) and
uniformly distributed on {1, · · · , n}. It is easily seen that
U˜ −◦−X1,J −◦−X2,J .
By applying Lemma 5.2 and the fact that (X1,i, X2,i) is independent of (X1,1, · · · , X1,i−1, X2,i+1, · · · , X2,n),
we have
I(K ′ ∧Xn1 )− I(K ′ ∧Xn2 ) = n
[
I(U˜ ∧X1,J)− I(U˜ ∧X2,J)
]
.
Considering that
I(K ′ ∧Xn1 )− I(K ′ ∧Xn2 ) = H(K ′|Xn2 )
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= I(K ′ ∧F|Xn2 ) + H(K ′|Xn2 ,F)
≤ H(F) + 2ε log |K|+ 1 (5.12)
≤ nR1 + 2ε log |K|+ 1,
where (5.12) follows from Fano’s inequality, with K ′ being 2ε-recoverable from (Xn2 ,F),
we have
I(U˜ ∧X1,J)− I(U˜ ∧X2,J) ≤ R1 + 2ε log |K|+ 1
n
.
As X1,J , X2,J can be identiﬁed with the rvs X1, X2 of the DMMS, the rv U˜ satisﬁes the
Markov condition (5.2) and the rate condition (5.3). Note that
H(K ′) = I(K ′ ∧Xn1 ) =
n∑
i=1
I(K ′ ∧X1,i|X1,1, · · · , X1,i−1) ≤ nI(U˜ ∧X1,J).
Hence,
I(U˜ ∧X1) ≥ 1
n
H(K ′)
≥ CCR(R1, 0)− ε− ε log |K|+ 1
n
= max
U :PUX1X2∈S(R1)
I(U ∧X1)− ε− ε log |K|+ 1
n
, (5.13)
i.e., I(U˜ ∧X1) is arbitrarily close to the maximum of I(U ∧X1) on S(R1).
Note that for every PUX1X2 ∈ S(R1), we can write
I(U ∧X1) = I(U ∧X1, X2) = I(U ∧X1|X2) + I(U ∧X2),
where I(U ∧X1|X2) can be chosen to equal R1, provided R1 < H(X1|X2). Hence,
max
U :PUX1X2∈S(R1)
I(U ∧X1) = R1 + max
U :PUX1X2∈S(R1)
I(U ∧X2)
is achieved with
I(U ∧X1|X2) = R1. (5.14)
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Furthermore, by Lemma 5.1, I(U ∧X1) is a convex function of PU |X1 for ﬁxed PX1, where
the convexity is not strict iﬀ U is independent of X1, which corresponds to the minimum
of I(U ∧X1). Considering that I(U ∧X1) is a continuous function of PUX1, with the rv
U˜ deﬁned above satisfying (5.13), we have for every δ > 0,
I(U˜ ∧X1)− I(U˜ ∧X2) = I(U˜ ∧X1|X2) ≥ R1 − δ.
It readily follows from (5.12) that
1
n
log ||F|| ≥ 1
n
H(F) ≥ I(U˜ ∧X1)− I(U˜ ∧X2)− 2ε log |K|+ 1
n
≥ R1 − δ − 2ε log |K|+ 1
n
,
completing the proof of the ﬁrst part of this theorem.
Next, we show that
CS(R1, 0) = CCR(R1, 0)− Rmin(R1, 0),
for R1 < H(X1|X2). Let
U∗ = argmax
U
I(U ∧X1),
where the maximum is over all the rvs U satisfying (5.2) – (5.3). Since by deﬁnition,
PU∗X1X2 ∈ S(R1) and
I(U∗ ∧X1) = max
U :PUX1X2∈S(R1)
I(U ∧X1),
it follows from (5.14) that
I(U∗ ∧X1) = I(U∗ ∧X2) +R1.
Hence,
CCR(R1, 0) = I(U∗ ∧X2) +R1 ≤ CS(R1, 0) +Rmin(R1, 0).
By symmetry, it is easily seen that
CS(R1, 0) ≤ CCR(R1, 0)− Rmin(R1, 0).
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For a given joint pmf PX1X2, deﬁne
S(R1, R2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
PUVX1X2 : PUX1X2 = PU |X1PX1X2 ,
PUVX1X2 = PV |UX2PUX1X2,
∑
u,x1,x2
PUX1X2 log
PUX1|X2
PU |X2PX1|X2
≤ R1,
∑
u,v,x1,x2
PUVX1X2 log
PV X2|UX1
PV |UX1PX2|UX1
≤ R2.
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
(5.15)
Note that the CR-capacity for Model 5.2 is
CCR(R1, R2) = max
(U,V ):PUV X1X2∈S(R1,R2)
I(U, V ∧X1, X2).
Proof of Theorem 5.2: To prove the ﬁrst part of this theorem, it suﬃces to show
that Rmin(R1, R2) ≥ min{R1, H(X1|X2)} + min{R2, H(X2|X1)}, for R1 < H(X1|X2) or
R2 < H(X2|X1). We now discuss it for three cases.
Case 1: R1 < H(X1|X2) and R2 < H(X2|X1):
Let K (with values in K) be arbitrary ε-CR with rate
1
n
H(K) ≥ CCR(R1, R2)− ε,
achieved by transmissions F = (F1, F2), where F1 = f1(Xn1 ) and F2 = f2(X
n
2 , F1).
Since K is ε-recoverable from (Xn2 ,F), there exists a rv K
′, as a function of (Xn2 ,F)
and taking values in K, such that Pr{K ′ = K} ≤ ε. It follows from Fano’s inequality that
1
n
H(K ′) ≥ CCR(R1, R2)− ε− ε log |K|+ 1
n
.
Let U˜ = F1X1,1 · · ·X1,J−1X2,J+1 · · ·X2,nJ and V˜ = K ′, where J is a rv independent of
(Xn1 , X
n
2 ) and uniformly distributed on {1, · · · , n}. It is easily seen that
U˜ −◦−X1,J −◦−X2,J
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and
V˜ −◦−X2,J , U˜ −◦−X1,J.
By applying Lemma 5.2 and the fact that (X1,i, X2,i) is independent of (X1,1, · · · , X1,i−1, X2,i+1, · · · , X2,n),
we have
I(F1 ∧Xn1 )− I(F1 ∧Xn2 ) = n
[
I(U˜ ∧X1,J)− I(U˜ ∧X2,J)
]
,
and
I(V˜ ∧Xn1 |F1)− I(V˜ ∧Xn2 |F1) = n
[
I(V˜ ∧X1,J |U˜)− I(V˜ ∧X2,J|U˜)
]
.
Thus,
I(U˜ ∧X1,J)− I(U˜ ∧X2,J) = 1
n
[I(F1 ∧Xn1 )− I(F1 ∧Xn2 )] ≤
1
n
H(F1) ≤ R1. (5.16)
Also,
I(V˜ ∧X2,J|U˜)− I(V˜ ∧X1,J|U˜) = 1
n
[
I(V˜ ∧Xn2 |F1)− I(V˜ ∧Xn1 |F1)
]
=
1
n
H(K ′|Xn1 )
=
1
n
[
I(K ′ ∧ F2|Xn1 ) + H(K ′|Xn1 , F2)
]
≤ 1
n
H(F2|F1) + 2ε log |K|+ 1
n
(5.17)
≤ R2 + 2ε log |K|+ 1
n
.
As X1,J, X2,J can be identiﬁed with the rvs X1, X2 of the DMMS, the rvs U˜ , V˜ satisfy
(5.4) – (5.5). Note that
I(K ′ ∧Xn1 ) =
n∑
i=1
I(K ′ ∧X1,i|X1,1, · · · , X1,i−1) ≤ nI(U˜, V˜ ∧X1,J).
Hence,
I(U˜, V˜ ∧X1, X2) = I(U˜ , V˜ ∧X1) + I(V˜ ∧X2|U˜)− I(V˜ ∧X1|U˜)
≥ 1
n
I(K ′ ∧Xn1 ) +
1
n
H(K ′|Xn1 )
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=
1
n
H(K ′)
≥ CCR(R1, R2)− ε− ε log |K|+ 1
n
= max
(U,V ):PUV X1X2∈S(R1,R2)
I(U, V ∧X1, X2)− ε− ε log |K|+ 1
n
,(5.18)
i.e., I(U˜ , V˜ ∧X1, X2) is arbitrarily close to the maximum of I(U, V ∧X1, X2) on S(R1, R2).
Note that for every PUVX1X2 ∈ S(R1, R2), we can write
I(U, V ∧X1, X2) = I(U ∧X1, X2) + I(V ∧X1, X2|U)
= I(U ∧X1|X2) + I(U ∧X2) + I(V ∧X2|X1, U) + I(V ∧X1|U),
where I(U ∧ X1|X2) can be chosen to equal R1, provided R1 < H(X1|X2), and I(V ∧
X2|X1, U) can be chosen to equal R2, provided R2 < H(X2|X1). Hence,
max
(U,V ):PUV X1X2∈S(R1,R2)
I(U, V∧X1, X2) = R1+R2+ max
(U,V ):PUV X1X2∈S(R1,R2)
[I(U ∧X2) + I(V ∧X1|U)]
is achieved with
I(U ∧X1|X2) = R1, (5.19)
and
I(V ∧X2|X1, U) = R2. (5.20)
Furthermore, by Lemma 5.1, I(U, V ∧X1, X2) is a convex function of PUV |X1X2 for ﬁxed
PX1X2 , where the convexity is not strict iﬀ (U, V ) is independent of (X1, X2), which
corresponds to the minimum of I(U, V ∧ X1, X2). Considering that I(U, V ∧ X1, X2) is
a continuous function of PUVX1X2, with the rvs U˜ , V˜ deﬁned above satisfying (5.18), we
have for every δ1 > 0 and δ2 > 0,
I(U˜ ∧X1)− I(U˜ ∧X2) = I(U˜ ∧X1|X2) ≥ R1 − δ1,
and
I(V˜ ∧X2|U˜)− I(V˜ ∧X1|U˜) = I(V˜ ∧X2|X1, U˜) ≥ R2 − δ2.
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It readily follows from (5.16) and (5.17) that
1
n
H(F1) ≥ R1 − δ1,
and
1
n
H(F2|F1) ≥ R2 − δ2 − 2ε log |K|+ 1
n
.
Therefore,
1
n
log ||F|| ≥ 1
n
H(F1) +
1
n
H(F2|F1) ≥ R1 +R2 − δ1 − δ2 − 2ε log |K|+ 1
n
.
Case 2: R1 < H(X1|X2) and R2 ≥ H(X2|X1):
Let K be arbitrary ε-CR with rate
1
n
H(K) ≥ CCR(R1, R2)− ε = R1 +H(X2)− ε,
achieved by transmissions F = (F1, F2). Then,
1
n
H(F1) ≥ 1
n
H(Xn2 , F1)−
1
n
H(Xn2 )
≥ 1
n
H(K)− ε log |K|+ 1
n
−H(X2)
≥ R1 − ε− ε log |K|+ 1
n
.
Also,
1
n
H(F2|F1) ≥ 1
n
I(F2 ∧Xn2 |Xn1 )
=
1
n
[H(Xn2 |Xn1 )−H(Xn2 |Xn1 , F2)]
≥ H(X2|X1)− ε log |X2|+ 1
n
,
where the last inequality follows since in this case, Xn2 is ε-recoverable from (X
n
1 , F2).
Therefore,
1
n
log ||F|| ≥ R1 + H(X2|X1)− ε− ε log |K|+ ε log |X2|+ 2
n
.
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Case 3: R1 ≥ H(X1|X2) and R2 < H(X2|X1):
The same arguments used for Case 2 apply here.
Next, we show that if R1 < H(X1|X2) and R2 < H(X2|X1),
CS(R1, R2) = CCR(R1, R2)− Rmin(R1, R2).
Let
(U∗, V ∗) = argmax
U,V
I(U, V ∧X1, X2),
where the maximum is for all the pairs of rvs (U, V ) satisfying (5.4) – (5.5). Since by
deﬁnition, PU∗V ∗X1X2 ∈ S(R1, R2) and
I(U∗, V ∗ ∧X1, X2) = max
(U,V ):PUV X1X2∈S(R1,R2)
I(U, V ∧X1, X2),
it follows from (5.19) and (5.20) that
I(U∗ ∧X1) = I(U∗ ∧X2) +R1,
and
I(V ∗ ∧X2|U∗) = I(V ∗ ∧X1|U∗) +R2.
Hence,
CCR(R1, R2) = I(U∗ ∧X2) + I(V ∗ ∧X1|U∗) +R1 +R2 ≤ CS(R1, R2) +Rmin(R1, R2).
The counterpart follows by symmetry.
Proof of Theorems 5.3 and 5.4:
Converse part of Theorem 5.3: For every ε > 0, let K (with values in K) be an ar-
bitrary ε-CR, achieved by transmissions F = (F1,F2) = (F1, F2, · · · , F2r−1, F2r) satisfying
(5.1). Since K is ε-recoverable from (Xn2 ,F), there exists a rv K
′, as a function of (Xn2 ,F)
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and taking values in K, such that Pr{K ′ = K} ≤ ε. Let
U˜i =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
F1X1,1 · · ·X1,J−1X2,J+1 · · ·X2,nJ, i = 1,
F2i−1, 2 ≤ i ≤ r,
(5.21)
and
V˜i =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
F2i, 1 ≤ i ≤ r− 1,
K ′, i = r.
(5.22)
It is shown in Appendix C.1 that {(U˜i, V˜i), 1 ≤ i ≤ r} satisfy the Markov conditions (5.6)
– (5.7). By applying Lemma 5.2, we have
I(U˜1 ∧X1,J)− I(U˜1 ∧X2,J) = 1
n
[I(F1 ∧Xn1 )− I(F1 ∧Xn2 )] ≤
1
n
H(F1),
and for 2 ≤ i ≤ r,
I(U˜i ∧X1,J |U˜1, · · · , U˜i−1, V˜1, · · · , V˜i−1)− I(U˜i ∧X2,J|X2,J, U˜1, · · · , U˜i−1, V˜1, · · · , V˜i−1)
=
1
n
[I(F2i−1 ∧Xn1 |F[1,2i−2])− I(F2i−1 ∧Xn2 |F[1,2i−2])]
≤ 1
n
H(F2i−1|F1, F3, · · · , F2i−3).
As X1,J , X2,J can be identiﬁed with the rvs X1, X2,
R1 ≥ 1
n
H(F1) ≥
r∑
i=1
I(U˜i ∧X1|X2, U˜1, · · · , U˜i−1, V˜1, · · · , V˜i−1). (5.23)
Also, it can be shown that
H(V˜1, · · · , V˜r|Xn1 ) =
r∑
i=1
H(V˜i|Xn1 , U˜1, · · · , U˜i, V˜1, · · · , V˜i−1)
= n
r∑
i=1
I(V˜i ∧X2|X1, U˜1, · · · , U˜i, V˜1, · · · , V˜i−1). (5.24)
Hence,
R2 ≥ 1
n
H(F2|F1) ≥ 1
n
H(F2|Xn1 )
≥ 1
n
H(V˜1, · · · , V˜r|Xn1 )−
1
n
H(K ′|Xn1 ,F2)
≥
r∑
i=1
I(V˜i ∧X2|X1, U˜1, · · · , U˜i, V˜1, · · · , V˜i−1)− 2ε log |K|+ 1
n
. (5.25)
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Therefore, {(U˜i, V˜i), 1 ≤ i ≤ r} satisfy the rate conditions (5.8) – (5.9).
It follows from (5.24) and
I(V˜1, · · · , V˜r ∧Xn1 ) = nI(V˜1, · · · , V˜r, X1,1, · · · , X1,J−1 ∧X1,J)
≤ n
r∑
i=1
I(U˜i, V˜i ∧X1|U˜1, · · · , U˜i−1, V˜1, · · · , V˜i−1),
that
1
n
H(K) ≤ 1
n
H(K ′) +
ε log |K|+ 1
n
≤ 1
n
H(V˜1, · · · , V˜r) + ε log |K|+ 1
n
≤ I(U˜1, · · · , U˜r, V˜1, · · · , V˜r ∧X1, X2) + ε log |K|+ 1
n
.
Converse part of Theorem 5.4: For every ε > 0, let K (with values in K) be an
arbitrary ε-SK, achieved by transmissions F = (F1,F2) satisfying (5.1). Let L = (K,F).
Clearly, L represents an ε-CR. Hence,
1
n
H(L) ≤ I(U˜1, · · · , U˜r, V˜1, · · · , V˜r ∧X1, X2), (5.26)
where the rvs {(U˜i, V˜i), 1 ≤ i ≤ r} are given by (5.21) – (5.22) (with K ′ replaced by a
suitable L′ = L′(Xn2 ,F)). Since K is an ε-SK,
H(L) ≥ H(K,F) = H(K) + H(F)− I(K ∧ F) ≥ H(K) +H(F)− nε.
Therefore, it follows from (5.23), (5.25) and (5.26) that
1
n
H(K) ≤ 1
n
H(L)−H(F) + ε
≤
r∑
i=1
[I(U˜i ∧X2|U˜1, · · · , U˜i−1, V˜1, · · · , V˜i−1)
+I(V˜i ∧X1|U˜1, · · · , U˜i, V˜1, · · · , V˜i−1)] + ε + 2ε log |K|+ 1
n
.
Achievability Parts of Theorems 5.3 and 5.4: The proof is analogous to that of [4,
Theorem 4.4], with a direct extension from one round of transmissions to r rounds of
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transmissions. The details of the proof are omitted here, but the idea behind the proof is
given in Appendix C.2.
Proof of Theorem 5.5:
The proof is analogous to that of Theorem 5.2, with the setting of {(U˜i, V˜i), 1 ≤
i ≤ r} as in (5.21) – (5.22).
124
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Research
6.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, we discussed the problems of
(i). the simultaneous generation of multiple keys by diﬀerent groups of terminals;
(ii). the constructions of SKs and PKs by multiple terminals; and
(iii). the examination of the relationship between the CR-capacity and the SK-
capacity for source models with rate constraints on the public communication.
In part (i), we considered three-terminal source models. We determined in Chapter
2 the inner and outer bounds for the PK-capacity region. Under certain special conditions,
these bounds coincide to yield the exact PK-capacity region. We determined in Chapter 3
the inner and outer bounds for the (SK, PK)-capacity region. Under a certain condition,
these bounds coincide to yield the exact (SK, PK)-capacity region.
In part (ii), we considered several simple secrecy generation models involving multi-
ple terminals, and proposed a new approach for constructing SKs and PKs. This approach
is based on Wyner’s well-known SW data compression scheme for sources connected by
virtual channels with additive independent noise. It has been shown that the generated
SKs and PKs satisfy the desired common randomness, secrecy and uniformity conditions.
In part (iii), we considered several two-terminal source models with rate constraints
on the public communication between these terminals. It has been shown that for each
of these models, the CR-capacity is equal to the sum of the SK-capacity and the smallest
achievable CLCR sum-rate.
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6.2 Future Research
There are many opportunities to expand beyond the research presented here.
For part (i), it would be of interest to seek the exact PK-capacity region and the
exact (SK, PK)-capacity region. A potential approach is to characterize the PK-capacity
region and the (SK, PK)-capacity region in terms of suitable decompositions of the overall
CR, a la the SK-capacity and the PK-capacity when a single key is generated [17]. It is
known in the case of a single key that the SK-capacity is obtained by subtracting from
the maximum rate of shared CR achievable by these terminals the smallest sum-rate of
the data-compressed interterminal communication which enables each of the terminals to
acquire this maximal CR. For counterpart problem involving the PK-capacity region, it is
open whether the largest sum of two individual PK rates is obtained by subtracting from
the maximum rate of shared CR the smallest sum-rate of the data-compressed interter-
minal communication which enables each of the terminals to acquire the randomness used
for the PK generation at that terminal. It is also open whether a similar decomposition
holds for the (SK,PK)-capacity region.
Furthermore, an obvious generalization of the three-terminal source models consid-
ered in Chapters 2 and 3 is the one in which a SK is generated by all three terminals,
and – simultaneously – all three pairs of terminals generate distinct PKs, each of which is
eﬀectively concealed from the remaining terminal. Entropy rates of these simultaneously
generated SK and PKs constitute a (SK, 3-PK)-rate quadruple. The set of all achievable
(SK, 3-PK)-rate quadruples is called (SK, 3-PK)-capacity region. Following arguments
similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 3.1, we can easily obtain an outer bound
for this (SK, 3-PK)-capacity region. Achievability proofs leading to inner bounds for this
(SK, 3-PK)-capacity region are still open.
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For part (ii), in all of the multiterminal source models considered in Chapter 4,
the i.i.d. sequences observed at diﬀerent terminals are related to each other through
virtual communication channels characterized by additive independent noises. Consider
the model in which terminals X1 and X2, which respectively observe i.i.d. repetitions of
the correlated {0, 1}-valued rvs. X1 and X2 with joint pmf PX1X2 , wish to generate a
SK of maximal rate. The observations at terminal X2 can be considered as inputs to a
virtual binary symmetric channel (BSC), while the observations at terminal X1 are the
corresponding outputs. Thus, this channel has the transition probability matrix PX1|X2.
There are two steps in the SK construction schemes in Chapter 4. The ﬁrst step
constitutes SW data compression for the purpose of CR generation at the terminals.
Although the existence of linear data compression codes with rate arbitrarily close to
the SW bound has been long known for arbitrarily correlated sources [12], constructions
of such linear data compression codes are understood in terms of the cosets of linear
error-correction codes for the virtual channel PX1|X2 only when this virtual channel is
characterized by (independent) additive noise [63]. For instance, when the two sources are
connected by a BSC from X2 to X1, a linear data compression code, which attains the SW
rate H(X1|X2) for terminal X2 to reconstruct the observations at X1, is then provided by
a linear channel code which achieves the capacity of the BSC PX1|X2.
However, if the i.i.d. sequences observed at terminals X1 and X2 are arbitrarily
correlated, the virtual communication channel PX1|X2 involved in the data compression
problem is no longer symmetric. It is shown in [21] that linear codes could not achieve the
capacity of a nonsymmetric channel in general. Therefore, it is not clear if the linear data
compression codes that achieve the SW bound can be provided by the linear capacity-
achieving channel codes anymore.
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The second step in the SK construction schemes involves SK extraction from the
previously acquired CR. Recent work [45] shows that for the special case of two-terminal
source model, this extraction can be accomplished by means of a linear transformation.
However, it is still unknown whether such a result holds for a general source model with
more than two terminals.
Next, as mentioned in Section 4.3, for the situation in which the marginal pmfs
at the two terminals diﬀer from the uniform, the extraction of a SK or a PK from the
previously acquired CR involves regular subsets. Loosely speaking, a SK or a PK is set as
the index of a sequence in a regular subset containing that sequence. Since by deﬁnition,
each regular subset consists of sequences of the same type or the same joint type with
regard to a given sequence, the generation of regular subsets is based on the procedure of
collecting a large number of sequences of the same type or of the same joint type relative
to a given sequence. However, the current complexity of such a collection poses a hurdle
in the generation of regular subsets, and subsequently, the explicit implementation of SK
or PK extraction.
Furthermore, the simultaneous construction of multiple keys by diﬀerent groups of
terminals is an interesting new topic, which is completely unexplored.
For part (iii), the examination of the relationship between the SK-capacity and
the CR-capacity for a given source model, with more than two terminals and with rate
constraints on the public communication between the terminals, is an interesting challenge
for future research. The ﬁrst step of the overall eﬀort is to characterize the CR-capacity
for such a model.
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Appendix A
Types and Typical Sequences
The following standard results on types and typical sequences can be found, for instance,
in [15], [11].
A.1 Types
The type of a sequence xn ∈ X n, X a ﬁnite set, is the probability mass function (pmf)
Pxn on X given by
Pxn(a) =
1
n
|{i : xi = a}|, a ∈ X .
The joint type of a pair of sequences (xn, yn) ∈ X n ×Yn is the joint pmf Pxnyn on X × Y
given by
Pxnyn(a, b) =
1
n
|{i : xi = a, yi = b}|, a ∈ X , b ∈ Y.
The number of diﬀerent types of sequences in X n does not exceed (n + 1)|X |, and the
number of diﬀerent joint types of pairs of sequences in X n ×Yn is less than (n+ 1)|X ||Y|.
A.2 Typical Sequences
Given generic rvs X , Y (taking values in the ﬁnite sets X , Y), with joint pmf PXY on
X × Y, the set of sequences in X n which are X-typical with constant ξ, denoted by T nX,ξ,
is deﬁned as
T nX,ξ

=
{
xn ∈ X n : 2−n[H(X)+ξ] ≤ PnX(xn) ≤ 2−n[H(X)−ξ]
}
,
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where PnX(x
n)

= Pr{Xn = xn}, xn ∈ X n; and the set of pairs of sequences in X n × Yn
which are XY -typical with constant ξ, denoted by T nXY,ξ, is deﬁned as
T nXY,ξ

=
{
(xn, yn) ∈ X n × Yn : xn ∈ T nX,ξ, yn ∈ T nY,ξ, 2−n[H(X,Y )+ξ] ≤ PnXY (xn, yn) ≤ 2−n[H(X,Y )−ξ]
}
,
where PnXY (x
n, yn)

= Pr{Xn = xn, Y n = yn}, xn ∈ X n, yn ∈ Yn.
It readily follows that for every (xn, yn) ∈ T nXY,ξ,
2−n[H(X |Y )+2ξ] ≤ PnX |Y (xn|yn) ≤ 2−n[H(X |Y )−2ξ],
where PnX |Y (x
n|yn) = Pr{Xn = xn|Y n = yn}, xn ∈ X n, yn ∈ Yn.
For every yn ∈ Yn, the set of sequences in X n which are X |Y -typical with respect to
yn with constant ξ, denoted by T nX |Y,ξ(y
n), is deﬁned as
T nX |Y,ξ(y
n)

=
{
xn ∈ X n : (xn, yn) ∈ T nXY,ξ
}
;
note that T nX |Y,ξ(y
n) is an empty set if yn ∈ T nY,ξ.
For every yn ∈ T nY,ξ,
∣∣∣T nX |Y,ξ(yn)∣∣∣ ≤ 2n[H(X |Y )+2ξ]. (A.1)
Proposition A.1 Given a joint pmf PXY on X × Y with PXY (x, y) > 0, x ∈ X , y ∈ Y,
for each ξ > 0,
∑
xn∈Tn
X,ξ
PnX(x
n) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|X | · 2
−n ξ2
2 ln 2
[∑
a∈X log
1
PX (a)
]2
, (A.2)
and
∑
(xn,yn)∈TnXY,ξ
PnXY (x
n, yn) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|X ||Y| · 2
−n ξ2
2 ln 2
[∑
(a,b)∈X×Y log
1
PXY (a,b)
]2
, (A.3)
for all n ≥ 1.
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Proof of Proposition A.1: We shall prove (A.2) here. The proof of (A.3), which is
similar, is omitted. Fix δ > 0 and consider the set T n[PX ]δ of sequences in X n which are
PX -typical with constant δ (cf. [15, p. 33]), i.e.,
T n[PX ]δ = {xn ∈ X n : maxa∈X |Pxn(a)− PX(a)| ≤ δ}.
Since T n[P ]δ is the union of the sets of these types P˜ of sequences in X n which satisfy
max
a∈X
|P˜ (a)− PX(a)| ≤ δ, (A.4)
we have
∑
xn∈
(
Tn
[PX ]δ
)c PnX(xn) =
∑
P˜ :maxa∈X |P˜ (a)−PX(a)|>δ
PnX
(
{xn : Pxn = P˜}
)
≤ (n + 1)|X | · 2−nminP˜ :mina∈X |P˜ (a)−PX (a)|>δ D(P˜ ||PX), (A.5)
using the fact that PnX({xn : Pxn = P˜}) ≤ 2−nD(P˜ ||P ) (cf. [15, Lemma 2.6]).
Next, by Pinsker’s inequality (cf. e.g., [15, p. 58]),
D(P˜ ||P ) ≥ 1
2ln2
(
min
a∈X
|P˜ (a)− PX(a)|
)2
≥ δ
2
2ln2
, (A.6)
with the previous inequality holding for every P˜ in (A.4). It follows from (A.5) and (A.6)
that
∑
xn∈Tn
[P ]δ
PnX(x
n) ≥ 1− (n+ 1)|X | · 2−n δ
2
2ln2 (A.7)
for all n ≥ 1.
Finally, observe that
T n[PX ]δ ⊆ T nX,ξ, if ξ = δ
[∑
a∈X
log
1
PX(a)
]
, (A.8)
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which is readily seen from the fact that for each xn ∈ X n,
−1
n
logPnX(x
n)−H(PX) = −1
n
log
(
2−n[H(Pxn )+D(Pxn ||PX)]
)
−H(PX)
= H(Pxn) +D(Pxn ||PX)−H(PX)
= H(Pxn)−H(Pxn) +
∑
a∈X
Pxn(a) log
1
PX(a)
−H(PX)
=
∑
a∈X
[Pxn(a)− PX(a)] log 1
PX(a)
.
Clearly, (A.7) and (A.8) imply (A.2).
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Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 4.1
The proof of Proposition 4.1 relies on the lemma below concerning the average error
probability of maximum likelihood decoding.
A sequence un ∈ {0, 1}n is called a descendent of a sequence vn ∈ {0, 1}n if ui = 1
implies that vi = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. A subset Ω ⊂ {0, 1}n is called quasiadmissible if the
conditions that un ∈ Ω and un is a descendent of vn together imply that vn ∈ Ω.
Lemma B.1 [35] If Ω is a quasiadmissible subset of {0, 1}n, then for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
dµp(Ω)
dp
> 0,
where
µp(Ω) =
∑
xn∈Ω
pwt(x
n)(1− p)n−wt(xn),
with wt(xn) denoting the weight of xn.
For a binary linear code, let E denote the set of coset leaders. It is known (cf. [49,
Theorem 3.11]) that ω = {0, 1}n\E is a quasiadmissible subset of {0, 1}n. If a binary linear
code is used on BSC(p), the average error probability of maximum likelihood decoding is
given by (cf. [54, Theorem 5.3.3])
µp(ω) =
∑
xn∈ω
pwt(x
n)(1− p)n−wt(xn).
It follows from Lemma B.1 that this average error probability increases with the crossover
probability p. In other words, if the same binary linear code is used on two binary
symmetric channels with diﬀerent crossover probabilities, say, 0 < p1 < p2 < 12 , then the
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average error probability of maximum likelihood decoding for a BSC(p1) is strictly less
than that for a BSC(p2). This can also be interpreted since a BSC(p2) is equivalent to a
cascade of a BSC(p1) and a BSC(p2−p11−2p1 ).
We now return to the proof of Proposition 4.1. It follows from Lemma 4.1 that for
some η > 0 and for all suﬃciently large n,
Pr{Xˆnj∗(i∗) = Xni∗} < 2−nη .
Recall that p(i∗,j∗) = max(i,j)∈E(T ) p(i,j) and (i = i0, i1, · · · , ir = i∗) is the path from i to
i∗. It is readily seen from Lemma B.1 that
Pr{Xˆni (i1) = Xni1} < Pr{Xˆnj∗(i∗) = Xni∗} < 2−nη .
Subsequently,
Pr{Xˆni (i2) = Xni2} ≤ Pr{Xˆni (i2) = Xni2, Xˆni (i1) = Xni1}
+Pr{Xˆni (i2) = Xni2, Xˆni (i1) = Xni1}
< 2 · 2−nη.
Continue this procedure, and ﬁnally we have
Pr{Xˆni (i∗) = Xni∗} < r · 2−nη < m · 2−nη.
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Appendix C
Supplemental Proofs for Theorems 5.3 and 5.4
For notational simplicity, we shall use A[i,j] to denote (Ai, · · · , Aj) in this appendix.
C.1 Proof of the Markov Conditions
We shall show that {(U˜i, V˜i), 1 ≤ i ≤ r} deﬁned in (5.21) and (5.22) satisfy the Markov
conditions in (5.6) and (5.7).
It is easily seen that
U˜1 −◦−X1,J −◦−X2,J.
To show that for 2 ≤ i ≤ r, U˜[1,r] and V˜[1,r] satisfy (5.6), it suﬃces to show that
X1,[J+1,n] −◦−X1,[1,J], X2,[J+1,n], F[1,2i−2], J −◦−X2,J, (C.1)
which implies that
F2i−1 −◦−X1,[1,J], X2,[J+1,n], F[1,2i−2], J −◦−X2,J .
In order to establish (C.1), it suﬃces to show that
PX2,J |X1,[1,n] ,X2,[J+1,n] ,F[1,2i−2] ,J = PX2,J |X1,[1,J] ,X2,[J+1,n] ,F[1,2i−2] ,J . (C.2)
Recalling that F2i−1 is a function of (Xn1 , F[1,2i−2]), the left hand side of (C.2) can be
written as
PX2,J |X1,J ,J
i−1∏
l=1
PF2l |X1,[1,n] ,X2,[J,n] ,F[1,2l−1] ,J
PF2l |X1,[1,n] ,X2,[J+1,n] ,F[1,2l−1],J
,
or equivalently,
PX2,J |X1,J ,J
i−1∏
l=1
PF2l|X1,[1,J−1] ,X2,[J,n],F[1,2l−1] ,J
PF2l |X1,[1,J] ,X2,[J+1,n] ,F[1,2l−1] ,J
, (C.3)
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since F2l is a function of (Xn2 , F[1,2l−1]). It is clear that the right hand side of (C.2) can
also be written as (C.3), proving (5.6).
Following the similar arguments used to show (C.1), we have for 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1,
X2,[1,J−1] −◦−X1,[1,J−1], X2,[J,n], F[1,2i−1], J −◦−X1,J ,
which implies that
F2i −◦−X1,[1,J−1], X2,[J,n], F[1,2i−1], J −◦−X1,J.
Further, it is easily seen that
V˜r −◦−X2,J , U˜[1,r], V˜[1,r−1]−◦−X1,J.
Hence, (5.7) is proved.
C.2 Idea of the Achievability Proofs
Given a DMMS with two components corresponding to generic rvs X1, X2, and auxiliary
rvs U[1,r], V[1,r] satisfying (5.6) – (5.9), for every δ > 0 and 1 ≤ i ≤ r, set
N1,i = 2n[I(Ui∧X1|X2,U[1,i−1],V[1,i−1])+2δ],
N2,i = 2n[I(Vi∧X2|X1,U[1,i] ,V[1,i−1])+2δ],
M1,i = 2n[I(Ui∧X2|U[1,i−1],V[1,i−1])−δ],
M2,i = 2n[I(Vi∧X1|U[1,i],V[1,i−1])−δ].
In the ith round, 1 ≤ i ≤ r, sequences uni ji,ki , 1 ≤ ji ≤ N1,i, 1 ≤ ki ≤ M1,i, which are
jointly typical (cf. [11], [15]) with
(un1 j1,k1 , · · · , uni−1ji−1,ki−1, v
n
1 p1,q1
, · · · , vni−1pi−1,qi−1)
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are selected at random. Then, with probability close to 1, there exists a uni ji,ki jointly
typical with
(xn1 , u
n
1 j1,k1
, · · · , uni−1ji−1,ki−1 , v
n
1 p1,q1
, · · · , vni−1pi−1,qi−1),
such that if terminal X1 transmits the index ji to terminal X2, the latter can reconstruct
ki by the joint typicality of uni ji,ki with
(xn2 , u
n
1 j1,k1
, · · · , uni−1ji−1,ki−1 , v
n
1 p1,q1
, · · · , vni−1pi−1,qi−1).
Next, sequences vni pi,qi , 1 ≤ pi ≤ N2,i, 1 ≤ qi ≤M2,i, which are jointly typical with
(un1 j1,k1 , · · · , uni ji,ki , vn1 p1,q1, · · · , vni−1pi−1,qi−1)
are selected at random. Then, with probability close to 1, there exists a vni pi,qi jointly
typical with
(xn2 , u
n
1 j1,k1
, · · · , uni ji,ki , vn1 p1,q1, · · · , vni−1pi−1,qi−1),
such that if terminal X2 transmits the index pi to terminal X1, the latter can reconstruct
qi by the joint typicality of vni pi,qi with
(xn1 , u
n
1 j1,k1
, · · · , uni ji,ki , vn1 p1,q1, · · · , vni−1pi−1,qi−1).
It can be shown that the entropy of the set of random integers {(ji, ki, pi, qi), 1 ≤ i ≤ r}
is close to log(
∏r
i=1 N1,iN2,iM1,iM2,i). Hence, this set of random integers will represent
CR of rate close to 1n log(
∏r
i=1 N1,iN2,iM1,iM2,i). The subset of the random integers,
{(ki, qi), 1 ≤ i ≤ r}, will represent the SK of rate close to 1n log(
∏r
i=1 N2,iM2,i).
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